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Foreword
Ian Harper1
Road pricing was not a major focus of the 2015 Competition Policy 
Review (Harper et al. 2015). Only one of its 56 recommendations 
related to road pricing, yet the subject attracted the largest number of 
submissions of any issue before the review panel—that is, if each of the 
numerous copies of the same one-page leaflet forwarded to the secretariat 
from people staunchly opposed to road pricing was counted as a separate 
submission!
Road pricing raises hackles. The authors of the one-page leaflet asserted 
that ‘our roads belong to the people, not the government’ and ‘our roads 
have been paid for already—we shouldn’t have to pay for them again’. 
People might have said the same of dams and water mains, or even 
electricity poles and wires, but they did not. There is something about 
paying to use public roads that infuriates people far more than paying 
for water, electricity or gas, even when these utilities are also in public 
ownership.
Yet the principles for efficiently allocating scarce resources (public or 
private) to road transport are no different from those applying to other 
networked utilities such as reticulated water, electricity or gas. That is 
why the Competition Policy Review included a discussion of road pricing 
along with the pricing and regulation of other infrastructure.
Road pricing is not a new idea, nor is it untried elsewhere in the world. 
In fact, the arguments in favour of road pricing are sound, well understood 
and not especially hard to articulate, as the various chapters of this book 
1  Ian Harper chaired the Competition Policy Review that reported to the Australian Government 
in March 2015. He is a Senior Advisor to Deloitte Access Economics and a board member of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia.
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amply demonstrate. Furthermore, technological developments have 
all but eliminated technical obstacles that have frustrated road pricing 
advocates for decades. Yet the prospect of treating access to and use of 
public roads similarly to energy, communication and water reticulation 
networks seems a distant one. Or is this view too pessimistic?
Alongside the heat generated by the review panel’s discussion of road 
pricing, there was also light. At least one high-profile talkback radio host 
took me to task in an interview about road pricing, but was discomfited 
when I asked how sensible it would be for the government to pay for 
electricity out of general revenue and then just allow people to use as 
much of it as they wanted. He saw quite quickly that this would result 
in waste and inefficiency, but it had never occurred to him that roads are 
funded and allocated in exactly this way.
Since the release of the review’s final report in 2015, there have been 
other reports canvassing different aspects of road pricing, some of which 
are mentioned in this book. The general tenor of public discussion, 
meanwhile, has been curious and intrigued rather than outraged, as far as 
I have observed, encouraged by public support for road pricing offered by 
motorists’ associations, public transport enthusiasts and other road users.
So is road pricing an idea whose time has finally come? The advent of 
electric vehicles raises the prospect of some users evading even the pretence 
of a user charge in the form of the fuel excise levy. The fact that these users 
may be among the wealthier echelons of the community adds urgency to 
the issue and recasts road pricing as potentially progressive rather than 
regressive in its impact on income distribution.
Furthermore, the widening application of data analytics is familiarising 
people with a closer relationship between their behaviour and what 
they pay for a service. If car insurance premiums, for example, become 
more sensitive to the time and location of travel, road conditions and 
congestion levels, as well as driver behaviour, how easy would it be to 
calibrate a road user charge into the insurance premium? And might not 
this be encouraged by governments willing to offer a rebate of vehicle 
registration fees or fuel excise in accordance with users’ acceptance of 
time and distance-based charges for road use? As the so-called sharing 
economy encourages people to think of assets as streams of services for 
xix
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which they can pay or, alternatively, be paid, again, how natural would 
it be to package the services provided by the road together with those 
provided by the vehicle?
My sense is that the ground is shifting for advocates of road pricing. 
As the various chapters of this timely volume make clear, the academic and 
policy cases in favour of road pricing are well established. Hand-wringing 
about the lack of political will to implement this overdue reform—also 
evident in this book—is understandable, but I wonder whether it isn’t 
also misplaced.
The late Sir Harold Knight, former governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, used to speak of ‘catching the policy train’ (Uren 2015). One 
needs one’s bags packed and ticket at the ready, since the ‘policy train’ 
keeps an irregular timetable and can pull into the station unexpectedly. 
The chapters in this volume show that our bags are well and truly packed 
on this issue, and have been for some time. And now there is a slowly 
rising din of whistling and rattling to be heard. Might that be the road 
pricing policy train about to pull into the station?
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Preface: The importance 
of road pricing
Mike Mrdak1
I have often noted that one of the great things about transport is that 
everyone has an opinion but very few people have all of the facts. In addition 
to facilitating policy debate and educating our public sector leaders, the 
Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) has a 
critical role in bridging this gap by connecting government with academia 
and by delivering the research we need to get the solutions that will deliver 
economic prosperity for our future.
Productivity growth is essential to growing national income, and Australia’s 
transport network has a central role to play in achieving productivity 
growth. Transport infrastructure is both a stabiliser and a catalyst. It is 
the lifeblood of our economy, enabling people to connect with jobs and 
to get goods to market. We are a lucky country in that all the projections 
indicate that we face a future of growth. But we cannot take this for 
granted, nor can we afford to be complacent.
In recent years, Australia’s population growth has been among the fastest 
in the developed world. Sydney and Melbourne are each expected to hit 
a population of 8 million people by 2050 (ABS 2013). All of our major 
cities are expected to increase their share of the national population. 
Our cities are where most of our economic activity occurs, but they are 
also our most significant productivity drains. The scourge of congestion 
is costing us—$16.5 billion in avoidable costs in 2015–16 and, under 
current settings, about $30 billion a year by 2030 (BITRE 2015). It is 
taking people too long to get to and from work. The freight task is also 
1  Mike Mrdak AO is Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development.
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growing, and is expected to increase by 80 per cent between 2010 and 
2030, with the road and rail freight tasks projected to be close to double 
their 2010 levels by 2030 (BITRE 2014: 8).
We need to reform the way we deliver and pay for transport infrastructure 
if we are to have sustainable growth, and we know the current model is 
not sustainable.
The costs of constructing and maintaining our roads continue to rise, 
as  increasing demand adds to the total size of the road network and as 
the price of engineering and construction services also increases.
Disrupting forces loom for the transport sector as much as for any other 
industry. Fuel excise revenue has been steadily declining as more fuel-
efficient vehicles enter the market. Hybrid and fully electric vehicles will 
deliver environmental and health benefits, but will further reduce fuel 
excise revenue.
Partially and fully autonomous vehicles and the rise of ride-sharing services 
will transform how we travel. These technologies will deliver enormous 
safety and productivity benefits, but are likely to impact the number of 
drivers being licensed and vehicles being registered, placing pressure on 
state and territory revenue streams and local governments’ parking coffers.
The current system is also inequitable, with those using the road networks 
the least subsidising those who derive most benefit from it. Our transport 
system is underutilised by not matching capacity with demand management 
in the way that other utilities and service providers do. Essentially, the 
land transport network has escaped the kind of microeconomic reform 
that we now take for granted as the most efficient and equitable way to 
deliver goods and services to markets.
Road pricing is not a new concept—after all, toll roads have existed in 
Australia since Governor Macquarie established a toll road from Sydney 
to Parramatta in 1811 (BITRE 2016)—and distance-based charging 
schemes have been trialled and implemented with varying success overseas. 
We need look no further than our colleagues in New Zealand to see how 
distance-based charging mechanisms can be used effectively in the heavy 
vehicle space, and how sovereign road funds can be ring-fenced for use for 
reinvestment in the road network.
xxiii
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But how would full market reform of roads look in a federation such as 
Australia? While we do not yet know the answer to this, I believe we are 
now at a tipping point, where momentum for reform is beyond doubt. 
In its responses to the 2016 Australian Infrastructure Plan (Infrastructure 
Australia 2016) and the 2015 Competition Policy Review (Harper et al. 
2015), the Australian Government explicitly supported investigating 
cost-reflective road pricing as a long-term reform option, and committed 
to establish a study chaired by an eminent Australian to look into the 
potential impacts of road pricing reform on road users. The challenges we 
face in this space are manifold and complex and we still have a long road 
ahead of us, but with advocacy for reform coming from interest groups 
as diverse as governments, private transport companies, peak industry 
bodies, policy think tanks and state motoring clubs, I see more support 
than ever for changing the way we provide and fund our roads.
This collection of articles from some of the most respected researchers, 
economists and public sector leaders on road provision and pricing is 
an invaluable addition to the policy literature. I thank ANZSOG for 
its initiative in publishing this important collection and commend the 
articles to everyone with an interest in reforming how we deliver and pay 
for Australia’s roads.
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Introduction: Shaping the road 
pricing and provision debate
Michael de Percy
Road pricing in Australia is shaping up to be an incredibly important 
policy instrument to change the behaviour of road users and to address 
the decline in federal fuel excise revenues. The current system of 
recovering basic costs from road use treats roads as a free-access ‘public 
good’ and, aside from toll roads, users do not pay directly for their use of 
the road network or contribution to congestion. The present system of 
levy charging (fuel excise and registration charges) has little impact on the 
behaviour of road users and, if the current system remains unchanged, traffic 
congestion in metropolitan areas is set to cost some $30 billion by 2030 
(BITRE 2015). For most non-commercial road users, the cost of using the 
road network is limited to a fixed annual state government access charge 
(vehicle registration and licence fee) and the federal fuel excise (currently 
40.1 cents per litre). However, since the early 2000s, more fuel-efficient 
vehicles have reduced fuel usage overall and, consequently, revenue from 
the fuel excise has been steadily declining (BITRE 2016). Further, the 
existing user charges (fuel excise and vehicle registration) may discriminate 
marginally between vehicle types and capacities, but not between heavy 
and light users of roads (although heavy users will necessarily pay more 
fuel excise). Moreover, fuel excise is collected as consolidated revenue by 
the Commonwealth, and therefore provides no market signals on the 
demand for particular roads. Consequently, estimates used to direct road 
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provision and maintenance routinely prove to be inaccurate, and often 
simply increasing the capacity of roads reinforces the behaviour that led 
to traffic congestion in the first instance.
Other networked infrastructure or utility services provided by 
governments—such as water, gas, power and telecommunications—have 
been provided on a user-pays basis since market reforms were introduced 
beginning in the late 1980s, yet the road network remains the least 
reformed infrastructure sector. This means that the change in behaviour 
evidenced in the efficient use of water, home heating, electrical power and 
telecommunications services—particularly in households—is not evident 
in our patterns of road use. While user charging has been adopted on private 
sector–funded tunnels and tollways, these charges are based on investment 
returns and not on changing the behaviour of users across the network. 
Whereas reforms in other networked infrastructure sectors removed 
the model of effectively taxing businesses to cross-subsidise households, 
road funding models—by relying on indirect taxes that do not relate to 
the volume of usage—tend to cross-subsidise heavy users through light 
or even non-users of roads. Effectively, this leads to cross-subsidisation 
of road infrastructure and impacts on the supposedly competitive rail 
sector—hence the Australasian Railway Association’s (2010: 21) support 
for the introduction of road pricing to ensure a level playing field between 
land transport modes. Further, where prices do not reflect volume of use, 
economic inefficiencies may result from externalities such as higher safety 
risks and further congestion and, subsequently, further degradation of 
roads. Changing transport behaviours is an important solution to traffic 
congestion, but the current system provides few incentives for users 
to reduce their reliance on road travel.
The primary purpose of a road user direct payment system (which might 
include volume-of-use charges combined with variable congestion 
charging during peak periods in central business districts) is to change 
commuter behaviour while at the same time rationalising road provision 
to better align it with strategic productivity considerations. Improvements 
in productivity require reduced traffic congestion and more effective 
use of transport infrastructure investment funds to deliver strategically 
important infrastructure. Building more and more roads into the future is 
unsustainable, and other approaches—such as changing traditional work 
and school hours—are unlikely to be achievable in the short term. Private 
sector investment entities have indicated that there are funds available 
for significant public–private partnerships (PPPs), and unsolicited 
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infrastructure proposals, such as Transurban’s recent East–West Link bid, 
are becoming an accepted way for governments to exploit infrastructure 
development opportunities.
But road reform is not just about roads. Transport reform may also 
contribute to other policy objectives, such as increasing physical activity 
or  reducing environmental impacts through bicycle riding, the use of 
smaller vehicles (such as mopeds) or increased use of public transport. 
However, commuters are unlikely to change their behaviour under the 
current regime because existing road user charges are more akin to blunt 
access taxes, where, once paid, a consumer can exploit the provision 
to their heart’s content. The charges convey negligible signals to road 
users about the costs of using particular roads, or to infrastructure providers 
about the demand for different roads. Furthermore, while investment in 
mass transit systems is under way—such as the Sydney and Melbourne 
metro systems, with major services opening in 2024—these systems will 
offer an alternative, large-scale option for commuters in Sydney and 
Melbourne. Introducing user charging to coincide with the availability 
of mass transit systems provides an ideal time to reform the planning, 
provision and maintenance of the road network, and incentivising 
behavioural changes that will help to decrease traffic congestion.
Previously, governments were prepared to tackle entrenched political 
obstacles to reform in introducing user-pays systems in public utilities 
and telecommunications services, but technological limitations, 
combined with entrenched interests, prevented reform of road pricing 
and provision. However, despite Professor Ian Harper’s 2014 review of 
productivity acknowledging that technology is no longer an impediment 
to the implementation of a road user-pays system, and most transport-
related interest groups calling for a road pricing and hypothecated 
funding system, there has been remarkably little policy action to date 
(Harper et al. 2015). Indeed, increased road provision has recently 
become a major federal election policy platform, utilising the existing 
funding model. As a result, the policy problem has become much more 
than how to adopt a particular pricing regime that will cover construction 
costs while encouraging more efficient use of transport infrastructure. 
Indeed, numerous technological and institutional mechanisms are well 
advanced overseas, already in implementation and have proven capability 
in delivering transport infrastructure efficiencies. The policy problem 
in Australia—like many other policy problems—relates to the impetus 
for reform and lack of political prioritisation. For instance, within the 
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
6
transport industry more generally, there is broad support for road charging 
reform on a user-pays basis. Yet, when economic or political opinion 
leaders—as opposed to industry advocates—meet, transport reform tends 
to be relegated to the ‘too-hard basket’ and supplanted by seemingly 
more pressing macroeconomic issues. Some commentators may argue 
that a focus on economic restructuring remains a pressing priority, but 
this places the transport industry in a difficult position: reform is easily 
achievable technically, yet incredibly difficult to implement without the 
necessary political will or the incentives for commuters to accept reform. 
It  is clear that transport reform cannot be achieved by the transport 
industry working in isolation; a consolidated reform effort is required.
This book addresses two major questions that need to be answered 
if reform of the road pricing and provision system is to stimulate policy 
debate outside the industry:
• How can the terms of the public debate concerning infrastructure 
planning, provision and pricing be ‘shifted’ to address the long-term 
problems that will be brought about by not acting?
• How can commuters and road users be encouraged to develop 
a  better understanding of longer-term issues of choice, pricing and 
interoperability of transport infrastructure?
This book highlights the major challenges to reform by bringing together 
some of the latest thinking on road pricing and provision in Australia, 
along with case studies from Singapore and New Zealand. The book 
addresses issues relating to three major transport infrastructure policy 
themes developed in consultation with the Australian Department of 
Infrastructure and Regional Development: 1) finding ways to better 
align the long-term planning of transport infrastructure with usage and 
productivity imperatives; 2) tackling the array of political and attitudinal 
impediments to achieving better infrastructure pricing and user-pays 
modes of pricing; and 3) translating technical capabilities and economic 
pricing theories into practice. While the book is intended to inform and 
stimulate discussion about future directions for transport infrastructure 
policy, and argue for a  more sustainable and systemic mode of cost 
recovery, it does not attempt to advocate a single preferred solution to 
the current policy problems. Indeed, specific (or even optimal) policy 
solutions designed to address traffic congestion or improve freight 
movement are often mired in conflict with existing political realities. 
Infrastructure planning is frequently overshadowed by other concerns, 
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such as private property rights, privacy rights and entrenched interests 
that make it all but impossible for governments to put the broader public 
interest forcibly ahead of narrow self-interest. Nonetheless, as Australia’s 
major metropolitan centres continue to grow and—as we will demonstrate 
later—fuel excise revenues continue to decline, better integrated planning 
and some form of co-contribution charging will become increasingly 
important to ensure Australia’s continued productivity and a better 
quality of life for citizens and commuters. The Harper (Harper et al. 
2015) and Henry (Henry et  al. 2010) reviews acknowledged that road 
reforms are among the most difficult to implement and will need to be 
conducted as part of a broader tax reform package. This book aims to 
provide a platform for elevating transport reform beyond the bounds 
of the transport industry—an important first step if road pricing and 
provision are to become key parts of the current reform agenda.
The book is divided into four sections. In Chapter 2, I consider where 
we are now and how we got here in developing a system of pricing and 
provision of road infrastructure. It has been noted that road reform cannot 
be done in isolation, and we find the story of roads was intertwined with 
rail and coastal shipping from the earliest days. In Section 2, we look 
to the long-term planning aspects of transport infrastructure. Marion 
Terrill considers the ways to reframe transport planning in Australia by 
shifting the debate away from an investment-only focus on big projects 
to considering transport as a complex social system interconnected with 
many spheres of policy. Philip Davies discusses Infrastructure Australia’s 
strategic role in infrastructure planning, the importance of long-term 
and intermodal planning and preparing for population growth in our 
major metropolitan areas. Expertise contributed by Teik Soon Looi 
provides a case study of Singapore’s world-class transport management 
network, outlining the challenges in reducing reliance on private vehicles 
and trialling new technologies in user charging, introducing advanced 
big data analysis for demand management and, soon, autonomous 
vehicles. Singapore’s example in using market signals and incentives and 
disincentives to radically change transport behaviours provides interesting 
food for thought. Singapore is one of the few Asian capital cities 
(along with Tokyo) where transport mobility is effortless and congestion 
has been almost eliminated; the quality of life and movement in these 
planned transport cities compares outstandingly with other regional 
centres such as Jakarta, Beijing or Bangkok.
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In Section 3, we look to how transport differs from other network 
technologies and at recent work on assessing the various options for road 
pricing and funding reform options. Alex Robson provides an economist’s 
perspective on the difficulties governments will face in trying to convince 
motorists that reform is a good idea. He highlights how recent experience 
demonstrates how forecasts are rarely accurate and how a rigorous cost–
benefit analysis can help in reducing policy errors. Brendon Lyon argues 
for a detailed public inquiry into road pricing and outlines the user-based 
approach adopted by Infrastructure Partnerships Australia in assessing 
the various options for road pricing. Interestingly, since the release of 
Infrastructure Australia’s 15-year plan (see Chapter 4), the Turnbull 
Government has announced that an ‘eminent Australian’ will be chosen to 
lead a study into the costs and benefits of road pricing in the near future. 
Peter Winder concludes this section with a case study of Auckland’s recent 
attempt to address shortcomings in infrastructure funding. He  argues 
for the necessity and value of making political trade-offs explicit and 
transparent, and ensuring all stakeholders clearly understand both the 
trade-offs and associated constraints in initiating reform.
In the final section, we consider how to turn theory into practice. 
Professor  Gary Banks draws on his long experience as the head of the 
Productivity Commission to detail the practical problems of addressing 
the concerns of the winners and losers of reform processes. The National 
Competition Policy reforms often faced stiff opposition, but strong 
technical and advisory support within key departments and political offices, 
and the importance of ‘policy champions’, are among the many practical 
lessons from these past successes. He argues that the need for change must 
become part of the policy narrative and it is up to political leaders to 
make a well-argued case that reform will make life better for Australian 
citizens. John Wanna concludes with an assessment of the prospects for 
and feasibility of reform pathways proposed by a selection of the more 
influential recent reports. His assessment considers the opportunities and 
challenges entailed when weighing up the various reform options and, in 
particular, highlights the implications for federal–state relations.
This monograph seeks to advance the road reform agenda by presenting 
some of the latest thinking on road pricing and provision from a variety 
of disciplinary approaches. It stresses the need for reform to ensure 
Australians can enjoy the benefits of efficient and sustainable transport 
infrastructure as our population and major cities continue to grow. Traffic 
congestion is avoidable, but we must act soon. The chapters presented 
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here all point to the need for change; the expertise and the technology 
are available, and the various reform options have been mapped out in 
some detail. It is time for the policy debate to shift to how—rather than 
whether—road reform should progress.
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Road pricing and road provision 
in Australia: Where are we 
and how did we get here?
Michael de Percy
In the beginning
British settlement of Australia began in 1788 and, from the outset, 
governments of all persuasions imposed strong ‘statist’ traditions of 
public ownership and control of important infrastructure. Economic 
development  and physical access across the continent were dependent 
on statist investment, construction and maintenance of crucial 
infrastructure—often called the ‘colonial liberalist’ legacy by subsequent 
historians. State intervention was accepted as a basic requirement of social 
progress and economic development and, over time, Australia became 
locked in a ‘path dependency’ paradigm reliant on state provision and 
regulation of vital infrastructure. Accordingly, the provision of modes of 
transport across the continent and the policy dictates associated with the 
crucial issues of provision and usage were framed within a particularly 
statist mindset. Roads, rail, shipping and river transport, as well as bridges, 
jetties and wharves (and later air transport), were all historically financed 
and governed by dirigisme and by institutional arrangements, rather than 
market-based measures such as private investment, private provision and 
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
12
consumer charging.1 Arguably, command-driven public provision 
and the arbitrary governmental regulation of transport infrastructure 
came at a cost to the overall productivity and efficiency of each type of 
infrastructure and the interconnectivity between them. And we are still 
living with the legacy of this pattern of state activism in the funding and 
provision of transport infrastructure.
The development of the railways across Australia is a good example. 
Colonies, and later states, invested heavily in extensive rail networks, 
opening up land and forests, connecting farms and towns and servicing 
urban areas. Rail was more important than roads. States funded these 
networks with capital borrowed from British banks, thereby generating 
enormous state debts at the subnational level. While the Commonwealth 
gradually had to assist in repaying these debts, the states guarded their 
individual rail systems with monopolistic regulations imposed on 
usage (and, to some extent, by formulating non-standard specifications 
such as different rail gauges—an early form of regulatory protection). 
Rail  preferencing, especially for the movement of freight, was a feature 
of Australian development for almost a century. As Hancock (1930: 55) 
argued during this period, Australia ‘[h]as come to look upon the State 
as a vast public utility, whose duty is to provide the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number’.
He continued (Hancock 1930: 110, 112–13), using the vast state railways 
as an example:
Let us consider the railways, for upon them rests the economic structure 
of each one of the States. In 1927–28 nearly one-half of the existing 
public debt of the States had been incurred on their behalf. In that year 
the deficits to which all the Australian railways confessed amounted to 
about £5,500,000. Yet in the three years prior to the war the railways had 
(at least in appearance) paid their way; they had even contributed to the 
various treasuries an aid of about £800,000. The difficulties of railways 
in post-war years, and particularly the difficulty of competing with 
road transport, are notorious all the world over … So, then the railways 
become an instrument for subsidizing ‘development’, for promoting 
decentralization for protecting local industry, for cherishing Naboth, for 
inaugurating the new social order. But this is confusion. The railways are 
not really an effective instrument for these assorted purposes. All these 
1  There were a few isolated examples of private provision of infrastructure—such as bridges and toll 
roads—but these were usually gradually incorporated into state-provided systems (see Sturgess 1996).
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miscellaneous demands upon their good nature make it more difficult for 
them to fulfil their own essential purpose, which is to provide adequate 
transport for goods and passengers at the lowest possible cost.
Hence, rail transport dominated the movement of freight and passengers 
until a 1954 decision by the Privy Council in London ended the 
protection of state government–owned railways (The Age 1954: 3). 
This decision to break the rail monopoly was historically significant in 
that, once these institutional barriers were removed, the majority share 
of the volume of freight moved by land transport shifted from rail to 
road. Coastal shipping—which was to some extent in competition with 
rail—had steadily declined and effectively disappeared from the transport 
policy narrative by this time (Fitchett 1976: 7). Indeed, only very recently 
have the institutional arrangements for coastal shipping been identified 
as barriers to increasing its share of bulk freight transport (Standing 
Committee on Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and 
Local Government and King 2008).
The legacy of the regulatory arrangements regarding rail freight, shipping 
and road haulage did not encourage active competition to increase 
efficiencies and contain costs between the different transport modes, 
or lead to better integration and interoperability. Indeed, the reverse 
occurred. When the highly regulated institutional arrangements that 
governed the state-owned and operated rail networks (which also allowed 
them to recover their costs) were eventually dismantled, the state rail 
systems soon became poorly performing commercial ventures, unable to 
pay their way, and experienced a long-term historical decline accompanied 
by the wholesale closure of branch-line rail networks. By contrast, road 
freight transport had been captured by private hauliers and transport 
firms who, along with passenger transporters and private motorists, all 
viewed roads and the road systems as free ‘public goods’, provided from 
general taxation by governments to connect regions and communities. 
Such thinking meant that while governments were pressured to invest in 
new roads and development road projects, they did not raise sufficient 
funds from road users to fund road building or to reflect the costs of road 
maintenance. In other words, while governments were forced to expand 
their road networks, it was difficult for them to efficiently charge road 
users for the full costs of provision and capture negative externalities such 
as the cost of maintenance. This discrepancy created subsequent problems 
for intermodal competition in that the cost of road transport was heavily 
subsidised, whereas rail was meant to be operated on a cost-recovery 
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basis, even though many rail lines, in fact, lost money. Moreover, 
governments found that they were expected to replicate the existing rail 
corridors and connections, which, arguably, led to the misallocation of 
investment dollars.
A second legacy of the earlier dominance of rail monopolies resulted 
in a general decline in road provision and maintenance (BTE 1977: 387). 
With the changed regulatory environment after the 1950s, and as freight 
and passenger movement became more reliant on the road network, 
state governments with relatively small tax bases struggled to fund 
improvements to their road systems. This gradually led to a greater role for 
the Commonwealth to fund national highways through the annual tied 
grants programs. Increased specific commitments by the Commonwealth 
for the funding of major road infrastructure improvements have been a 
feature of federal–state relations since the 1960s. However, despite the 
Commonwealth’s involvement and the increasing importance of the road 
network, and the extent of the National Competition Policy reforms of 
the 1980s, Australia’s road infrastructure remains the ‘least reformed of 
all infrastructure sectors, with institutional arrangements around funding 
and provision remaining much the same as they were 20 years ago’ (Harper 
et al. 2015: 28–30).
Regulatory reform in the road transport sector has focused mainly on 
issues of road safety, vehicle inspection and heavy vehicle regulation. 
As  the quantity and capacity of heavy road vehicles increased, 
governmental attention to road usage increased exponentially—directed 
mainly towards the levels of investment in and maintenance of roads, and 
often related to safety measures. By the 2010s, while rail still dominated 
bulk freight transportation (carrying cargo such as coal, iron ore and 
grain; see Figure 2.1), road haulage dominated the non-bulk freight task 
(Figure 2.2). This pattern has been manifested since deregulation of road 
transport took effect in the early 1970s (BTE 1977). In recent decades, 
the propensity of rail to carry bulk freight and for non-bulk freight to go 
by road has increased sharply. By contrast, coastal shipping tonnages have 
remained largely stable, although the sector’s share of the freight task has 
declined in relation to road and rail. The 2008 Coastal Shipping Inquiry 
conducted by the Australian Parliament acknowledged that this declining 
share in the freight task means more freight on road and rail services, 
which are already under pressure.
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Figure 2.1 Bulk freight task by mode (billion tonne kilometres)
Source: BITRe (2016: Table T 2 .1a) .
Figure 2.2 Non-bulk freight task by mode (billion tonne kilometres)
Source: BITRe (2016: Table T 2 .1b) .
The complex relationship between road and rail transport in Australia 
not only has a long history, but also has many dimensions and paradoxes. 
As railways were deployed, there was a tendency for roads to be left to 
decline or remain unsealed. Until the 1954 Privy Council decision, rail 
passenger travel was heavily cross-subsidised by requirements that all freight 
of a certain size and moving over a certain distance had to travel by rail. As 
a result, state railways tended to operate at a surplus. Only after the Privy 
Council decision enabled competition from road transport did the state 
railways begin to run at a loss. So, over time, the waxing and waning of the 
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road and rail transport industries were largely due not to the commercial 
disciplines of the market, but to the consequences of  policy decisions 
and the regulatory framework. The pattern of ‘trading off’ between road 
and  rail modes may have occurred out of economic necessity and, for 
the most part, the supply of passenger and freight transport options in 
the past was at least adequate to meet the demands of population growth 
and the level of economic activity. In the present, however, the current 
supply of both road and rail transport infrastructure in Australia is 
nowhere near meeting demand. Furthermore, projections into the next 
30 years suggest the consequences of inadequate investment in transport 
infrastructure, coupled with the inefficient transport behaviour of users, 
will lead to significant costs and a potential lowering of the standard of 
living. Nevertheless, ways of dealing with these issues have been proposed 
for some time.
Changing paradigms: Pricing, planning 
and behaviour
Celebrated economists and urban planners such as Arthur Pigou (pricing) 
and Le Corbusier (planning) identified issues affecting the pricing and 
planning of road networks as early as the 1920s. Pigou (1920) proposed 
a tax to equal negative externalities, and his ideas were taken up by 
William Vickrey (1948: 227; 1963: 457), who saw them as a means to 
introduce congestion charging to influence the behaviour of road users 
and investors. In planning, Le Corbusier (1987) examined the long-term 
impact of historical legacies on the roads of Paris from the Middle Ages, 
which were based on the easiest routes for pack animals to negotiate. 
He considered this pattern obsolete and contemplated the complete 
replacement of existing thoroughfares to make them more suited for 
automobiles. For Le Corbusier, the complete redesign and rebuilding of 
road systems was required, rather than tinkering with existing networks, 
which would not solve the basic problems.
Australian governments have, over time, acknowledged these two major 
issues of pricing and planning. However, the challenges of recalibrating the 
entire system of transportation have proved to be politically difficult. 
The  task would have involved two aspects. First, governments would 
have had to undo the legacy of an (inadequate) cost-recovery funding 
system that has been collected predominantly through general taxes and 
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flat levies, with no obvious correlation between road use and taxes paid. 
Second, and following that, governments would have to overcome the 
legacies of past transport infrastructure planning and design, where rail 
routes, for example, were based on the capacity of steam locomotives, 
ventured to remote parts of the states and connected long-exhausted 
remote mining ventures or small rural towns. In more recent times, these 
routes did not efficiently connect the major country towns, nor were they 
optimal to provide services to travellers.
In Australia, road and rail transport infrastructure has remained largely 
under government ownership and control, and therefore negative 
externalities have been captured through taxation more generally 
(and often via policies focused on specific issues such as transport safety, 
noise, environmental pollution and urban renewal). Further, state 
governments have adopted a variety of planning responses, ranging from 
the organic (Sydney, Brisbane) to the planned (Melbourne, Adelaide, 
Perth). There is some irony, however, in the different outcomes of the 
two approaches. For example, Sydney addressed the traffic congestion 
problem created by rail level crossings early in its history, partly because 
of geography, but also because of the sprawling nature of the city and 
its traffic routes. Melbourne, on the other hand, with its light rail 
network and orderly road system, did not focus on the removal of level 
crossings until an allocation in the 2015–16 budget, with the removal 
of some 50  level crossings required to improve safety and congestion, 
to be conducted over eight years. Further, Melbourne has only recently 
addressed the legacies of the light rail network’s outdated congestion-
causing rail tracks crisscrossing the centre of the city. The combination 
of pricing and planning legacies has led to numerous responses from 
government, but usually pricing emerges as a way to fund critical new 
infrastructure that may or may not have been in the ‘pipeline’ of major 
infrastructure projects.
The challenges created by historical legacies are numerous and relate 
to issues ranging from planning approval (such as ‘corridor preservation’) to 
behaviours around the use of the infrastructure (such as an expectation 
that roads are public goods and therefore their use should be free to 
all). Road user charges, or tolls, have been used sparingly by Australian 
governments to recover the costs of investment—in particular, for 
infrastructure projects such as the Sydney Harbour Bridge and Brisbane’s 
Gateway Bridge and for a web of tunnels carrying freeway traffic under 
city centres, rivers and harbours. While improved engineering methods 
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allowed the Hume Highway to be rerouted to bypass smaller towns and 
to make road travel between Sydney and Melbourne faster and safer, 
many of the existing rail lines in New South Wales (NSW), Victoria and 
South Australia still follow routes designed around the limitations of 
steam-driven engines to connect farming communities. While there are 
now more private toll roads and private railways in Australia, road and 
rail infrastructure generally remains under government control, with the 
Commonwealth assuming an increasing political role for the allocation 
of road funding. In recent years, the Commonwealth has sought to claim 
some ‘dividend’ from its partial asset ownership in such projects, but states 
and territories have been reluctant to engage with them on this matter; 
the Commonwealth could impose its preferences by insisting payments 
of dividends from recipient states become a condition of specific-purpose 
payment funding (and most likely the states would be reluctantly forced 
to accede).
Throughout the various states and territories, existing road user charges 
are based on a ‘two-part tariff’ model, where road users pay a flat ‘network 
access charge’ (state-based motor vehicle registration fees tied to vehicle 
size and/or location) and a quasi user charge based on fuel consumption 
(the Commonwealth’s fuel excise on petrol, diesel and liquid petroleum 
gas, or LPG). However, there is no obvious link between these charges 
and investment in and maintenance of roads. Nor is there a close link 
between these fees and levies and actual patterns of usage or usage in 
times of high congestion. For instance, a driver travelling 10,000 km in 
Sydney’s central business district (CBD) would pay exactly the same fuel 
excise as a driver covering the same distances on virtually unused country 
roads. Increasingly, fuel efficiency has also reduced the amount of revenue 
raised through the fuel excise, with those owning older cars tending to pay 
more for their use of the roads than those driving more efficient vehicles. 
While heavy vehicles pay higher fees for road use and access, there is no 
direct link between the damage done by these vehicles and the resulting 
cost of maintenance.
When the goods and services tax (GST) was introduced in 2000, 
the  indexation of fuel excise was temporarily discontinued. Despite the 
fuel excise being increased biannually in line with the consumer price 
index (CPI) since 2014, revenue from fuel excise continues to decline 
and local governments—responsible for the majority of roads—still 
struggle to find adequate funds to maintain existing roads. Meanwhile, 
the Commonwealth—which has no direct constitutional responsibility 
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for roads, and in fact owns or controls very few roads on the continent—
has taken on a greater role in funding roads through successive federal 
governments using road funding as a major policy platform for 
electioneering purposes. The result has been to increase the availability 
and capacity of roads, without an increase in funding to maintain either 
existing or new roads.
Australia has reached the point where, in the future, the consequences of 
‘doing nothing’ will inevitably lead to increasing costs. This will be due 
to massive traffic congestion in the major cities, fuelled by population 
growth, rising affluence and unchecked demand. Moreover, there will 
be a decreased capacity for freight and passenger movement on the road 
network due to a lack of upgrading and maintenance. When combined 
with the lack of investment in alternative transport modes—particularly 
high-speed rail—there are few incentives for motorists or truck operators 
to change their behaviour and reduce demand on the existing road 
infrastructure. Evidence from overseas jurisdictions, such as California, 
clearly indicates that states cannot build their way out of traffic congestion; 
they merely add to it exponentially. Indeed, increasing the capacity of 
roads simply increases the demand for them, and reinforces existing road 
use behaviours. It creates perverse logics and outcomes.
Following this argument, it is apparent that two things need to occur 
on the policy front. First, there needs to be an increase in investment in 
alternative transport modes, particularly rail, which can move freight and 
greater numbers of people efficiently and speedily. Second, there needs 
to be a way to modify the current behaviour of road users to encourage 
efficient use of existing roads. Planning and pricing, then, are the keys to 
improving the efficiency of passenger and freight transport in Australia. 
The problems, of course, are first, how to prioritise and fund infrastructure 
projects and, second, and much more importantly, how to garner political 
support for an appropriate road pricing system so that the patterns of usage 
change to facilitate network efficiencies and maximise user satisfaction.
At the heart of the public policy problem is the entrenched perception of 
roads as a free public good for which users do not need to pay (despite 
roads not being wholly a ‘public good’ in definitional terms; one person’s 
enjoyment of the good can impact on another’s enjoyment through 
congestion). Users see roads and their usage of them more or less as an 
inalienable ‘right’, and itemised payments for the use of roads through tolls 
and charges as an annoying infringement of these same rights. Road tolls 
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of even miniscule levels irritate passenger vehicle drivers beyond belief, 
and where specific toll-based infrastructure is built to alleviate congestion 
it is not clear that truck drivers or tradespeople who have to pay the 
toll personally (not their firms) will take the optimal option. Part of the 
problem is that road users do not experience the charges they are already 
paying for road access and use as that use actually occurs. Tolls, however, 
provide a point-of-sale signal, whether a beep on the dashboard or an 
online credit card payment, which clearly links usage with the price.
This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of a direct link 
between road  user charges and investment in transport infrastructure 
and maintenance. The current two-part tariff does not provide users 
(or,  indeed,  investors) with price signals that can effectively modify 
behaviour. This occurs because there is no information provided to the 
consumer at the point of sale that directly correlates with their use of 
the infrastructure (DIRD 2016: 41). In comparison, consumers of energy, 
water and telecommunications services will modify their behaviours in 
the use of these services because there is a clear price signal at the point 
of sale, and they incur an itemised bill. Hence, the more consumers use 
the services, the more they pay; therefore, patterns of usage are necessarily 
constrained by the consumer’s budget and their motivation to save money. 
Road usage is not so rationed or priced to change unnecessary usage or 
usage in peak congestion periods. We pay the price of congested usage 
indirectly in time by waiting in queues and enduring endless traffic jams, 
but we do not count the collective cost of these wasted hours, fuel, mental 
frustration and opportunities in terms of what other useful things those 
trapped in the endless tailgates could undertake.
While paying excise taxes for fuel does represent a quasi user charge, as the 
number of fuel-efficient vehicles increases, these price signals are decreasing 
accordingly. Yet, road users continue to use roads without paying directly 
for the proportionate use of them (or the congestion they cause) and, 
as the revenue from the fuel excise declines, governments increasingly pick 
up the tab for the supply and maintenance of road infrastructure, despite 
increasing demand by road users. This means that low-volume users of 
roads, and those with less fuel-efficient vehicles, are cross-subsidising 
high-volume users. It also means that the true cost of road freight is not 
being captured in the price of freighted goods. Consumers still pay the 
price for these externalities through increased taxes and other opaque 
input charges, but the price is not visible to the consumer, nor does it 
factor to change their behaviour.
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With general levies and charges there are no clear signals for the demand 
for transport infrastructure beyond the collective voice of road users in 
their dissatisfaction with traffic congestion or poorly maintained roads. 
The same principle applies to road freight. Rather than improving rail 
freight services, policy thinking is dominated by road freight to such 
an extent that addressing shortfalls in the non-bulk freight task has led 
to calls to increase the capacity of freight trucks—from B-double to 
B-triple. Such thinking sees consideration of the externalities relating 
to  road safety, increased maintenance costs due to rampant damage of 
road surfaces and increased congestion on major freight routes relegated 
to the achievement of the freight carrying task. It is interesting that road 
freight, using vehicles with ever-increasing capacities, is being considered 
on the Hume Highway (connecting Sydney and Melbourne) when there 
is an existing viable railway line between the two major cities. Given that 
a freight train can move maybe 1,000 times more than a single B-triple 
truck and, additionally, the rail network suffers less from use than the road 
network, it is arguable that externalities relating to road network use are 
not being captured appropriately in the price of road freight.
Not surprisingly, then, rail industry advocates have been major supporters 
of road pricing reform, with a rail inquiry and numerous reports by 
the Australasian Railway Association recommending road pricing as a 
means to improve intermodal competition. It is interesting that the rail 
industry is now in a similar position to that of the road transport industry 
before the 1954 Privy Council decision. Then, competition between rail 
and road was prevented by legislation. Now, competition between rail and 
road is reduced by the subsidisation of road transport inherent in the 
two-part tariff system and the funding of road infrastructure through 
unrelated revenue streams. Rail transport tends to be more expensive 
as  the price of rail travel reflects more of the costs of inputs and usage 
than the price of road travel. It may be said, then, that the existing 
system encourages freight behaviours based on inadequate pricing signals. 
Rather than encourage improvements in rail infrastructure, perceptions 
of cheaper prices associated with road freight, particularly at the point of 
sale, encourage increased capacity in the existing system, leading to the 
problems discussed above.
Similar behaviours can be observed among business investors weighing 
up potentially profitable infrastructural investments, despite increased 
interest from superannuation and private equity funds in investing in 
infrastructure (Anthony 2016; Desloires 2016). The preponderance 
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of infrastructure ‘announcements’ by various Australian governments 
for electioneering purposes (pork-barrelling), coupled with established 
attitudes and behaviours towards road usage, has tended to restrict 
the private sector’s role in building infrastructure to public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) with government. While this is not necessarily a 
bad thing, it means that transport infrastructure is captured by political 
processes rather than by clear economic principles. Conversely, it may 
be said that there is more to life than economic efficiency, but given the 
economic consequences of the status quo are forecast to reduce Australia’s 
living standards and, indeed, our quality of life, it is important that the way 
we conduct planning, provision and use of transport infrastructure leads 
to increases in economic efficiency. There is much literature to support the 
need for Australia to do so (see, for example, BITRE 2014; DIRD 2014, 
2016; Harper et al. 2015; Henry et al. 2010; Juturna Consulting 2012; 
Laird 2014; OECD 2010, 2012, 2014, 2017), and motorists in any of 
Australia’s major metropolitan centres are surely aware of the extent of 
the existing problems with traffic congestion. But whether those same 
motorists (and also governments) are prepared to change their behaviours 
to enable the required efficiencies to occur is quite another matter. And, 
for as long as road funding and provision remain a political rather than 
an economic issue, without strong leadership, transport reform is unlikely 
to occur.
Revenue, expenditure and changing 
perceptions
The reaction of the Australian public to talk of road user charges has 
typically remained negative. And the tabloid press has milked the outrage 
for all it is worth. For example, after colluding with the Sunday Telegraph 
about the issue of road user charging (O’Rourke 2015), the Daily Telegraph 
tested a mooted charge of 1.5 cents per kilometre (based on a similar 
voluntary scheme in Oregon) or a $10 congestion charge (which would 
appear to be based on the London zonal congestion charges) and put these 
propositions to Sydney residents (O’Rourke 2015). Predictably, there was 
community outrage. One respondent—a locksmith who travelled 70 km 
a day for his business—preferred things to stay as they were. He believed 
it was ‘not fair if we end up having to pay more to do our jobs just because 
someone wants to get more cars off the road’. To have to pay for the use 
of the road—which, to him, was a necessity for his business—even if 
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a fuel rebate was applied, would see him ‘out of pocket’. Further, the 
Sunday Telegraph’s editorial challenged the fairness of paying a user charge 
on a road system that was effectively a daily car park, especially when 
there was no other modal choice available for many users and commuters 
(Saleh 2015). For users to be asked to pay a charge for use of a road that 
they seem to have no choice other than to use can be seen as little more 
than revenue raising, rather than a means of changing behaviours and 
providing market information. For policymakers, such negative views of 
road pricing will not be easy to overcome—much like voters’ aversion 
to a value-added or GST consumption tax during the late stages of the 
twentieth century.
The implementation of the GST (see Chapter 7, this volume) provides an 
interesting counterfactual to the potential doom surrounding road pricing 
and, indeed, lessons about how road pricing can be introduced. After years 
of political debate over the introduction of a consumption tax, it was only 
through the leadership of John Howard and Peter Costello that the GST 
came to be. Former Liberal opposition leader John Hewson’s infamous 
GST ‘birthday cake’ demonstrated the political problem of trying to 
explain something seemingly simple but technically very complex. 
Nevertheless, once introduced and despite the political trade-offs with 
Democrats’ leader Meg Lees resulting in a rather narrow conception of 
the proposed broad-based consumption tax, the GST has not resulted 
in the doom and gloom predicted before its introduction. Yet the GST 
was a major reform that, accompanied with lower income taxes, has been 
generally positive in its impact on individuals and businesses. That is not 
to say the GST does not require further reform, but the biggest sticking 
point today with road funding (see Chapter 10) is how we reform the 
broken system where revenues historically viewed as the purview of the 
states and collected by state treasuries will be collected and redistributed 
by the Commonwealth.
Nonetheless, behavioural change by road users will be key to reducing 
congestion and improving the efficiency of Australia’s transport 
infrastructure. Road and rail infrastructure spending has increased as 
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past decade and grew 
from 0.69 per cent in 1986–87 to 1.23 per cent in 2015–16 (Figure 2.3). 
Clearly, the problem is not principally a lack of infrastructure spending, 
but a case of using the existing infrastructure more efficiently. Moreover, 
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road-related revenue and expenditure have been steadily increasing on 
all fronts and at all levels of government. The details of each part of the 
revenue and expenditure regime are worth briefly noting.
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Figure 2.3 Road and rail infrastructure expenditure as a percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP)
Sources: ABS (2017a: Table 3; 2017b: Table 11) .
Total public sector road-related revenue has steadily risen in the past 
decade, allowing for the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Figure 2.4). 
However, the mix of revenue items has changed, with increases in state 
and territory revenues (Figure 2.5) the most significant growth area in 
public sector revenue increase (along with the GST on road-related 
consumption). Of these, the largest growth is evident in the proportion 
of vehicle registration fees and tolls. While increases in tolls reflect the use 
of relevant parts of the road network, the network access charge (vehicle 
registrations)—which tends to reinforce perceptions of roads as public 
goods—is increasing, providing motorists with a ‘double-whammy’ 
effect: increased access fees and charges for sitting gridlocked in traffic. 
Meanwhile, the fuel excise, which represents a quasi user charge, is 
declining steadily (Figure 2.6). Road-related expenditure is also increasing 
across the public sector generally (Figure 2.7) and for the Commonwealth 
(Figure 2.8), state and territory (Figure 2.9) and local levels of government 
(Figure 2.10).
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Figure 2.4 Total public sector road-related revenue in Australia 
(2015 prices)
Source: BITRe (2016) .
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Figure 2.5 State and territory road-related revenue by type (2015 prices)
Source: BITRe (2016) .
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
26
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
18 000
20 000
Fuel Excise GST FBT FIRS Luxury Car Tax Customs Duty
$ 
m
ill
io
n
Figure 2.6 Commonwealth road-related revenue by type (2015 prices)
Source: BITRe (2016) .
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Figure 2.7 Total public sector road-related expenditure for Australia 
(2015 prices)
Source: BITRe (2016) .
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Figure 2.8 Total Commonwealth road-related expenditure (2015 prices)
Source: BITRe (2016) .
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
$ 
m
ill
io
n
Actual amount Trend line
Figure 2.9 Total state and territory government road-related expenditure 
(2015 prices)
Source: BITRe (2016) .
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Figure 2.10 Total local government road-related expenditure 
(2015 prices)
Source: BITRe (2016) .
In its examination of road-related revenue and expenditure trends, the 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (DIRD 2016: 
41) noted:
While there is only very limited hypothecation of road-related revenue 
to road expenditure, the cost of building and maintaining our roads 
is increasing at a rate faster than road-related revenue collected from 
motorists in taxes and charges.
Aspects of the current system of road-related fees and charges, such as 
fixed registration charges and stamp duty, do not provide a direct signal to 
road users about the cost of service provision and can encourage inefficient 
use of road services.
Population growth, urban development and changes in the broader 
economy will increase future demand on road infrastructure and, based 
on current trends, congestion is forecast to increase in major urban 
areas, which will constrain productivity. Without improved congestion 
management, the net social costs of congestion are expected to almost 
double over the next 15 years. The avoidable social cost of congestion 
in the eight Australian capitals was estimated to be approximately 
$16.5  billion in the 2015 financial year [in 2010 dollars], rising from 
about $12.8 billion in 2010. These costs are projected to rise further to 
around $30 billion by 2030 without measures to cut congestion.
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Clearly, the long-established mix of road-related revenue and expenditure 
is unsustainable into the future, and the idea of hypothecation is not new. 
Indeed, when it was introduced in 1929, the fuel excise was tied to road 
funding, and this was not changed to general revenue until 1959. Road-
related revenue may not be tied to roads, but consumers expect it to be 
so. But consumers are not the only ones who are reluctant to see a change 
to how we pay for roads. Since 1959, successive federal governments have 
been reluctant to restrict their ability to raise general revenue and to tie 
policy expenditure to hypothecated revenue. There is some merit to this 
principle. In 1990, then minister for land transport in the Australian 
Labor Party Government, Bob Brown, explained:
[In] our seven years we have increased funding in a period of very 
tight fiscal  restraint by 18 percent over and above the seven years of 
our predecessors. That represents, in terms of dollars, an additional 
$19.6 billion in today’s terms, in today’s prices that we’ve put into the 
road system. We shouldn’t, any more than we say we’ll determine how 
much we’ll put into education on the basis of how much income tax 
school teachers pay. That would be absurd. It’s equally absurd for us to say 
that we will determine our level of road funding on the basis of how much 
tax motorists pay … So we’re not about y’know, that whole question of 
hypothecation, determining how much we’ll put into roads on the basis of 
how much tax comes from any particular source. (Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 1990)
An important change to note, however, is that, by 1990, the federal 
government had taken a lead role in funding roads, one that had 
been steadily increasing since the removal of protection from state rail 
services. The increasing demand for road freight transport led to the 
Commonwealth Aid Roads Act 1959, which ceased hypothecation of fuel 
excise and introduced a formula for allocating funds to states based on 
a combination of population, area and the number of registered vehicles 
with a quota of state funding to be provided to obtain the allocated federal 
funding (but out of consolidated revenue) (Clark 1988: 285). By 1969, 
the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads (CBR) had been established and 
increasingly sophisticated formulas were adopted to achieve efficiency 
measures in investment allocation in line with growing demand for 
roads. The CBR ‘recommended the creation of a system of national 
highways’ and, by 1974, ‘program approval was required for state road 
expenditure to ensure that “national objectives [were] taken fully into 
account”’ (Jones 1974: 382, cited in Clark 1988: 287). Constitutionally, 
the Commonwealth could not direct or enforce specific levels of state 
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expenditure on roads. However, its various leveraging formulas enabled it 
to withhold funding from the states if national objectives were not being 
achieved through state expenditure. Hence, the Commonwealth was 
gradually able to ‘impose its will’ on the states (Clark 1988: 287).
While some state discretion was preserved during the Fraser Government’s 
‘New Federalism’ period, the Australian Bicentennial Road Development 
(ABRD) program adopted a hypothecated fuel tax (in addition to the fuel 
excise) from 1982 to 1988 to fund Commonwealth road projects through 
a form of specific-purpose grants. This enabled the Commonwealth to 
leverage control over policy areas of state responsibility, and was showcased 
by road signs advertising the Commonwealth’s role in funding roads for 
the community. Since this period in particular, the constitutional powers 
over roads generally ascribed to the states have been in conflict with the 
Commonwealth’s financial powers, and an accepted formula for funding 
roads remains a sore point with the states (Clark 1988: 287; Head et al. 
1990; Holderhead 2017). Despite improved government marketing 
of road funding initiatives, and increased road funding being used for 
election purposes, the period from the late 1980s until the early 2000s 
witnessed generally flat growth in funding, with the Commonwealth 
providing the smallest share of the three tiers of government (Webb 2004: 
16). Nevertheless, Commonwealth funding of roads has trended upward 
and road funding continues to play a politically important role, such as 
the Roads to Recovery program, which will provide some $4.4 billion 
from 2013–14 to 2020–21 ‘to Australia’s local councils, state and territory 
Governments responsible for local roads’ (DIRD 2017b). So, finding the 
right formula for reform will require a significant shift of the debate on 
road pricing and provision if the emerging institutional framework is to 
be sustainable.
Where we live, how we commute and ideas 
about equity
Urban sprawl has been a perennial feature of Australian cities, predicated 
on the widespread take-up of the motor car. The use of cars as a major 
mode of travel continued to grow from the 1920s until the mid-2000s, 
after which car use has generally levelled out or appeared to decline 
on a per capita basis. There has been much research into this observed 
phenomenon seeking to explain the reasons behind this historical ‘peak’ 
and then slightly declining trend. Three alternative hypotheses have been 
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proposed—namely, ‘peak car usage’, ‘saturation of use’ and ‘interrupted 
growth’ (OECD and ITF 2013). Peak car usage is based on the idea that 
the number of kilometres travelled by privately owned cars has reached 
its finite peak, and the car as an essential means of individual transport is 
therefore on the decline. Reasons for the decline in motor vehicle usage 
include changes in attitudes towards living conditions and the preference 
of professionals, particularly the younger generation, to live in inner cities 
and commute via public transport, cycling and walking. Living in the 
inner city, the need for a car is decreased. Newman (2015) suggested 
that, by 2004, the peak in car usage had occurred in all major Australian 
cities, and therefore fears about increasing urban traffic congestion were 
unfounded (see Newman and Kenworthy 2011). Increased congestion 
was generally portrayed as a major policy challenge by authorities 
such as Infrastructure Australia (2015), in the Australian Infrastructure 
Audit, and BITRE (2015a), in the State of Australian Cities 2014–2015 
report. Newman suggested the observable travel behaviours of younger 
generations were changing and, accordingly, he proposed better planning 
for travel by modes such as cycling, walking and light rail. He argued that, 
as car travel on a per capita basis continued to decline, these alternative 
modes of transport would further decrease demand for urban car usage 
and thus alleviate congestion problems.
While it may be plausible that car usage has peaked on the basis of 
per capita  kilometres travelled by car, this does not necessarily mean 
a reduction in traffic congestion on highly congested road systems. Indeed, 
the modelling by Infrastructure Australia (2015) and BITRE (2015b) has 
predicted the major driver of urban traffic congestion will be population 
growth rather than the number of kilometres travelled by individual 
drivers. Although car use has historically increased as incomes have risen, 
BITRE’s (2015b: 5) projections adopt the ‘saturation’ hypothesis, in 
which car use as a proportion of population is expected to peak by 2020 
because ‘people are spending as much time on daily travel as they are 
willing to commit; and are loath to spend any more of their limited time 
budgets on yet more travel, even if incomes do happen to rise’.
Interrupted growth is a worst-case scenario. According to this hypothesis, 
car usage has slowed due to a combination of ‘national incomes measured 
as GDP per head, population, and fuel cost of motoring’ (Goodwin 2013: 
78). However, based on what is assumed about future combinations of 
these factors, ‘car traffic will continue to grow, albeit at a slowing rate, for 
several decades into the future’ (OECD and ITF 2013: 78). The above 
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three approaches to understanding car use are merely plausible hypotheses, 
and therefore inconclusive in determining future trends in individual car 
use. BITRE’s approach is to adopt ‘saturation’ as the middle position, 
where road use will remain at present rates for the medium term, but 
congestion will remain an issue due to population growth (BITRE 2015b: 
7). Such a  conservative approach is warranted, given the emergence of 
self-driving or driverless cars.
Driverless cars present a major opportunity to reduce traffic congestion 
by automating driving actions and organising (or ‘platooning’) vehicles 
to allow for more efficient traffic flow (Mikulski 2010: 45). But driverless 
cars are no instant panacea for sound infrastructure design; existing road 
bottlenecks can create traffic congestion, even for driverless cars (American 
Highway Users Alliance 2015). Further, Fulton (from the University of 
California, Davis, Institute of Transportation Studies, cited in Muoio 
2017) has drawn attention to the need for a system of road pricing even 
with driverless vehicles. He stated:
[A]utonomous vehicles won’t fix congestion woes unless a pricing system is 
put in place that discourages zero-occupancy vehicles … We are especially 
concerned about zero-occupant vehicles that can happen with automated 
vehicles … That scenario is especially plausible with private ownership of 
those vehicles and no limits to what we can do with them … For example, 
many companies are interested in programming autonomous cars to run 
errands or pick up packages, but these efforts could increase traffic by 
multiplying the number of zero-occupant cars, or ‘zombie cars’ … I think 
it’s going to take some kind of pricing system that discourages zero-
occupant vehicles and also makes penalties for single-occupancy vehicles.
Without a system of road pricing, it will also be difficult to incentivise 
a reduction of single-occupant vehicles on our roads. But this is predicated 
on people’s willingness to share vehicles with others. Otherwise, the trend 
of single-occupant vehicles during peak traffic periods will not end with 
driverless vehicles. For example, Amman, the capital of Jordan (in the 
Middle East), has a two-tier taxi service. The more expensive service is 
a traditional book, hail and ride service, whereas the less expensive ‘service’2 
taxis run on set routes with set stops, accepting passengers until the car 
is full. The resulting behaviours mean that rich people take traditional 
taxis and poor people take service taxis. Rather than efficiency, complex 
(or even superficial) ideas about class, taste, dignity and economic capacity 
can determine users’ transport behaviours (see Veblen 1994). Studies of 
2  In the French pronunciation of the word.
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public transport have made similar conclusions: people are happy for 
governments to fund or subsidise public transport for others, but will 
continue to drive private vehicles for their own transport requirements 
(ARRB 2016; Carey 2016; Carrel et al. 2013).3 And these trends are not 
necessarily consistent over time: a person living in high-density housing in 
Surry Hills in Sydney in the 1920s and catching the tram to work is a far 
cry, for example, from a person living in high-density housing in Surry 
Hills today and commuting on light rail. Where we live and how we travel 
have as much to do with trends, tastes and societal preferences as they do 
with efficiency and economy.
Increasing medium- to high-density inner-city housing means transport 
infrastructure such as bus and light rail services becomes less expensive 
for individuals as demand increases, and the shorter distances mean that 
transport infrastructure investment is more efficient, in that its supply, in 
a smaller geographical area, meets a concentrated demand. The preference 
for investment in light rail in Canberra, the Gold Cost, Sydney and 
Adelaide, for example, is based on the premise of higher-density housing 
located closer to where people work. While not necessarily requiring less 
investment in terms of infrastructure spending, transport infrastructure 
that serves a densely populated, discrete area enables greater potential 
return on investment due to high demand. For example, while a high-
speed rail system between Melbourne and Sydney might enable people 
to live further from the central business districts, and the speed of the 
service ensures a shorter time for commuting, the return on investment 
depends on the number of people accessing the service from more distant 
places. Compare this with a light rail service in an area of high-density 
housing: the investment in light rail is less, but the demand for the service 
is considerably higher given the number of potential users of the service. 
For a high-speed rail service, which necessarily requires greater investment 
outlay, the consumer price for the service is considerably higher to achieve 
a commensurate rate of return on that investment. Given the potentially 
lower demand from a lower number of users in lower-density areas, there 
is a trade-off for the commuter in terms of the cost of using a high-speed 
rail service versus the cost of using a private car, but this may be offset by 
lower property prices. In terms of systemic efficiency, if light rail were to 
reduce the number of cars on inner-city roads then, paradoxically, there 
is an incentive for the use of private cars by those living outside the area 
serviced by light rail. So the modal mix becomes important in transport 
3  For attitudes towards public transport in popular culture, see Jaffe (2015); The Onion (2000).
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management, along with pricing and value capture or, alternatively, 
instances of policy tinkering in one area may create unforeseen behavioural 
problems in another.
The obvious trade-off with inner-city transport infrastructure is that 
property prices will increase in areas serviced by light rail, while properties 
further away from the CBD will remain less expensive. This means that, 
in the absence of alternative modes, less-wealthy people will continue to 
live further out and continue to rely on private vehicles, while wealthier 
people will enjoy the benefits of concentrated transport infrastructure, 
typically provided through public funding. This raises an issue of social 
equity, in that governments cross-subsidise the wealthy by providing 
transport infrastructure that does not service those who cannot afford 
to live in high-density, inner-city areas. Further, the road network that 
sustains those living in lower-density, outer-city areas is less efficient if 
it continues to be provided as a public good and will have little impact 
on transport behaviours unless alternative modes of transport are made 
available.
The hypothetical scenarios outlined above lead policymakers to consider 
two necessary interventions to capture these relevant externalities. First, 
some form of ‘value capture’ from improved land values is necessary to 
ensure that wealthier, inner-city property owners do not receive a free-
rider benefit from increased property values brought about by public 
investment in transport infrastructure. Second, a form of discretionary 
road pricing is necessary to ensure that those who use the roads pay for 
that use. In the present system, behaviours become established in the 
absence of the true cost of externalities. A wealthy person can live in the 
inner city and take advantage of public transport, thereby reducing the 
individual’s transport costs, whereas a less wealthy person would be better 
off living further from their place of employment and using their private 
car to commute. Such problems of equity make it difficult to balance 
social policy with economic policy outcomes. For Infrastructure Australia 
(2013: 17):
The best approach to urban transport funding may be to source all funds 
directly from users or beneficiaries. The aim would be to encourage 
optimal travel behaviour and moderate demand, as well as provide finance 
for services and infrastructure. In an ideal world revenues would be higher 
than financial costs in order to account for externalities … However, such 
an approach has not been adopted. Also, it may prove infeasible; for 
example in some circumstances it may be more efficient to collect taxes 
than user charges.
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In the absence of appropriate pricing systems to 1) capture increased 
property values and 2) provide price signals for demand for transport 
infrastructure, there is little rational basis for investing in transport 
infrastructure other than for election purposes.
The path to road reform: A predilection 
for reporting, not acting
Three major inquiries relating to market reform, revenue reform and 
productivity have reported to the federal government: the Hilmer 
competition law review in 1993, the Henry review of tax in 2010 and 
the Harper review of productivity in 2014. In each case, the slow pace 
of reform, the lack of sustainability of the present funding arrangements 
and the inefficiency of the road transport sector (respectively) were 
noted. Further, many public submissions to the inquiries pointed to 
the road transport sector as an area of concern. The Hilmer review on 
competition law (Hilmer et al. 1993: 14) noted the progress on reforms 
such as those for rail and heavy vehicles while acknowledging that 
‘the community generally [was] impatient for much more rapid progress 
by governments in reforming our infrastructure and regulatory systems’. 
Road construction was not yet subject to consistent competitive tendering 
and Commonwealth–state cooperation on road transport was ‘likely to be 
successful, though the pace of such cooperative effort [was] at times of 
concern’ (Hilmer 1993: 209–10, 298). Further, Hilmer et al. (1993: 201) 
found ‘a vast amount of regulation … [was] perceived to be restricting 
competition without adequate justification’. By the time of the Hilmer 
review, major market reforms were well under way in telecommunications 
(Dobes 1991), water (Tisdell et al. 2002: iii) and energy (AEMC 2017),4 
but, by comparison, the rate of reform of the road transport sector has 
been glacial.5
4  Energy sector reform began in 1991 and, in 1995, the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) endorsed the recommendations of the Hilmer review.
5  The Federal Interstate Registration Scheme (FIRS) for heavy vehicles (weighing more than 
4.5 tonnes) began with the Interstate Road Transport Act 1985, and came into effect in 1987 as an 
alternative to state-based registration (DIRD 2017a). The purpose of the Productivity Commission’s 
(2016) report was ‘to assist COAG to implement efficient pricing of road and rail freight 
infrastructure’ (see Chapter 9, this volume). But the harmonisation of national heavy vehicle laws 
was not consolidated until 2013, when the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL) came into effect. 
Further, user charges for heavy vehicles based on actual use are still a few years away, with light vehicle 
user charges expected to take some 15 years (Fletcher, cited in Chang 2016).
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The Henry review (Henry et al. 2010) found:
Current road tax arrangements will not meet Australia’s future transport 
challenges. (p. 53)
… Transport-specific taxes should only be imposed where they improve 
the way that people, businesses and governments make decisions. 
In general, this means that transport taxes should be designed to correct 
market failures in the transport sector. (p. 375)
… The existing structure of fuel tax, annual registration and other road-
related taxes is designed primarily to raise revenue. These taxes more than 
cover the direct costs of providing road infrastructure, but are not capable 
of providing specific prices that vary according to location or time of use. 
(p. 376)
… Governments should analyse the potential network-wide benefits and 
costs of introducing variable congestion pricing on existing tolled roads 
(or lanes), and consider extending existing technology across heavily 
congested parts of the road network. Beyond that, new technologies may 
further enable wider application of road pricing if proven cost-effective. 
In general, congestion charges should apply to all registered vehicles using 
congested roads. (p. 377)
In 2014, the Harper review (Harper et al. 2015: 1) found that road reform 
was ‘one of the top five issues most often raised in submissions’, and it:
recommend[ed] reforming road transport by introducing cost-reflective 
road pricing in a revenue-neutral way and linked to road construction, 
maintenance and safety so that road investment decisions are more 
responsive to the needs and preferences of road users. (p. 8)
Further:
[I]n roads there has been little progress introducing pricing that reflects 
the actual cost of use on the network, such as time and location charging. 
Investment in those sectors is either funded directly from budgets or by 
users across the network rather than from users according to the costs 
they impose on the network. Roads in particular have also been subject to 
investment bottlenecks. (p. 194)
… [T]here has been little progress in attempting to introduce cost-
reflective pricing in roads and linking revenue to road provision. As a 
consequence, there is criticism that new roads are being built in the wrong 
places for the wrong reasons, while too little attention is paid to getting 
more efficient use of existing road infrastructure. (p. 195)
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Clearly, road pricing and provision are complex, but the reform process 
has been inordinately slow.
An interesting feature of the road transport sector in Australia is the 
immensely detailed and documented research and reporting that have 
occurred over the decades. Yet the Harper review (Harper et al. 2015: 
38) found that ‘roads are the least reformed of all infrastructure sectors, 
with institutional arrangements around funding and provision remaining 
much the same as they were 20 years ago’.
Given the extent of reporting on road reform over the years, from a policy 
perspective, it is surprising that progress has been so slow. For commuters 
in the major metropolitan centres, the daily realities of Australia’s road 
networks should be enough to persuade any rational voter to call for 
change. But generational habits have a peculiar way of being hard to give 
up, as the Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE 1977: 147–8) discovered 
when considering road user charging (then referred to as ‘cost recovery’) 
some 40 years ago:
The BTE’s view is that private motor vehicle operation is essentially 
outside the framework of this study. This statement is not made merely 
to sidestep a difficult issue, but has sound philosophical grounds. In every 
other mode of transport, the major services are offered to the public 
through marketing agencies of various sorts (airlines, railways and so 
on). Whether such agencies operate at a profit or not is irrelevant in this 
sense. The fact is that such agencies form an identifiable interface between 
a  complex background organisational structure and an individual user. 
The same applies for commercial road freight transport, where an end user 
of a transport service pays one fee to one organisation, and need not be 
aware of the complete organisational structure which leads to the setting 
of that fee. However, this system breaks down when private (i.e. not hire 
and reward) motor transport is considered. The private motor vehicle 
operator is, in many senses, on his own. In essence, he is a user of the road 
system, rather than a transport service.
The absence of point-of-sale pressure on road users’ transport behaviours 
reinforces the status quo. This means reform is not a simple process, and 
yet another report will not make the transition any easier. But there has 
been some positive policy action that may see the long-overdue reforms 
placed firmly on the policy agenda.
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Conclusion: A time for action
On 24 November 2016, Paul Fletcher, the Minister for Urban 
Infrastructure and Cities (2016a, 2016c; see also Chang 2016), announced 
that the Turnbull Government had committed to implementing five 
key initiatives of Infrastructure Australia’s (2016) 15-year infrastructure 
plan. Further reform of heavy vehicle charges will be the priority, while 
the costs and benefits of a road user charging system for light vehicles 
will be  investigated. The media release gave an indicative timeline of 
10 to 15 years. This follows the minister’s earlier call for submissions to 
a discussion paper on the wider use of value capture to fund infrastructure 
(Fletcher 2016b). Further, the minister echoed Infrastructure Australia’s 
(2016: 87) words and agreed that public knowledge of the existing 
road funding regime is limited, with most citizens adverse to any form 
of charges, regarding them as a ‘new tax’. Road reform will no doubt 
‘require the removal of familiar taxes and charges such as excise on fuel 
and registration fees’ (Infrastructure Australia 2016: 87). At least a lack 
of research reports should not prove a stumbling block.
Public perception is the key issue affecting the ability of governments to 
be decisive in reforming this important productivity and revenue issue for 
Australia. Road pricing offers a ‘doable’ policy response to a major source 
of frustration for millions of Australians who experience traffic congestion 
every working day. The research has been done, the reports have been 
written, we have the technology and a consensus has formed among the 
key industry players. This is important: already the Australian Automobile 
Association is calling for changes to fuel receipts to show consumers how 
much tax they are paying at the pump (Coorey 2016). Yet the biggest 
challenge will be getting the states and territories on board. The states may 
baulk at yet another Commonwealth revenue grab after the experience of 
John Howard’s legacy GST arrangements, or a ‘GST birthday cake’ may 
stall the process, and a lot will be riding on Minister Fletcher’s recently 
announced ‘eminent person’ to champion the reform transition. Either 
way, finally, it appears that road reform is firmly on the political agenda.
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3
Reforming transport planning 
in Australia
Marion Terrill
This chapter considers ways to reframe transport planning in Australia 
by reorienting debate away from the traditional investment-only focus 
on big projects to considering transport as an organic enabling system 
interconnected with many spheres of policy. To date, most transport 
planners have been preoccupied with planning how people should move 
about as if they are in control of the system. Planners have devised various 
ways to move people and freight around more efficiently, including 
approaches such as ‘park and ride’, carpooling, avoiding peak hour, 
utilising freeways, avoiding ‘rat-running’ and requirements for delivery 
trucks to deliver at night. All of these approaches have one thing in 
common: they are attempts to work out what people should be doing and 
planning how they should move about.
Planning a complex social system is difficult, but it does not stop people 
from trying to do it. We see this in a lot of different fields. I will address 
transport planning shortly, but first let me discuss how any complex 
social system works and how it organises itself. There is a fierce debate 
going on at present about science and maths training. We have people 
such as Australia’s Chief Scientist saying we need to lift enrolments for 
core science disciplines at post-secondary levels. We have the Business 
Council of Australia saying we need to devise a 10-year plan to get more 
students into tertiary science and technology courses. Their voices are not 
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alone, but we could ask another set of questions: why are so many people 
choosing courses other than science and technology; why are they making 
the ‘wrong choices’; and, who is managing the education system?
The reality is that no one is managing it. People are making their own 
decisions. The system is organising itself. People are deciding whether to 
study science and maths, or fashion, or fine art, or law, or nothing at all, 
on the basis of their own preferences, what they think they will do at 
the end of it and what they have to pay directly and indirectly. If we do 
not have enough science and technology graduates, those who do these 
disciplines will command a higher wage, we will import graduates from 
countries such as Ireland or China, or people in related fields will upskill. 
Meanwhile, those people who have studied fashion and fine art are 
presumably doing a thing they value more, even if getting a job at the end 
of it is harder. Therefore, our ability to really manage these systems and to 
get people to do what we want is pretty limited. So, what I want to do in 
terms of framing is to say that when society tries to solve these complex 
social problems, the best thing to do most of the time is to try to create 
the right incentives, then it is not necessary to plan the precise details, 
as people will figure out what to do and how to adapt to situations.
The concept of the self-organising system is incredibly relevant to transport 
planning. It is very clear that we need ports and roads and trains, and that 
government has an important role in ensuring we have the means to move 
around and that freight can get to and from airports, warehouses and 
depots. But how do we decide how many we need and where to put these 
things? This chapter is about how we approach this question. I will discuss 
the four major levers that are available to government in its transport 
planning role: investment, pricing, regulation and network management.
As with government, I will start with the investment function. So much 
of the public debate about transport planning begins and ends with 
investment. We have recently witnessed former treasurer Joe Hockey 
invoking the spirit of Joh Bjelke-Petersen as he welcomed the appearance 
of 165 cranes over the Sydney CBD and even two springing up in Hobart. 
Meanwhile, in the lead-up to the Canning by-election in Western Australia 
in 2015, federal opposition spokesman on transport and infrastructure, 
Anthony Albanese, talked about the government’s neglect of infrastructure 
and how dire that neglect is for increased congestion.
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In an environment of population growth, it is clear there will need to 
be growth in infrastructure investment, even if the exact nature of what 
is needed is a lot less clear. So the aspect of investment I will discuss 
here—which is one that seldom receives much airtime—is the issue 
of timing. I will start by mentioning a really important marker in the 
business environment today: the cheapness of money. Yields on 10-year 
government bonds hit an all-time low in February 2015, of 2.28 per cent. 
In other words, it has never been cheaper for government to borrow 
money—not just in Australia, but also around the world. Andy Haldane 
(2015) from the Bank of England has found that short-term interest rates 
are at their lowest point since Babylonian times. Money is cheap. If ever 
there was a time to borrow for transport infrastructure, now is that time.
Figure 3.1 Domestic passenger travel per capita
Sources: BITRe (2015: Table T3 .1, p . 61); ABS (2014a) .
On the other hand, demand for transport infrastructure is changing. 
Figure 3.1 indicates passenger demand for different types of transport 
on the basis of per capita distance travelled. It is immediately apparent 
that the distances people are travelling have flattened, and are beginning 
to decline slightly after years of growth—most evident in private vehicle 
travel. Use of other transport modes has increased, but overall domestic 
distance travelled per capita is 1 per cent lower than it was 10 years 
ago. The volume of domestic freight per capita has increased reasonably 
steadily over the past 20 years. It did flatten a bit at the time of the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). And there has been quite an increase in the past 
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decade, but it has come mainly from rail, and that has been mainly bulk 
rail in Western Australia—in other words, iron ore. Moving to an aggregate 
level, and taking account of population growth running about 1.4 per 
cent at last count (ABS 2016c), passenger car travel is now levelling off, 
air travel is still booming and bus and rail are growing more slowly. The 
volume of domestic freight has continued to increase in aggregate.
This suggests that population growth alone is not a reliable indicator 
of  investment need, given the changing nature of travel demand across 
the modes.
Another consideration, as indicated in Figure 3.2, is the level of existing 
investment. This shows that while government spending has recently 
slowed, it remains well above the level of 2004, when current rapid growth 
began. The figure indicates that the value of engineering construction 
work completed and the value of transport infrastructure building over 
the past decade have in fact been the highest since the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) began collecting this information. They peaked in 
2012, but declined over the next two years. There is some GFC stimulus 
spending included in the figure; nevertheless, the level of investment over 
the past 10 years has been considerable.
Figure 3.2 Government spending on transport infrastructure
Sources: ABS (2016a; 2016b: Table 11) .
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Why does it matter today that governments have spent so much in the 
past decade? It matters because of the debt that is now sitting on state 
and territory balance sheets for that spending. Over the seven years to 
2013–14, interest and depreciation costs as a percentage of state revenue 
increased from about 6 per cent to 9 per cent, and are estimated to 
remain close to 9 per cent over the forward estimates period, as Figure 3.3 
indicates. Interest expenses have increased more quickly than depreciation. 
The increase is equivalent to states spending about 0.5 percentage point of 
gross domestic product (GDP) more to cover the infrastructure spending 
of previous years, and this is despite extremely low interest rates.
Figure 3.3 State and territory depreciation and interest costs
Source: ABS (2014b), cited in Grattan (2014) .
So what should Australian governments do about their transport 
investment? The states are taking a range of very different positions. 
The  Victorian Treasurer, Tim Pallas, made headlines by contemplating 
debt financing public infrastructure (Davey 2015), and largely on the 
basis that Victoria’s 10-year borrowing rate is 2.65 per cent—close to the 
cheapest it has ever been. The Queensland Government has indicated that 
it may be prepared to borrow money to fund needed public transport 
infrastructure if the Commonwealth does not help (APP 2015), and that 
is essentially because Queensland is not participating in asset recycling. 
On the other hand, the NSW Government has brought forward $600 
million of infrastructure spending, because it is benefiting from a stamp 
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
52
duty windfall from the Sydney housing boom as well as $20 billion from 
electricity privatisation (Gerathy 2015). Western Australia is pushing back 
its investment program, with its iron ore royalties dropping precipitously 
(Government of Western Australia 2015: 5).
In summary, my reading of the situation is that governments have 
built a great deal of infrastructure over the past 10 years, and that has 
corresponded with the mining boom. However, state governments have 
essentially competed for construction resources in that time. Now that 
private investment is falling, the public sector has already committed to 
substantial transport infrastructure construction and is not especially well 
placed to take advantage of this buyer’s market; therefore, this does not 
seem to have been the wisest way to run infrastructure policy. On the 
other hand, one might say, ‘What is done is done, and what should we 
do now?’ It is very clear that we should still be open to funding transport 
infrastructure if there is a good cost–benefit ratio; admittedly, this is 
a big ‘if ’.
Turning to the second lever—pricing—the biggest issue is road pricing, 
and it is hard to spend much time in transport circles without coming 
up against this issue. Expert opinion from the Henry review and  the 
Productivity Commission to the Harper review has all lamented 
the  inefficient way we fund and manage our roads. Road pricing is 
essentially about explicitly charging for the costs that one vehicle’s road 
usage imposes on others. Typically, this focuses on one of two things: the 
cost of maintenance due to wear and tear (and this relates largely to heavy 
vehicle usage) and the cost of congestion to regular users and potentially 
other externalities. This concerns all vehicles in particular places and at 
particular times.
The congestion argument may be summarised as follows: when people 
suffer in bumper-to-bumper traffic, they conclude that we need to build 
more highway lanes; but when governments reflexively add capacity to 
solve congestion, it helps, but only temporarily. Before long more traffic 
builds up, and once again we are trying to solve the same problem. 
A study in the United States found worsening congestion in 99 of 100 
places studied since 1994, even though in 92 of those places there was 
an increase in the amount of roadway miles per capita. In fact, building 
more roads to try to move vehicles faster can make traffic worse. Focusing 
on the ‘rush-hour peak’ also ignores the much greater availability of 
the road system in ‘off-peak’ periods, when far greater numbers of trips 
53
3 . ReFoRMInG TRAnSPoRT PLAnnInG In AUSTRALIA
could be taking place. The potential value of moving some trips off peak 
is high. Nevertheless, such road-building strategies can also occur at the 
same time as a relative underfunding of public transport, which ironically 
leads people to rely more on private cars because of poor performance or 
services in public transport networks.
An interesting case involving the introduction of road user charging has 
occurred over the past decade in Stockholm, Sweden. One of the architects 
of Stockholm’s congestion charging, Jonas Elliasson, sought explicitly to 
counter the fear that ministers feel about congestion charging by careful 
consideration of the rollout of the scheme. There were four major findings 
from this Swedish experiment. 
First, a very modest initial charge in a trial period can make a big 
difference to acceptance. In Stockholm, the charge of €1 to €2 for people 
to travel to Stockholm’s CBD reduced traffic in a heavily congested area 
by 20 per cent, with people’s response immediate and rather pronounced. 
Second, the experiment found that the relationship between traffic flow 
and congestion is not linear; a reduction of 20 per cent in vehicle numbers 
would reduce congestion by far more than 20 per cent. Third, surveys 
found that people in Stockholm were fiercely against the pricing program 
at first, with reports of up to 70 per cent opposition. However, by the time 
the trial was conducted, this had reversed—to 70 per cent in favour of the 
pricing program. What this means in terms of transport planning is that 
70 per cent of people in Stockholm wanted to pay for something that had 
previously been ‘free’. Fourth, experts found that road users adapted their 
attitudes and behaviour so thoroughly they could not even remember 
what they used to believe; they thought they had supported congestion 
charging all along!
My reflection on this experiment is that we should not assume that 
congestion pricing is impossible. The experience overseas suggests 
that governments in Australia are far too timid. Given that the pay-off 
from congestion pricing has the potential to be very high, we could 
achieve much more functionality in transport usage with much less 
political pain than the political class fears. I suggest the most useful 
message is that we should get on with convincing them of the benefits of 
congestion charging.
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The third lever is regulation. Transport regulation generally has the 
objective of enabling the best use of scarce resources in moving people and 
things around, and, in more commercial settings, this typically means at 
the lowest cost. But regulation does not always lead to cost containment. 
I will cite two examples of ‘skewed’ regulation that focus partly on the 
objectives of transport accessibility, but also bring in other political 
objectives that may ultimately determine the regulatory settings: ports 
and ride-sharing.
Ports play an important, if not particularly obvious, role, with the cost of 
port services an important component of the cost of goods and services, 
which ultimately falls on either consumers or exporters. There are several 
ways that regulations affecting ports could be improved.
First, when ports are put up for sale or long-term lease, state governments 
should avoid the temptation to inflate the sale price without retaining 
control of ongoing user charges. In Melbourne recently, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) made a forceful 
submission to the Victorian Legislative Council on legislation before 
the Victorian Parliament to lease the Port of Melbourne on a 50- to 70-
year lease (ACCC 2015). As the ACCC emphasised, governments have a 
strong incentive to structure their privatisation process to maximise the 
sale price, but this price—if it is high—will flow through to port users into 
the future. In fact, the ACCC went so far as to say that the government’s 
privatisation policy could be considered to effectively impose a tax on 
future generations of Australians. The government has proposed a 50- to 
70-year lease with price controls for the first 15 years, but, after that, the 
process remains unclear.
Second, governments should minimise the fees charged to ports and port 
operators. Between 2012 and 2016, there was a $75 million licence fee 
for  the Port of Melbourne—which, in other words, is a tax on trade. 
Fees and charges like this are simply passed on. The chief executive officer 
(CEO) of freight logistics company Asciano, John Mullen, has said: 
‘If a port owner has to put up prices to try and get a return, ultimately the 
consumer, or manufacturers, or exporters are paying that bill’ (Roberts 
2014). Similarly, the Port of Melbourne recently imposed a rent review 
on one of its stevedores, DP World, asking for a staggering 767 per 
cent increase in the rent it pays, leading to a bitter dispute (Financial 
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Review  2015). The firm currently pays $16 to $18 per square metre. 
Following the dispute, the firm will now be paying $20 per square metre, 
rather than the proposed $120.
A third improvement that could be made to the regulations affecting ports 
is shipping regulation. The Commonwealth could overturn the current 
rules that make it perfectly legal for groupings of two or more shipping 
lines to band together and charge what is known as pan-Australian freight 
rates. Under such arrangements, shipping companies charge the same rate 
at each port of call, meaning there is no incentive for the more expensive 
ports to bring their costs down, and there is no advantage to running 
a lean operation. Effectively, this means the leaner ports are subsidising 
the less efficient ports. These types of changes would lower the input 
costs of businesses that want to export and the costs of goods that go 
to Australian households and businesses. Therefore, there are potential 
benefits to be gained in regulating ports.
My second example is ride-sharing through companies such as Uber—
currently very topical. During 2015, taxi and hire car operators were 
planning rolling 24-hour strikes and rallies across the major cities in 
Australia. Most of the debate about Uber and ride-sharing more generally 
focuses on taxi regulation. The Victorian taxi industry has experienced 
more reforms than elsewhere. Taxi regulations cover four key areas: safety, 
availability, customer service and price. While it is likely that all states 
over time will narrow the gap between ride-sharing and taxis, it is not 
clear how long this will take. Nevertheless, the biggest barrier is likely to 
be the value of perpetual licences, which governments have issued over the 
years and which are essentially a right to operate a taxi. In Melbourne, taxi 
licences have traded at about $290,000, and in Sydney, $390,000 (Taxi 
Services Commission 2017; RMS 2017).
Figure 3.4 indicates that passengers are already voting with their feet. 
I have taken data from the United States, where ride-sharing is a little 
more established than it is here, and what you can see is the first panel 
shows the steady drop in the number of taxi trips taken in San Francisco, 
with the introduction of transport network company regulation making 
little or no difference to the trend. Similarly, in Australia, despite the 
uncertain legal status of Uber, in its first six months of operation, 11 per 
cent of Sydney residents used the service. It has only become more 
popular since then; the price is competitive and many people believe it 
offers better customer service.
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Figure 3.4 Impact of ride-sharing on taxi revenue and licence values
note: TnC = transportation network companies .
Sources: Chicago Data Portal (2018); DataSF (2018) .
The right-hand panel in Figure 3.4 shows what happened in Chicago to the 
price of ‘taxi medallions’, which are similar to Australia’s perpetual licences. 
It is likely a similar drop could be experienced in Australia. The Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) in New South Wales (NSW) has 
estimated that 15–20 per cent of the price of a taxi fare is being transferred 
to the licence owner as economic rent. While taxi regulation is really 
important to Uber, it is not the only kind of regulation that matters. There 
are two other important elements: tax and employment law. On tax, Uber 
is taking the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) to court over whether even 
occasional ride-share drivers should register for the goods and services tax 
(GST), with Uber arguing its drivers are members of the sharing economy 
and should be treated the same as Airbnb hosts, who do not have to register 
for GST until their turnover reaches $75,000 a year. On the other hand, the 
ATO is saying, ‘You are providing taxi services, so you have to pay it from 
the first dollar, as taxis do.’
On employment law there has been recent publicity in the United States 
concerning a San Francisco judge who ruled that Uber drivers in California 
were employees, which opens the door to benefits such as overtime pay and 
reimbursement for expenses. Here in Australia, this issue is not entirely clear. 
It is arguable that Uber drivers are more like contractors in the sense that they 
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choose how much work, if any, they do, and they do not wear a uniform or 
have a livery. Further, the GST decision indicates that they are regarded more 
like contractors. Uber does set rates of pay and drivers can drive for Uber only 
if they are authorised to use its app. This is still very much a ‘grey’ area.
What does all this mean for transportation regulation? Getting more 
trips from the existing cars on the road does improve capital productivity. 
Enabling people to work—including having people who would have 
worked just a little or just a little more than they do at present—
is employment boosting. This is good for the individual, they are good 
for the economy and there is no compelling reason not to establish the 
minimum sufficient regulation to give ride-sharing the scope to operate 
legally. The only sticking point is the political problem of the declining 
value of perpetual taxi licences, and this really depends on how courageous 
governments are prepared to be.
The fourth and final lever available to government is network 
management. This is a low-glamour, but high-return, lever. Figure 3.5, 
compiled by Infrastructure Australia, reports an enduring finding. 
A  similar finding came out of the Eddington Transport Study in the 
United Kingdom. It is that small and medium-sized projects tend to have 
higher benefit–cost ratios than many of the mega projects that are so 
appealing to so many governments.
Figure 3.5 Economic returns of smaller schemes compared with larger 
schemes (projects submitted to Infrastructure Australia)
Note: BCR = benefit–cost ratio.
Source: Infrastructure Australia (2013) .
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An example of this is Melbourne’s rail network. This network is not 
particularly small, but close to $1 billion has been spent on maintenance 
and renewal over the past four years—after what has been described 
as decades of neglect. There are a few issues here. One is the outdated 
signalling, which is a big source of delays in the system. Some signals are 
100 years old, with a design life of much less than this. They are prone to 
failure, they are expensive to maintain and there are few people left who 
know how to maintain them.
Similarly, the network includes some very complex rail junctions. What 
this means is that a failure or delay on one part of the track cascades 
through the network. As the different lines converge on to the city loop, 
throughput is limited by the capacity of the loop, and where lines converge 
the speed is limited to 25–40 kilometres an hour. This is an important 
facet in the relatively poor performance of the Melbourne network during 
peak periods.
A third problem is a lack of adequate electrical power, particularly in 
the inner city. All trains bought this century have had to be detuned to 
perform to the same specifications as the older and slower trains, which 
require less voltage. The newest trains perform very badly under this low 
voltage. These impediments are not small things, but they are also not 
mega projects, and so are not so appealing to politicians in terms of the 
publicity opportunity. But they are not about building new things so much 
as about getting more from existing assets. This is also a prominent focus 
in NSW, where the state is spending $1 billion on upgrades to the existing 
road network, including works to relieve congestion at pinch points across 
the capital, Sydney, to extend clearways, make improvements to real-time 
traffic management and so forth.
In a similar vein is the issue of maintenance across the entire transport 
network. It is difficult to make general comments about the overall state 
of maintenance of Australia’s transport network, but Figures 3.6 and 3.7 
are indicative.
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Figure 3.6 International comparison of Australia’s investment 
in transport infrastructure
Source: oeCD (2016) .
Figure 3.7 International comparison of Australia’s maintenance 
expenditure on transport infrastructure
Source: oeCD (2016) .
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Figure 3.6 shows that, from 2004, (new) Australian investment in transport 
infrastructure increased dramatically, and it remained at very high levels 
compared with other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. On the other hand, Figure 3.7 shows 
our maintenance spending on transport infrastructure seems to be at the 
bottom of the pack of OECD countries. Without being a comprehensive 
study, this suggests our maintenance spending—or maintenance activity—
may not be keeping up with our new building; and perhaps we are more 
keen to build new infrastructure than to look after what we already have. 
Essentially, the points to be made about network management are that 
we should ‘sweat’ the assets, we should be open to small and medium 
investments as well as big ones and we should set the maintenance budget 
with some reference to the value of the underlying assets.
Conclusion
Our thinking about transport planning is best when we set the broad 
structure of the system, but avoid trying to determine the detail of how 
we want businesses and individuals to respond. In this chapter, I have 
argued that in relation to transport planning the challenge is to push back 
from an investment-only focus and a desire to build big, heroic projects. 
Transport, after all, is an enabling service; it is not something we generally 
value in its own right. We value it as it enables us to do other things that 
we care about. This means it does not really have its own agenda, but is 
part of many other agendas.
We should remember that we have at our disposal not just the investment 
lever, but also three other important levers, which should be fully 
exploited in creating the transport system: pricing, regulation and network 
management. In the meantime, the message for policymakers is to stop 
counting cranes on the skyline.
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4
How to deliver better 
infrastructure planning
Philip Davies
Soon after the delivery of the speech on which this chapter is based, Infrastructure 
Australia (2016) released its 15-year Australian Infrastructure Plan .
The plan was developed following consultation on the Australian Infrastructure Audit 
and recommended fundamental changes to the way Australia plans, funds, delivers 
and uses its infrastructure .
It had 78 recommendations for reform and was structured around four main themes:
• productive cities, productive regions
• efficient infrastructure markets
• sustainable and equitable infrastructure
• better decisions, better delivery .
Alongside the plan, Infrastructure Australia released a new Infrastructure Priority 
List, which identified 93 projects and initiatives around the country. The list provides 
rigorous, independent advice to governments and the public on the infrastructure 
investments Australia needs .
Infrastructure Australia will update the plan at least every five years and the priority list 
regularly throughout each year .
For more information and to download the plan and the priority list, go to 
www .infrastructureaustralia .gov .au .
The public discussion on infrastructure is often constrained by focusing 
on specific projects, rather than long-term policy and strategy, and there 
are certainly some challenging opportunities in front of us—not least 
those identified in Infrastructure Australia’s recent audits. We see growing 
population levels, and the recent audit suggests we could face an annual 
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cost of traffic congestion of $53 billion by 2031. We also have governments 
grappling with budget constraints and long-term environmental concerns. 
On the other hand, we are seeing continued economic growth and an 
increase in demand for infrastructure services—and most of these are 
good signs. These are signs of the success of the nation; however, unless 
we engage with some of these challenges now, we are going to wake up in 
the future and realise our quality of life is not what it used to be.
Auditing existing practices and 
demand projections
This chapter focuses on the importance of long-term integrated planning, 
particularly the integration of transport and land use planning. As a 
starting point, I will take the opportunity to set the scene somewhat in 
terms of what my organisation, Infrastructure Australia, does and what 
our role is in providing leadership. Infrastructure Australia’s role includes 
being an advisor to governments, as well as to investors and owners of 
infrastructure, through the whole life cycle of their assets, but particularly 
around policy and planning. In mid-2014, with bipartisan support, 
the Infrastructure Australia Act was amended, setting up Infrastructure 
Australia as an independent statutory body with a mandate to prioritise 
and progress nationally significant infrastructure. The Act also established 
a 12-person board and the right to appoint a CEO. I was appointed in 
2015, and we were already in the throes of some fairly significant activity 
relating to planning, including the release of the Northern Australia 
Audit and the Australian Infrastructure Audit, both released in May 2015. 
Both documents highlighted the need for action and provided an evidence 
base from which to build our future plans.
The Australian Infrastructure Audit in particular took a long-term view, 
out to 2031. It considered some of the key drivers of demand and identified 
some of the challenges we will face if we do not act (it is very much about 
if we do not act); this evidence base is what we have now drawn on, 
working closely with states and territories, to start to identify some of the 
solutions we think will address the challenges. These issues were brought 
together in the 15-year Australian Infrastructure Plan, which was released 
in 2016.
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One of the key findings of the Australian Infrastructure Audit was 
that, after 2031, we are likely to face an increase in population of 40 
per cent—to about 30.5 million people, as indicated by Figure 4.1. At 
present, our population—to put it into context—is the fastest-growing 
among the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). Most of that population growth is forecast 
to be in our four largest capital cities: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and 
Perth. Figure 4.2 indicates the projected growth of these four cities. There 
are two questions we have to ask ourselves. First, what does the increase 
in population in our cities mean for how these cities will operate and 
function? This is an important question because the major cities are 
projected to grow, by 2061, to a size comparable with London, New York 
and Paris today. This means we need to think differently about how our 
major cities operate. Second, what are the outcomes we want, and are 
there opportunities to grow some of the smaller capital cities in a different 
way so we can spread the load and make better use of the infrastructure 
we already have in those cities?
Figure 4.1 Australia’s projected population growth to 2061
Source: Infrastructure Australia analysis of data from ABS (2013a; 2013b: Series B) .
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Figure 4.2 Projected population growth in Australian capital cities 
to 2061
Source: Infrastructure Australia analysis of data from ABS (2013a; 2013b: Series B) .
Reiterating the need for long-term planning
It is crucial we embrace this opportunity to shape and plan not only our 
cities, but also our future infrastructure needs. This is not an easy role. 
It is fair to say we have moved away from long-term planning in recent 
years and have become very focused on the short term—largely on major 
projects. We need to get back to basics with regard to strategic planning, 
at the regional, city and national levels. More so than in the past we are 
seeing a great deal of change, such as demographic change, with an ageing 
population, shifts in the patterns of demand and much disruption, which 
is spoken about a lot—but not all of this disruption is bad. Most of us 
appreciate that this disruption presents a great opportunity, particularly to 
connect with the community and take them on a journey. We are seeing 
global economic shifts and changes in the way we go about doing our 
work. Unfortunately, despite the importance of these challenges, long-
term planning is missing somewhat, and our project pipelines are relatively 
short. Addressing these issues is the call to arms we have picked up, along 
with our colleagues, around the country in developing this 15-year plan.
We have identified a number of key trends. One is that, in Australia, 
we have moved away from planning and feasibility studies. These were 
a big feature in the past, but are not so much a feature today. We have also 
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moved, on occasion, to committing funding to problems before they are 
turned into solutions and fully developed as projects. We have also not 
had enough focus on getting the most out of the infrastructure we already 
have—something touched on in the previous chapter. One of the things 
Infrastructure Australia is focused on, therefore, is the better use of what 
we already have, before we rush off to plan a new project. Yet, as a result of 
this lack of a pipeline, we in Australia are not consulting enough with the 
community. Often our conversations come very late in the piece and do 
not bring the community on the journey. Currently we are undertaking 
a small number of post-completion reviews, which often highlight 
that our previous infrastructural projects appear to be examples of lost 
opportunities. Ex-post reviews give us the insight into the outcomes that 
were delivered, so we can learn from our good work as well as our bad 
work and feed that back into the next project.
Some of the benefits of long-term planning tend to run counter to the 
abovementioned points, and a return to long-term planning will help 
address many of the major issues we face. We must recognise that projects 
generally cannot be delivered overnight; they take years of planning before 
we can give them a green light and have them ready to proceed. A return 
to long-term planning at the state and federal levels means we will have 
an observable long-term pipeline of up-and-coming projects. To date, the 
general absence of that pipeline of projects has meant the supply chain 
has also suffered, so it is not just about the people involved in delivering 
these projects within government; it is also about the downstream supply 
chain. Without a long-term pipeline, suppliers are not able to plan their 
resources and their capability, and employers are not sure whether they 
should recruit, retain or train staff, especially in some specialised areas. 
Subsequently, Australian taxpayers pay the cost for that.
Improving our planning capabilities
There are a number of key areas for improvement in planning. First, there 
is real need for higher-quality data to underpin our decision-making, and 
this is certainly something we found while conducting the Australian 
Infrastructure Audit. Access to data is still a challenge. Second, there is 
much discussion about integrated land use and transport planning—
or integrated land use and infrastructure planning—yet it does not happen. 
In particular, we have moved away from protecting transport corridors. 
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Third, there is a growing need for greater transparency and rigour in our 
project selection processes. Fourth, as mentioned above, there is a need for 
ongoing ex-post reviews, as these provide learning opportunities.
In terms of data, we have certainly seen a lack of quality across most 
sectors.  We found in the audit that it was particularly challenging to 
collect data on the operations and maintenance of assets, the performance 
and delivery of infrastructure, the services and service levels the 
infrastructure is delivering and the cost of maintenance. As Marion Terrill 
argues in Chapter 3 (see Figures 3.2 and 3.6), we are investing a lot in 
infrastructure, but perhaps not paying enough attention to how much 
we need to be spending on maintenance and operations. This may sound 
somewhat pessimistic, but we are not alone in facing these challenges. 
The most recent period has been about supporting the mining boom, 
building up our infrastructure and getting the country going; and, in 
such circumstances, it is unnatural to focus on sweating assets and driving 
performance improvements. So, this is not a problem we have; it is more 
a matter of shifting our focus.
I previously worked in the United Kingdom, with responsibility for 
operating London’s roads, and, despite the levels of congestion in London 
and the challenges there, we had exactly the same issues. The maintenance 
funding would often be spent on things other than maintenance. 
For instance, there were about 6,000 traffic signals in the city and, when 
I took over responsibility, no one had looked at timing the traffic signals 
for some 27 years. In effect, they were installed and subsequently forgotten 
about. London at the time was a city going through significant growth 
and experiencing significant congestion, with a good deal of pressure to 
address those issues. But it had not been done because it was not the focus 
of the times. I use this example as a kind of baseline to show that we know 
we are not alone in this; we just need to shift our focus.
Having said that, another area we could improve on is thinking about 
systems and networks. We need to gain a better understanding of how 
infrastructure actually works together (intermodally). When we are 
project focused, it is easy to avoid thinking about the bigger picture, how 
the solution fits into a network and how we can make the system work 
as a whole. When looking at pieces of a supply chain, it is important to 
consider the whole chain. With these challenges in mind, our 15-year 
plan has some suggestions about how we might address them.
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In terms of the evidence base, we found some gaps in data availability, but 
what we did do well in the audit was some detailed modelling, particularly 
around some of the transport corridors in our capital cities. We looked 
at what that estimated $53 billion worth of congestion actually looked 
like in terms of transport corridors. That has certainly been very helpful 
in the planning process on which we have embarked with the state and 
territory governments—looking at what the solutions might be and then 
using those to inform the plan. And, in the interests of sharing access, 
we have made our assembled data available to all. There is now an awful 
lot of data on our website if anyone is interested in looking at it, and some 
regional development agencies have already been using it for their own 
planning purposes. Obviously, we need to build this evidence base over 
time, and that is something Infrastructure Australia has been talking with 
the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure about.
Integrated transport and land use planning is an important function 
that can be improved. And it is not just about moving people; it is also 
about moving goods. Infrastructure Australia’s audit predicted that we 
will see a doubling of land freight volume to 2031. Particularly around 
some of the larger capital cities, we are approaching circumstances similar 
to something I experienced in the late 1990s in Japan, where there was 
a ‘game change’ in terms of how goods were distributed around Tokyo. 
Although Tokyo is a much larger city than any of Australia’s capital cities 
hopefully will ever be, there was a real shift in terms of how goods were 
distributed through the city, and that is the type of thinking we need 
to adopt here.
What we tend to find today is that the planning and provision of 
infrastructure and land use are still often undertaken in silos, with 
different government departments responsible for different aspects 
of the infrastructure network in terms of its planning and delivery, 
and, as  a  result,  we do not necessarily get the outcomes we need or 
deserve—and that is one of the reasons we do not think at the systems 
level. Therefore, we are very focused on how we think about planning. 
On occasion, our cities are not planned in the best way, and in the context 
of the growth we are expecting, this is something to which we really need 
to pay attention.
As a first step in long-term planning, we are looking to work closely with 
state and territory governments, where we can play a role in challenging 
how we think about planning as we bring this 15-year plan together. 
Another thing we have done well in the past, but not so well recently, is 
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to protect transport corridors—one of the benefits of which is that we can 
accommodate future projects at a reasonable cost. History demonstrates 
that corridor protection is an important element of long-term planning.
Between the 1950s and the 1980s, a number of state governments 
protected corridors that enabled major projects to be built, such as the 
West Link M7 in New South Wales, the East Link in Victoria and, in 
recent times, the Badgerys Creek Airport site in Sydney. Many of these 
sites were set aside some 10 to 20 years before the project commenced. 
So there is evidence that state governments have had some success in long-
term planning, but corridor protection has often been overshadowed by 
a short-term focus in recent times.
Another area of discussion is the transparent project selection process; 
and,  once having done a good job of the long-term planning, it is 
important to ensure we have a rigorous process for evaluating our projects 
and that our projects are adequately solving the problems we need to 
solve. Options to solve some of these problems need to be appropriately 
identified and scoped, and we do not need to attempt a new solution all 
the time; we also need to be thinking about how we can improve what we 
already have. For example, would new signalling on a rail system actually 
provide greater benefits than building a new rail line?
Infrastructure Australia’s strategic 
advisory role
Infrastructure Australia is required to undertake an assessment of 
all projects  of national significance over $100 million for which 
Commonwealth funding is sought. Despite what some people think, we 
do not develop our own business cases and we do not make decisions 
regarding the funding of projects. Our role is that of an advisor and an 
assessor of the solutions presented, and hopefully we have been involved in 
developing these solutions early in the piece, where we can provide useful 
input and advice. We do assess the cost–benefit of projects, we make those 
assessments public once they are completed and we have a  rigorous 
methodology for conducting the assessment. We look at strategic fit—how 
that solution fits into the wider network—how it addresses the problems 
of national significance that have been identified, at the evidence that has 
been provided and at the economic viability. Importantly, the proposal 
must have a clear delivery plan and be deliverable and realistic.
71
4 . HoW To DeLIveR BeTTeR InFRASTRUCTURe PLAnnInG
In terms of oversight, the Department of Infrastructure plays an important 
role. Once Infrastructure Australia has completed its strategic planning 
role, the department will often oversee the project when it is to receive 
federal funding.
An area where we in Australia really could do better is in assessing 
the outcomes of projects. Once the planning and implementation of 
the project are complete, it is crucial that we measure the outcomes, 
understand whether we delivered the benefits in the business case and the 
broader outcomes of some of our investments, in terms of not only the 
project, but also its impact on the community and its fit into a system or 
a city or wherever it might be. These outcome assessments are necessarily 
long term in their approach. We might measure these things when we 
implement a project, we might need to measure them five years later, 
10 years later or so on, and without that kind of evidence it is difficult 
to improve the way we do our planning; this is something on which we 
need to focus.
Having discussed many of the challenges and some of the improvements 
in planning we could make, what has Infrastructure Australia’s role been 
in supporting some of these processes? We are keen to play our role—
from both an advisory and a facilitation point of view—and we must 
get back to building and maintaining the evidence base, we must return 
to long-term integrated planning and we must start to secure corridors, 
not only in our cities, but also between them, and we must ensure there 
is a transparent, rigorous project selection process, and that we get back 
to doing ex-post reviews.
Infrastructure Australia is focusing on these matters, and we are committed 
to provide more commentary on the issues in the wake of our 15-year 
plan. The plan was structured around four themes:
• productive cities, productive regions
• efficient infrastructure markets
• sustainable and equitable infrastructure
• better decisions, better delivery.
This planning process was not conducted in isolation, as we worked 
closely with our colleagues in the infrastructure agencies, organisations, 
governments and industry bodies across the country—focusing 
particularly on the long-term agenda. During the consultation process 
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in which we travelled around the country talking about the audit, we 
have consulted with more than 500 people, including representatives of 
private organisations and governments, to seek their input into shaping 
this future plan.
We also met separately with state and territory governments to work 
together to solve some of the challenges we identified in the earlier audit 
to feed information into the plan. We received more than 85 submissions 
to the plan that helped inform our decisions; we have begun updating 
our Infrastructure Priority List and we have refreshed the way we consider 
projects as part of that process.
Conclusion
The main driver on which we need to focus at present is the scale of 
projected population change, which is something we have not seen before, 
particularly in our four largest capital cities. If we get this right, however, 
we can protect and enhance the quality of life we all enjoy. Infrastructure 
Australia must play a key role in supporting our collective long-term 
planning into the future. The plan we released in 2016 represents a major 
step forward in taking a solid evidence base and developing solutions to 
protect Australia’s infrastructural future.
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Singapore’s land transport 
management plan1
Teik Soon Looi2
This chapter explores Singapore’s system of land transport management, 
describing what we have done and why. As many international observers 
have noted, Singapore is often regarded as a global exemplar for its 
management of the city-state, but transport management involves very 
complex issues and we have had to ‘shift the debate’ in our own jurisdiction 
to achieve sustainable change.
I begin by asking how Singapore fares today. We have just celebrated 
50 years of nation-building since independence. We are a compact 
city-state with one level of government, unlike Australia, which has 
a  federal government and different states and territories. This makes 
things easier for us—decision-making is faster and centralised—but it 
also brings problems, which I will share. Our population is 5.5 million 
and still growing. Our land area is limited and housing already consumes 
14 per cent and roads a further 12 per cent of the available land mass. 
We realised some time ago that we cannot go on building roads; this is 
a reality we had to face.
1 All data and figures used in this chapter come from the Land Transport Authority, Singapore.
2  The views expressed herein are the author’s responsibility and may not reflect the views of the 
Land Transport Authority, Singapore.
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Singapore has changed enormously over the past 50 years, from a city 
of congestion and overcrowded, unreliable buses in the 1960s and 1970s 
to an efficient, sustainable urban transport system today.
So how did we do it? First, we put public transport at the core. We also 
made a deliberate choice to make public transport affordable, comfortable 
and reliable; and we wanted public transport to be viable or financially 
sustainable for the long term.
The statistics on our high-density transport system tell us that 7.7 million 
trips are taken daily—comprising 1 million taxi trips, close to 3 million rail 
trips and close to 4 million bus trips every day. The rail-based rapid transit 
system remains the backbone of the transport system, supplemented by 
the bus system. Buses provide comprehensive coverage, with more than 
350 routes and 4,552 buses in operation. We now have three bus service 
providers or operators, including two longstanding large operators, 
SMRT Buses and SBS Transit. In addition, we recently opened up the 
industry through a competitive tender process and the third provider, 
Tower Transit, started operation in early 2016. Bus fares and services are 
regulated as we transition to a bus service contracting model over the next 
two years.
Rail transport is the backbone of our system because it offers high-capacity 
rapid travel along the major corridors. Today we have two operators, 
SMRT  Trains and SBS Transit. We retain two operators because we 
believe in competition and want to do benchmarking comparisons of 
performance. Our rail system is still expanding; we started with 67 lines, 
we now have 182 and we are going to double that to 300-plus. Again, fares 
and services are regulated, and we have a competitive tendering regime in 
place to allow operators to compete for operating licences for rail services.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 indicate how we compare against other major cities in 
terms of usage and convenience of buses and rail, as well as our preference 
for public transport and low private car ownership (in terms of private cars 
per person and measured against gross domestic product (GDP)). These 
indicate that Singapore (circled in red) is unusual in many ways, especially 
compared with Sydney and Melbourne (shown circled by broken lines).
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Figure 5.1 Public bus and rail usage
Source: Local Transport Authority, Singapore .
Figure 5.2 Mode sharing versus private vehicle use
Source: Local Transport Authority, Singapore .
Singapore’s standing on these charts is a result not of chance, but of 
judicious planning and sound policy interventions. In Singapore, we 
control the growth of the number of vehicles and vehicle usage, and 
we have congestion pricing as a major component of traffic demand 
management. After Hong Kong, Tokyo and Seoul, Singapore is one of the 
heaviest users of public transport—and, again, Melbourne and Sydney 
are outliers.
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
76
But we still have challenges. Our population is projected to grow from 
5.5 million to 6.9 million by 2030—a figure we use for infrastructure 
planning. In undertaking future planning, we have to know the size of 
the market for which we are going to cater, so this expected increase in 
population is one of our key challenges. As mentioned, our land area is 
limited, so there are many competing demands and many trade-offs are 
necessary. We often try to design multiple uses for strategically located 
land (surface use as well as aerial and underground uses), which requires 
us to debate with the city planning authorities on land use allocation 
when we are planning transport facilities. We have to design our system 
to be commuter-centric and not planner-centric; people have changing 
needs and preferences and they seek to be engaged in decision-making. 
This desire for greater engagement has been raised in commuter surveys 
quite frequently in recent years. Another challenge we face is the issue of 
whether to operate public transport enterprises on a for-profit basis or on 
a desired performance basis. We are quite market driven in the provision 
of public transport services and the operations are profitable. But we 
have been debating how we can better balance the issue of profitability 
vis-à-vis the kind of performance the community wants to see—a kind 
of  social obligation that may be expected from these public transport 
service providers.
Planning for transport management
So how do we plan in practice? In transport planning, our strategy is 
to use  integrated land use and transport planning based on a ‘hub and 
spoke’ concept. It is quite straightforward (Figure 5.3). We have dormitory 
towns and new (or Housing Development Board (HDB)) towns where 
people live, and we service these with local feeder buses, which link to 
transport hubs and on to longer journey corridors, including the commute 
into the central city. We bring people via the feeder ‘spokes’ to the hub, 
and then into the city. There are great efficiencies here. We also use buses 
on long-haul journeys in corridors that are not yet served by mass rapid 
transit (MRT) trains. The most important thing here is that the transfers 
are seamless, and we focus on taking care of the first and last mile of the 
transport journey to complete commuter convenience.
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Figure 5.3 An integrated hub-and-spoke network
Source: Local Transport Authority, Singapore .
Our overall concept dates back to the 1970s; we refresh the plan every 
10 years, with the latest plan now developed for 2030 and beyond. Much 
of the central planning is coordinated by five key government agencies. 
The Land Transport Authority (LTA) is in charge of all land transport 
matters, while the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) is the central 
city planner. The Housing Development Board plans housing estates 
or towns, the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) develops industrial and 
business parks and the National Parks Board is in charge of making 
Singapore a city in a garden. With these key players in the government’s 
service, it is easier to organise coordination. Not that we don’t have 
problems; it is just that coordination becomes easier because these are the 
largest determiners of transport and land use planning parameters.
We believe a strategic long-term view is very important. Our planning 
horizon is 30 to 40 years, supplemented by mid-term master plans 
running out to 10 to 15 years. The near-term plans run for five to 10 years 
and are sometimes called planning feasibility studies. From these cascading 
plans, we in the LTA develop our rolling five-year road development 
program, the rail lines master plan and the bus network plan.
I have been asked many times: why does Singapore do such long-range 
planning? There are three main reasons. First, such planning makes 
economic sense as it helps us to maximise ‘value capture’ in the system. 
Because we plan ahead, we can promote high-density transit–oriented 
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development, optimise our land take and enhance overall system viability. 
Second—and probably most importantly—we can shape the travel 
patterns of commuters in terms of meeting transport demand with supply, 
and we can provide more travel options and reduce car dependency 
through better transport interconnectivity. Third, we also get the chance 
to safeguard our plan for future transport corridors by making provisions 
such as setting aside land and connecting facilities.
Let me provide two examples, which those who have been to Singapore 
may have seen in operation. Sengkang Town transport hub is a high-
quality  integrated development. It has good connectivity and transport 
choices: Light Rail Transit (LRT), heavy rail or MRT, buses and taxi 
drop-offs for passengers. Another example is the giant interchange facility 
at Dhoby Ghaut—something like one might see in Hong Kong or 
Tokyo. With five underground levels, the station connects three rail lines 
(the north–south, north–east and circle lines). Costing some S$268 million 
(A$259 million) and opened in 2003, it was among the first integrated 
transport hubs. The LTA developed a substantial commercial property 
above the station, including an 18-storey office tower, to capitalise on the 
value capture.
In planning transport facilities, we can be very obsessive about 
minimising the land take. As a road planner, every time I proposed adding 
an extra lane, I would be asked: ‘Why are you doing that? If you don’t 
need that, don’t do it! If you take one more lane, it’s less space for others, 
the shop frontages may have to go, the green planting strips will go.’ 
In the planning authority, we have a mechanism called the Master Planning 
Committee, which brings different agencies together to deliberate on land 
use allocations and to discuss options and trade-offs.
Land transport master plan
In the LTA, we have had three major planning rounds: 1995–96 saw our 
first white paper produced (the LTA was formed in 1995); in 2008, we 
revised the plan and called it the ‘Land Transport Master Plan (LTMP) 
2008’; and we issued a further LTMP in 2013. We are well into the 2013 
LTMP and are talking about the next version, due in late 2018. The 
five-year plan keeps changing because circumstances change quickly and 
we have to anticipate and plan ahead, as transport facilities are lumpy 
projects that take time to be realised. Currently, we have a set of clear 
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objectives aimed at enhancing the travel experience. These objectives are 
more connections, better service, liveable inclusive communities and a 
reduced reliance on private transport. These are then supported by specific 
and measurable targets to drive transport management: 75 per cent of 
journeys to be made on public transport; 85 per cent of journeys of less 
than 20 km to be completed in less than 60 minutes; and 80 per cent of 
households living within a 10-minute walk from a train station. These 
targets paint the picture, and we have to deliver them by 2030.
More connections
In terms of increasing connections, our rail network has expanded to 
more than 150 km, and we are building more rail lines very aggressively. 
The  rail network is becoming denser in terms of the interconnectivity 
of rail corridors, the latest being the Downtown Line, which will be 
completed in stages, from the north-west to the city centre and extending 
further to the east.
We have not forgotten buses, however. During the 1980s, when we were 
opening many new rail lines, we questioned whether we should discard or 
curtail bus routes because of the efficiency of rapid rail transport. We used 
the term ‘bus service rationalisation’, and reduced bus routes to avoid 
duplicating the rail lines and used them as feeders to the train stations. 
We are now returning buses to some corridors because they offer more 
choice, and people still want them.
Greater interest has also emerged in ‘active mobility’—more walking and 
more cycling, especially for the first and last mile of a journey. Singapore 
is a tropical city, so we are building a lot of covered walkways through the 
‘walk2ride’ program. These ideas are gaining a lot of traction and public 
acceptance and we are looking at how best to engage people and promote 
such movement.
Better service
As we expand our rail facilities, we also need to consider renewing and 
enhancing the existing network. Presently, we are changing our signalling 
systems to add capacity in terms of allowing more train trips. But we 
cannot build train lines overnight to meet immediate demands. Train 
lines are lumpy infrastructure and take about six to 10 years to be realised. 
So, while waiting for new lines to be built, we have decided to ramp up 
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our bus services. Through the Bus Service Enhancement Program (BSEP) 
launched in 2012, an additional 1,000 buses were added to do three 
things: improve connectivity in the interim, ease crowding and increase 
reliability. Besides adding more buses to increase capacity and create new 
services, we also introduced the Quality Incentive Framework, using 
market mechanisms to incentivise the operators to do better. This idea, 
taken from London, sees operators encouraged to overperform to gain 
additional payment for services, while, if they underperform, their service 
payment will be reduced.
While we have the BSEP in place, we need market signals to tell us whether 
the operators are efficient and whether we (and consumers) are paying 
the right price for the services. We are therefore moving to a bus service 
contracting model. We announced this decision in 2014; we introduced 
the first of two bus service contracting packages in 2015, which gave us 
some price information for the third package, awarded in 2016. Such 
information will enable us to negotiate with bus operators as we transition 
the remaining packages into the contracting model.
Another measure we have introduced is to shift behaviour in terms of 
managing peak demand. Peak-hour travel is always going to be a problem, 
but one way to deal with it is to incentivise commuters to travel outside 
peak hours—for example, by offering free travel before morning peak 
times. In economic terms, we are experimenting with the ‘power of free’ to 
change commuter behaviour. Currently, we offer free rides if commuters 
arrive in the city from selected stations. If commuters exit the stations 
before 7.45 am, they qualify for a free ride; they receive a discount on 
the normal fare if they are just outside that time (7.45–8 am). Leveraging 
on our ticketing system—which is a closed system using ‘tap in/tap out’ 
monitoring—we have implemented a scheme called the Travel Smart 
Reward, which allows commuters to earn points, much like a loyalty 
program. Off-peak travellers can play a game and win prizes, and this has 
proven to be a successful innovation.
Liveable and inclusive community
In terms of inclusivity, we have been making our trains and buses 
more accessible to the aged and people with disabilities. We recognise 
that Singapore has an ageing population who will need assistance with 
access. We also have to educate other transport users about the needs 
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of our elderly or disabled communities—even with simple things such as 
pedestrian crossings that are designed to make drivers slow down and give 
way to those seeking to cross.
Reducing reliance on private transport
In relation to private transport, we have sought to change the narrative 
from ‘I want a car’ to ‘why would I want a car?’. This is a real challenge, 
but it  will eventually be achieved. Some years ago, when I visited 
Copenhagen, the ‘cycling city’, I asked locals, ‘Would you ever consider 
owning a car?’ The question had not even occurred to them. They said: ‘Why 
would I want to own a car? Cycling is fine by me.’ So, in Copenhagen—
even with a lower population density than Singapore—locals do not seek 
to own cars and prefer bike riding. In contrast, Singapore, with its higher 
density, has developed public transport as our preferred strategy to reduce 
private car ownership and congestion.
We control vehicle ownership through the vehicle quota system, which 
has been in place since 1991. As can be seen from Figure 5.4, we have 
significantly cut the rate of growth in vehicle ownership through use of 
the quota system. If a person wishes to own a vehicle, they must place 
a bid in a public auction for a Certificate of Entitlement (CoE), and only 
if they are successful can a vehicle be bought. As the supply of CoE reduces 
in tandem with controls on the vehicle growth rate, the auction price 
increases. Today, Singaporeans have to pay about S$70,000 (A$67,600) 
just to secure a piece of paper entitling them to buy a car—an increase 
from S$10,000 (A$9,700) in the mid to late 2000s—while the quota of 
new CoEs has fallen from 2,500 per bidding exercise to just 500. The cost 
of a CoE is therefore two to three times the price of a medium-sized car.
To further constrain vehicle usage, we use Electronic Road Pricing (ERP), 
which began as a manual Area Licensing Scheme (ALS) in 1975, and 
has been in place since 1998, when the technology became available. 
Our system is a usage charging system based on a cordoned area and 
a point along a road. One of the benefits of going fully electronic was 
that it eliminated the need to staff the gantries to check on vehicles 
passing through. Our narrative with this policy is very clear: ERP is about 
congestion pricing; it is not about collecting tolls for road maintenance 
or repair.
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Figure 5.4 Ownership restraint: Vehicle quota system
Source: Local Transport Authority, Singapore .
Setting the appropriate ERP rate is very important. Our rates vary 
according to the time of day and location. Rates will increase or decrease 
depending on whether the speeds along the road are more or less than the 
defined speed ranges, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. We review the charges 
every three months. This is to ensure we are setting the right price signal. 
Motorists can read the amount to be charged every time they pass through 
the ERP gantries, with each deduction accompanied by a sound effect 
that reminds the driver they are paying for that trip.
Figure 5.5 Spatial and temporal flexibility in Electronic Road Pricing
Source: Local Transport Authority, Singapore .
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The defined speed ranges are determined by the speed flow curves 
and correspond with the optimal level of service (LoS) for traffic flow. 
Figure  5.6 shows the speed flow curve for expressways. If the average 
speed decreases (meaning more congestion), we increase the ERP rate; 
similarly, if it increases, we decrease the rate. We believe we have to be 
very clear about the rates and by how much and when they are adjusted.
Figure 5.6 Determining speed ranges
Source: Local Transport Authority, Singapore .
In many ways, our ERP is fair, and we can monitor traffic conditions in 
terms of congestion measured by average speed and adjust our charging 
regime. During school holidays, for example, we remove the charges 
because there is no congestion, which people think is fair. So the integrity 
of the system works when drivers recognise that when and where roads are 
congested, they pay a charge, but when they are not congested, the charge 
is reduced or removed. We are considering extending the ERP to include 
charging by distance travelled, which will be more cost efficient for the 
city, and increasing charges for parking.
Since 1975, congestion has not increased in Singapore’s CBD, despite 
significant increases in vehicle use. Figure 5.7 shows the effectiveness 
of congestion charging.
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Figure 5.7 Effectiveness of Area Licensing Scheme and Electronic 
Road Pricing
Source: Local Transport Authority, Singapore .
Future mobility
In terms of future mobility in the city, we are planning for an era 
of ‘smart mobility’, including developing ‘ERP2’ with Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) technology to avoid building more gantries. 
We will introduce advanced big-data analytics, better demand management 
and an intelligent transport system as set out in our smart mobility vision 
for 2030.
In terms of autonomous vehicles (AVs), we are looking at four main 
issues: fixed and scheduled services, point-to-point mobility on demand, 
freight and utility. We believe that AV—appropriately applied to provide 
mobility solutions—can help to reduce demand for car ownership, 
reduce road congestion during peak hours and reduce reliance on human 
resources. We think we are in a good position to make this happen as 
we work promptly on the three key enablers: regulation, technology and 
public acceptance.
We cannot allow our city-state to become dysfunctional because of 
congestion—as so many global cities already are. Our vision is quite clear. 
We have four objectives. First, build more connectivity into the system. 
Second, provide better services that people want and use. Third, open 
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the system to all, enabling us to enhance our liveability and maintain an 
inclusive community. And fourth, reduce the level of car ownership to 
minimise congestion. At the centre of our land transport management 
is government regulation—regulation that is strategic, has community 
acceptance and is supported by smart technology to produce better 
outcomes. Congestion is a cost we all suffer unless it is well managed and 
alternatives are attractive. We need to be focused on long-term planning, 
because it clearly sets out our future directions and allows us to manage 
accordingly. We believe in using economic transaction-based price signals 
to inform policy and manage the transport system. Our intent is to use 
market signals and incentives (or disincentives) to change behaviour to 
enable the optimal operating viability and best cost–benefit ratio for the 
community. That is how we work.

Section 3: Road pricing
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Is pricing road transport 
significantly different to pricing 
other network infrastructure?
Alex Robson
Introduction
Australian governments have faced a number of challenges implementing 
significant policy reforms over the past few decades. The road transport 
sector is one area where reform has proved particularly challenging. 
Explaining the problems associated with road usage—especially in relation 
to funding issues, maintenance, road pricing and congestion charging—
is not an easy task. In many areas, we already have user charging for the 
private enjoyment of publicly provided goods (for example, universities, 
utilities, rail transport and ports), but not generally in relation to roads, 
outside a few toll corridors and tunnels. Many argue that this situation 
will need to change to ensure a more efficient allocation of scarce resources 
and to align supply with demand.
Proponents of user charging argue that it is intended to serve two broad 
economic purposes. On the demand side, user charges are intended to 
provide a transparent price signal of the direct opportunity or resource 
costs of a project to those who derive direct benefits from its provision. 
The main idea behind such a price signal is that the introduction of a user 
charge will encourage efficient resource utilisation of a given facility—
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in economic terms, up to the point where marginal benefits equal marginal 
resource costs. This price signal will have the effect of limiting the possibility 
that the facility will be over-utilised. The second objective relates to the 
supply side: appropriately designed user-charging arrangements may 
provide a signal to the private sector and the government, assisting them 
to allocate resources efficiently across a range of projects and other uses, so 
policy objectives can be achieved in a cost-effective manner.
Although price signals can in principle help to achieve these objectives, 
they  are by no means a panacea. Across Australia, we currently have 
a  range of indirect forms of road charging that raise funds, but which 
on the whole do not provide direct price signals for usage. For passenger 
vehicles, the main levy is the Commonwealth’s fuel excise, which is 
estimated to amount to a tax of 5.5 cents per kilometre travelled by 
motorists. We  also  have other indirect user charges—such as myriad 
vehicle registration fees and motor vehicle stamp duties on new vehicles 
and transfers of ownership. Australia, therefore, currently has a two-part 
cost recovery scheme for road use involving both federal and state levels 
of government, with ‘fixed’ charges represented by vehicle registration 
requirements plus a ‘marginal’ charge through the fuel excise levy, which is 
tied to usage. One of the main problems today—and a principal concern 
for policymakers—is that the marginal charge does not always reflect 
social marginal costs. Many argue, for example, that charges are too low 
on congested roads and too high on uncongested roads.
Marginal cost and average cost pricing
Most of the economic issues associated with pricing are not new. Figure 6.1 
shows an idealised example of an infrastructure project. Average costs 
(AC) of supply, which include fixed, upfront construction costs, tend to 
be higher than the marginal cost (MC).
In Figure 6.1, when marginal benefits (MB) (at the point Q*) equal 
marginal costs (MC), we have an efficient level of output (but note the 
exception discussed below). The problem is that if the facility has fixed 
costs (AC), the public (or private) entity that is going to run such facilities 
will run at a loss under marginal cost pricing, since average costs exceed 
marginal costs. The rectangle between D–AC–MC represents the fact 
that this entity is running at a loss, and that loss has to be subsidised 
from somewhere. This is a well-known, fundamental issue with marginal 
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cost pricing: even though it generally could be implemented, it is not 
necessarily ‘incentive compatible’ in that it will not align usage with 
average costs or allow the owner to break even.
Figure 6.1 Marginal cost pricing
Source: Author’s work .
Another issue in relation to marginal cost pricing is the argument put 
forward by Ronald Coase (1946). Suppose that government provides 
a good or service and commits to price it at a marginal cost. If fixed costs 
are high—so that average costs remain high—then under the marginal 
cost pricing rule we could achieve some ‘optimal’ level of usage at Q*. 
At this point, marginal benefits appear to equal marginal costs, but what 
could in fact occur is that the project is socially wasteful (see Figure 6.2). 
The reason is the fixed costs are just too high. So, in this situation, it is 
straightforward to design an infrastructure pricing scheme for which the 
price equals marginal costs, but this is a project that should not go ahead 
at all. In summary, we can get people to reveal their demand curve by 
having some sort of pricing scheme where price equals the marginal cost, 
but that does not necessarily have anything to do with whether the project 
is a good idea in the first place. In cases like this, Coase proposed the idea 
of a two-part tariff, with an access fee to cover fixed costs and a price per 
unit equal to marginal costs.
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Figure 6.2 Marginal cost pricing may produce a socially wasteful outcome
Source: Author’s work .
Another alternative is average cost pricing (see Figure 6.3). The issue here 
is that we immediately get an efficiency loss: the project breaks even, but 
there is a deadweight loss triangle because price exceeds marginal cost. 
This is a second-best outcome. We may be willing to put up with that, 
but it is not a first-best solution.
Figure 6.3 Average cost pricing
Source: Author’s work .
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A practical issue with average cost pricing concerns implementation. 
If the average cost curve cuts the demand curve at two or more points, 
we have to decide which average cost will actually be charged. Figure 6.4 
shows this situation. At the point (P0, Q0), price equals average cost, so 
the project breaks even. But this is not a second-best point, because the 
deadweight loss is higher than it would be at the other point in the diagram 
where the average cost curve cuts the demand curve. So an average cost 
pricing rule provides only a partial answer in this situation.
Figure 6.4 Average cost pricing: Which average cost?
Source: Author’s work .
A final difficulty with average cost pricing is that it may not even be 
feasible—in the following sense. In Figure 6.5, the area under the demand 
curve far outweighs the total cost of the project, so this is a project that is 
socially beneficial. But there is no average cost price that exists here that 
will allow the project to break even. The basic lesson is that, although 
these pricing rules—marginal cost and average cost pricing—are simple 
in theory, they are likely to face a range of difficulties in practice.
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Figure 6.5 Average cost pricing: Existence?
Source: Author’s work .
Congestion pricing
Policymakers often face a range of other issues in relation to road users. 
One well-known issue is the concentrated times that consumers use the 
infrastructure. This raises issues around congestion pricing. When there is 
high road use, a road becomes an example of an ‘open access’ or ‘common 
pool’ resource: it is non-excludable, but rival in consumption. Congestion 
is a classic example of a ‘negative externality’, and we get non-price 
rationing in the form of queuing and long delays. This likely represents 
an efficiency loss, as some people with higher-value uses face delays and 
the social cost of lost time, and the congestion may have even completely 
excluded some high-value users.
The idea of congestion pricing is that it tries to produce a better allocation 
of that road space to high-value users. Roads with high-value users can 
gain, but those with low value can potentially lose. Figure 6.6 illustrates 
a situation in which we have a classic example of a congestion externality: 
at the margin, social costs exceed private costs. The optimal outcome here 
is to set a Pigouvian tax or charge that reflects the ‘negative externality’ 
at the optimum, which is at Q* in Figure 6.6. In the absence of a charge, 
we get a welfare loss of G, which is the sum of the excess of social costs at 
the margin over social benefits at the margin from driving.
95
6 . IS PRICInG RoAD TRAnSPoRT SIGnIFICAnTLy DIFFeRenT?
Optimal congestion pricing operates as follows. At point Q**, social 
marginal benefits equal social marginal costs. The optimal charge is the 
gap between marginal benefits and costs at this point, and is indicated on 
the vertical axis on the left-hand side of the figure. When this charge is 
introduced, there are some people who will be ‘tolled off’ (lying between 
Q* and Q**), and they will choose to no longer drive, reducing overall 
demand. Naturally, they are personally going to lose out, as shown in area 
F—the excess of their private benefits over the costs they faced before the 
charge was introduced.
On the other hand, road users who continue to use the road will have 
quicker commute times, because now their costs of travelling are lower 
by C plus D. But notice that their travel cost, plus the monetary cost 
(A plus B), is actually higher than the total travel costs they initially faced.
Figure 6.6 Congestion pricing
Source: Author’s work .
This brings us to one of the major potential problems with congestion road 
pricing—and one that could explain why it has not taken off in Australia: 
at the optimal charge, people who continue to drive will be worse off. 
They save on their travel time, but the optimal charge increases their 
overall costs of travel. Society as a whole gains, because the government 
gains revenue from the toll. The net social gain is G (we have eliminated 
the original deadweight loss). Equivalently, the net gain is C plus D minus 
F, which is equivalent to the area G.
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In summary, the issue governments face is that drivers who are going to be 
tolled will in fact face a charge that—from an individually rational point 
of view—they do not want to pay. Simply put, when we levy the optimal 
toll, people are going to feel it in their hip pocket and will feel directly 
worse off—even though there is less congestion. So, although cultural 
or historical factors may be important for explaining why tolls have 
been unpopular in Australia, economics provides us with an alternative 
explanation: drivers may be worse off, even though congestion falls and 
society as a whole is better off.
This suggests that while it is always possible to think in the abstract about 
an efficient congestion pricing regime, implementing such a charge is 
going to be very difficult politically. Governments would need to persuade 
people that this is a good idea, either by using the revenue wisely or by 
carefully hypothecating it and using it as a sort of persuasive device 
(which may have its own efficiency costs).
Other practical difficulties with 
congestion pricing
Measuring benefits
There is a range of other practical difficulties that governments face if 
they are trying to convince people that congestion pricing is a good 
idea. In assessing any congestion pricing scheme, it is important to take 
care that we are counting benefits properly. Measurements of the total 
costs of congestion abound, but from an economic point of view they 
are not particularly interesting. What should ultimately be of interest 
to policymakers are the congestion costs that are avoided if an optimal 
pricing scheme is implemented. Some amount of congestion is efficient; 
it would not be optimal to have no congestion at all. The upper bound 
of the net benefit of congestion charging is the area G in Figure 6.6 
(and  it  really is an upper bound, because congestion pricing schemes 
can be costly to run). Importantly, notwithstanding the total costs of 
congestion, if a significant portion of the revenue from congestion pricing 
is spent on collection costs, or is wasted, this could outweigh the benefits, 
G, and the pricing scheme could actually make society worse off.
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On the other hand, there are other benefits to consider. In addition to 
savings in journey times for commuters, there are reductions in fuel 
use and pollution emissions. Accident externalities and their associated 
costs may also fall, although this is by no means certain; a reduction in 
congestion may induce commuters to drive faster. In the long run, society 
may also benefit from a better allocation of road space.
Spillover effects
Another well-known difficulty is the potential for charging on one road 
to have spillover effects on to untolled roads. Introducing a charge on 
one road may simply divert traffic and worsen congestion on other roads. 
Any  real-world assessment of congestion pricing ought to account for 
these costs as well.
Figure 6.7 Example 1: Incomplete congestion charging
Source: Author’s work .
Figure 6.7 illustrates the theory, but there are many examples of this 
in practical policymaking. Alcohol taxation—specifically, the recent 
‘alcopops tax’ (introduced in 2008)—is a good case in point. The alcopops 
tax was supposedly designed as a kind of Pigouvian tax on certain types 
of alcoholic beverages. The practical problem was that it was easy to 
substitute alcopops for other types of alcoholic beverages with their own 
social costs. If those costs have not been priced correctly, there will be 
a negative welfare effect from switching to those other things that could 
outweigh the positive effect of reduced alcopop consumption. The same 
phenomenon is possible with higher tobacco taxation, where the effect 
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of reducing tobacco use might be that consumers switch to other socially 
undesirable things (such as hard drugs or other illegal substances), which 
themselves are not taxed in the optimum Pigouvian way.
Other examples abound. With congestion pricing, the concern is that 
while we may be able to reduce congestion on one road, this may lead 
to people doing ‘rat runs’—using other roads—and simply shifting the 
congestion into other areas. This then reduces the welfare gains identified 
in Figure 6.5, and we could end up with a negative overall welfare effect 
if these other distortions are large enough.
Another possible difficulty with congestion charges is that, while there will 
be fewer people choosing to drive, they may not have alternative modes 
of transport (such as convenient, easily accessible, inexpensive public 
transport). In response to a congestion charge, individuals may decide 
to not work at all. This would reduce labour supply, which is already 
distorted by other taxes such as income taxes, payroll taxes and the goods 
and services tax (GST). So there could be a welfare loss in the labour 
market that needs to be accounted for (see Figure 6.8).
Figure 6.8 Example 2: Interaction with labour taxes
Source: Author’s work .
These spillover effects may seem like esoteric points, but in the real 
world they are very important. The essential point is that we are likely to 
produce unwanted spillover effects in markets that are already distorted 
and, if these effects are large enough, we need to count them in any cost–
benefit analysis of road pricing.
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Forecasting demand
Another practical difficulty in regards to road pricing in Australia is 
forecasting performance. The simple models examined above assumed 
that policymakers knew what traffic demand looked like and how it 
would respond to the introduction of a toll. If the traffic forecast turns 
out to be wrong, additional costs can ensue. Suppose, for example, that 
the government has implemented a toll in such a way as to balance out 
expected marginal benefits and expected marginal costs. Figure 6.9 shows 
what that toll might look like. If, however, actual demand turns out to be 
lower than expected, from an efficiency point of view, the imposed toll 
should have been lower. In Figure 6.9, the toll is far too high, producing 
a social loss because the traffic forecast was wrong.
Figure 6.9 Social costs of poor traffic demand forecasting performance
Source: Author’s work .
This has been a genuine problem in Australia. Table 6.1, which was put 
together by Robert Bianchi at Griffith University, shows the performance 
of toll roads in Australia over the past decade or so. In most cases, it has 
not been good. Li and Hensher (2010) point out that demand forecast 
errors in Australia have, on average, been minus 45 per cent—actual 
demand tends to be 45 per cent lower than predicted. The cost of over-
forecasting demand is one that must be taken into account when we are 
thinking about the benefits and costs of various policies.
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Table 6.1 Average toll road traffic performance since 2000
Source: Robert Bianchi .
Congestion charging as monopoly pricing
Another issue that could arise in practice is if congestion charging is used 
purely as a revenue-raising device. Governments are often in positions 
where they are pure monopoly providers of roads and can therefore charge 
a price (or allow a private provider to charge a price) that maximises profits, 
rather than the optimal congestion charge. In Figure 6.10, the price 
charged is relatively high, but the welfare loss caused by the monopoly 
pricing here is shown in the shaded area to the left. The welfare gain that 
could have been obtained is the shaded area to the right. It is not clear 
which of those triangles is larger here; if governments are going to use 
road pricing just as a revenue-raising device and act like a pure monopoly, 
they could end up making things worse.
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Figure 6.10 Congestion charging as a pure revenue-raising device
Source: Author’s work .
Conclusion: The importance of rigorous 
cost–benefit analysis
All of this points to the need for careful cost–benefit analysis of pricing 
schemes and road charges, because it is by no means a foregone conclusion 
that pricing is always going to provide net benefits. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, in theory, we can think of cases where pricing schemes are 
a good idea, but it is just as easy to think of cases where they are not.
One of the main reasons for undertaking a rigorous cost–benefit analysis 
is to reduce or eliminate theoretical ambiguities and deal with two types 
of errors:
• There is a policy that is beneficial, but is not adopted because the initial 
assessment is that it is not beneficial—and no cost–benefit analysis is 
conducted to demonstrate that the initial perception is incorrect.
• A bad project goes ahead (but would not have proceeded if a cost–
benefit analysis had been undertaken).
A good cost–benefit analysis will not always give the perfect answer 
or completely eliminate uncertainties, but it will tend to reduce the 
probabilities of making these kinds of policy errors.
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I conclude with a word of caution from a well-known infrastructure 
example that illustrates what can happen in public policy when 
policymakers do not use cost–benefit analyses appropriately: the National 
Broadband Network. No cost–benefit analysis of the initial rollout of 
fibre-optic cable was undertaken, and costs and timing have subsequently 
blown out. Ergas and Robson (2009) undertook such an analysis and 
found that the project’s costs would exceed its benefits by somewhere 
between $40 billion and $20 billion, depending on the discount rate 
used. A proper cost–benefit analysis would have identified many of the 
subsequent construction and cost risks.
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Using road pricing as a viable 
option to meet Australia’s future 
road funding needs
Brendan Lyon
Australia faces two problems in road transportation: on the supply side, 
we face diminishing revenues to maintain and expand the road network; 
and, on the demand side, we lack any effective tools to manage congestion 
or shape peak demand periods.
Together, these factors see lower capital, productive and allocative 
efficiency in road transport—hence our rapidly escalating economic 
and social costs. Various reports by the Productivity Commission, the 
Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE), 
Infrastructure Australia, Infrastructure Partnerships Australia and others 
outline these challenges.
In this chapter, I will discuss where we can act to address these essential 
transport challenges, what this might mean for the road network and 
users and what it (ideally) means for those who are working in policy roles 
with the government—and why you should be enthusiastic and actively 
involved in this issue.
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Everything old is new again
User charges through both public tolls and even identifiable early 
forerunners of modern road public–private partnerships (PPPs) have been 
used from the earliest days of colonial Australia.
The first toll way, a bridge, opened in 1802, just 14 years after the 
First Fleet made landfall and almost a century before Federation (New 
South Wales Parliament Legislative Council 2017). Indeed, by the later 
nineteenth century, colonial Sydney had numerous tolling plazas, with 
tolls levied to fund the expansion and maintenance of the road network.
Modern road PPPs also have recognisable precedent in colonial times. 
The original Pyrmont Bridge in Sydney is one such example. Opening 
in 1858, the bridge was privately developed and financed, with colonial 
legislation granting a right to the owners to levy a differential toll on 
users—essentially the same as a modern PPP.
This relatively long history of tolls and charges involved community issues 
similar to those in modern times. Figure 7.1 is an excerpt from an 1863 
letter to the Sydney Morning Herald by Mr John Pendrill, complaining 
about aspects of the Pyrmont Bridge charge. I note that Mr Pendrill 
continued to use the bridge—because it was convenient.
Figure 7.1 Variable tolling in 1863
Source: Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1863 .
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Pendrill’s letter reflects two points that remain true today. First, while 
people will never love paying for access, they will pay where it provides 
value. This relates to Alex Robson’s point (Chapter 6, this volume) about 
choosing the right assets, with the right capacity and in the right places. 
The second point is that opposition to user charging is not new; it has 
always been and remains a sharp aspect of the infrastructure debate.
From road tolls to road pricing
Beyond individual ‘facility’ tollways, a wider concept of whole-network 
road user models has a much shorter history. The Industry Commission 
(now Productivity Commission) developed road pricing concepts in its 
Rail Transport report (Industry Commission 1991).
While that report principally considered the operational structure 
of public sector railways, it also developed a case for rationalised, cost-
reflective transport pricing across the wider transport network, across 
modes and across different journey types. This work shows the very high 
level of policy sophistication in the Industry Commission at that time, 
given that enabling technologies such as the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) and even free-flow tolling based on radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) were yet to come into existence.
Revenue decay creates a burning platform 
for change
Our analysis of contemporary transport infrastructure funding sources 
showed substantial decay in the Commonwealth fuel excise, with 
the earlier de-indexation of the fuel tax and a consumer shift towards 
fuel-efficient vehicles combining to halve federal fuel excise revenues 
as a proportion of receipts.
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia released its first volume of work on 
the structure of Australia’s road transport market in early 2010, reflecting 
our view that structural change in some form was unavoidable because 
of this debased revenue model. Reflecting the Industry Commission’s 
(much) earlier work, our paper developed concepts for a system where the 
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
106
road-related taxes and charges become a fundamental response to improve 
the productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency challenges affecting 
Australia’s transport system.
Ultimately, our paper resolved the abolition of the current federal/state 
‘fuel tax plus rego’ two-part tariff in favour of a much more sophisticated 
and equitable pricing model, with charges calculated on:
• the distance travelled
• vehicle mass
• the location of use
• the time of day.
This is an economically efficient but radically different model to what 
we are used to—a pricing model that allows costs of use, including 
congestion, to be made explicit to the user rather than absorbed by the 
community at large.
Road pricing and funding reform principles
Noting the potential for (sometimes extreme) community and political 
sensitivity to major reform options, we released our 2010 paper to develop 
key concepts, but also to provide a basis for discussion of the issue with 
policymakers and, particularly, with the major motoring clubs.
This was deliberate because, practically, road pricing would be unlikely to 
receive any degree of policy consideration if the key user groups opposed it.
In what is an enduring credit to Australia’s motoring clubs, far from being 
opposed to change, they were highly engaged and highly knowledgeable. 
Brian Negus from the Royal Automobile Club of Victoria (RACV) and 
then CEO of the Australian Automobile Association (AAA) Andrew 
McKellar deserve particular credit for their willingness to engage and 
to lead on this issue—as does Michael Bradley, the current AAA CEO.
By 2014, our partnership with the motoring clubs saw us jointly release 
a major study called Road Pricing and Transport Infrastructure Funding: 
Reform pathways for Australia (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2014). 
It is available on the Infrastructure Partnerships Australia website and is 
an interesting piece of work.
107
7 . USInG RoAD PRICInG AS A vIABLe oPTIon To MeeT AUSTRALIA’S FUTURe RoAD
This paper addressed important questions, particularly around how 
rationalised pricing might affect typical users—for example, people in 
regional areas.
In this way, it allowed the motoring clubs to adopt a position on this 
difficult issue—and, in so doing, to signal to policymakers they were up 
for a process of serious structural change.
While we have not published on this yet, the revenue hypothecation aspect 
of our reformed pricing model should be supported by complementary 
measures to enhance the dynamic efficiency of road transport, through 
adopting utility-type regulation of capital investments and operating 
expenditures. This could inform user price setting, but also simultaneously 
take road transport legitimately ‘off budget’ and remove it from political 
or geographic bias in capital expenditures.
The four fundamental problems in Australia’s 
contemporary road transport sector
Our 2014 paper identified four fundamental problems:
1. The revenue model is fundamentally debased.
2. There is an opaque connection between revenue collection and 
network investment.
3. There is a lack of sophistication in the two-part tariff pricing model 
(as also noted by Alex Robson in this volume).
4. The current pricing model sees inequitable outcomes for user groups.
We resolved that, for these fundamental reasons, the current system is not 
sustainable in the longer term without change.
The terminal revenue model
Figure 7.2 shows the terminal decay of the Commonwealth fuel excise, 
which, by 2010–11, had almost halved in proportional terms. This has 
been led by two factors. First, the biannual indexation of fuel excise to the 
consumer price index (CPI) was abolished in 2001 and not reintroduced 
until 2014–15. The second, continuing and now accelerating factor is the 
community’s shift to fuel-efficient, hybrid and ‘fuel-free’ electric vehicles.
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Figure 7.2 Fuel excise as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP)
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
It’s opaque
A key benefit of structural change is the opportunity to fundamentally 
connect what users are charged with what funds are expended—and on 
what. The current system has developed organically over a century or so, 
with predictably confused structures and a resulting lack of transparency 
and accountability. Figure 7.3 describes the status quo.
A key aspect of our model is the hypothecation of road-related taxes 
and charges to transport—thereby insulating motorists from subsidising 
consolidated revenue—and insulating state treasuries from subsidising 
motorists.
Hypothecation would allow the revenue collection envelope to 
be calculated, based on determination of allowed levels of capital 
investment, and transparency and review of the cost to motorists from the 
operation and maintenance of the wider road network.
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Figure 7.3 There is no link between revenue and investment
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
It’s unsophisticated
While the fuel excise was designed to price road consumption, it cannot 
make fuel consumed in peak hour in Melbourne or Sydney more 
expensive than fuel consumed on, for example, a regional road. This 
means the road pricing model lacks the sophistication to manage urban 
congestion—the most obvious, the most frustrating and the most costly 
transport challenge.
Australia’s road network is available 24 hours a day; it endures excessive 
demand during the relatively short commuter and weekend peaks in 
major cities, but it also sees massive underutilisation during other periods, 
particularly overnight. There is a practical limit to the number of new 
lanes that can be built on motorways, meaning that some form of demand 
management will be needed in key areas.
Congestion could be resolved through the type of cordon or area 
charging schemes considered and assessed in our paper (and discussed by 
Alex Robson in Chapter 6); but in our work we found that this would 
neglect the important opportunities to increase the overall performance 
of road transport.
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The Productivity Commission has recently produced two reports on the 
pricing and funding of roads that attempted to resolve such important 
transport issues. The first report, chaired by Gary Banks in 2006, attempted 
to calculate the actual costs of road and rail freight infrastructure, with 
a view to introducing user charging for heavy road usage. It also attempted 
to calculate the costs of congestion. The second report, in 2015, chaired 
by Peter Harris, looked more broadly at user charging and optimal models 
for road funding and reflects the concepts in Infrastructure Partnerships 
Australia’s work on the topic. This second report contained two important 
recommendations (DIRD 2014: 11):
Recommendation 8.1
The first step in a long-term transition to a more efficient and effective 
approach to the provision and funding of roads should be the establishment 
of Road Funds by State and Territory Governments. State Governments, 
and local government associations, should actively encourage and support 
local governments to form regional Road Funds for networks of local 
roads. To be effective, Road Funds should:
• have the objective of clearly linking road-user preferences with 
investment and maintenance decisions
• integrate the tasks of road funding and provision
• have a significant degree of autonomy
• have access to adequate revenue to meet the costs of the road network 
they administer, as required by the relevant road users
• entail transparent processes for determining the level and allocation 
of funds
• include an open and transparent procedure for direct involvement 
of road users and consultation with the broader community on project 
selection, funding, and road charging decisions
• involve systematic post-project evaluation and periodic review of the 
arrangements.
The implementation of Road Funds should take into account the research 
and analysis developed for heavy vehicles by the Heavy Vehicle Charging 
and Investment reform project …
Recommendation 4.1
The Australian Government should actively encourage State and Territory 
Governments to undertake pilot studies on how vehicle telematics could 
be used for distance and location charging of cars and other light vehicles. 
To do so, the Australian Government should: 
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• offer to partly fund these pilot studies
• work with the States and Territories to address privacy concerns and 
share lessons from the trials and overseas experience
• ensure that motorists are directly involved via roads and motorists 
associations.
The pilot studies should be designed to inform future consideration 
of a shift to direct road user charging for cars and other light vehicles, 
with the revenue hypothecated to roads. Heavy vehicle trials could 
also be developed on a similar basis. The Road Funds proposed in 
recommendation 8.1 could be tasked to undertake the trials if this does 
not result in unreasonable delay.
What are we trying to achieve?
Across policy work, Infrastructure Partnerships Australia emphasises the 
need to identify the fundamental outcomes sought through change.
In our 2014 paper on road pricing, we refined these ‘first principles’ into 
a simple assessment framework through which to analyse the spectrum of 
potential pricing models. We filtered these models against their ability 
to deliver:
• adequate revenue to sustainably fund transport network expansions 
such as new roads
• adequate revenue to fund appropriate maintenance
• a fairer allocation of costs and benefits in the transport market
• funding stream security
• improved network performance.
It’s nice to have options
Cordon or area charging was the first model we assessed. The community 
is broadly familiar with these types of schemes, which operate, for 
example, in London, Stockholm, Milan and Singapore. Our assessment 
showed that while these are relatively simple to design and implement and 
observably effective in dealing with congestion, there are limitations to 
simply bolting on additional charges in particular areas.
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Table 7.1 Cordon area pricing assessment
 = partially .
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
Next, we assessed a ‘national highway improvement charge’, a facility 
charge that would see revenue collected from, and reinvested in, particular 
roads, corridors or networks. This approach could allow the cost of 
particular roads or networks to be removed from government budgets—
similar to some European networks such as Italy’s Autostrada. As with 
cordon charging, this type of approach was found to be too limited when 
compared with the breadth of challenges facing Australian transport.
Table 7.2 Highway improvement charge assessment
 = partially .
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
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Having rejected limited pricing models applying to all vehicles, but only 
on parts of the network, we next assessed a model that would apply 
to the whole network—but only to particular vehicles, such as freight 
vehicles. This kind of ‘whole of network, partial fleet’ pricing model 
offers substantial benefits in terms of a detailed trial for a broader road 
pricing reform, and could conceivably be progressively rolled out to 
cover additional vehicle classes. Logically, however, the full benefits of 
the pricing signals offered by a whole-of-network model would not be 
realised when only particular vehicles are covered, so the scheme only 
partially meets most of the objectives laid out for road pricing reform 
(see Table 7.3).
Table 7.3 Network pricing assessment
 = partially .
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
Logically, given the scale of misallocations, inefficiencies, cross-subsidies 
and revenue decay in road transport, we found that enduring solutions 
could only be found through fundamental, systemic change.
Our universal road user charging (URUC) model would cover all vehicles 
and the entire road network and see the existing ‘fuel tax plus rego’ charges 
abolished, replaced with on-vehicle charging based on the time, mass, 
distance and location of use.
As shown in Table 7.4, our URUC delivered the broadest range of 
benefits, but would represent the deepest and widest microeconomic 
reform in several decades—no mean feat in today’s policy environment!
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Table 7.4 Assessment of universal road user charging model
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
Table 7.5 shows the simplified options analysis, with the existing 
framework of road user charging used as the base case for assessment.
Table 7.5 Comparison of options
 = partially .
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
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Impacts on users
To allow a thorough assessment of the typical user price impacts that might 
be expected under the proposed URUC, we defined a number of ‘test users’. 
The rationale for generating test users was to provide a sample of different 
types of light vehicle to compare and contrast the different components of 
the model and provide ‘real-world’ user comparisons against the existing 
charging regime. These test users are shown in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4 Avatars representing different road user profiles
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
Peter, the first avatar, owns a single vehicle, which he drives a few times 
a week for personal use on short trips, and a light commercial vehicle that 
he uses for his business. Under the URUC model we applied, he would 
pay 23 per cent less because he is a low mileage user outside the city. This 
is important, because one of the fears regional motorists have, by virtue of 
the long distances they need to travel, is that they might have to pay more. 
In fact, the model we applied shows there is a very large cross-subsidy that 
comes from capital city users and goes across to non–capital city users.
Graham, the second avatar, has two cars, an Audi A4 and a Jeep Cherokee. 
He drives to work every day along a highly utilised motorway corridor 
north-west of Sydney and his wife drives short distances in the local 
area—for example, for the school drop-off. We found for this household 
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a roughly 10 per cent cost increase. For Graham, it is a 45 per cent increase, 
but there is a substantial decrease for his wife. Again, it shows that, across 
the household, the outcome is fairer.
Leanne, our third avatar, is a nurse from south-eastern Queensland. 
Leanne does not drive in the capital city and there is a large cross-subsidy 
that is flowing through from her road use, resulting in a 23 per cent 
reduction in her costs. Additionally, she does not travel during peak times.
Table 7.6 shows a comparison of the new charges estimated under the 
URUC model with charges under the current system. The structure put 
forward would see no greater cost burden on users as a whole; rather, 
it would redistribute charges to better reflect true costs (including 
externalities) and benefits. Before implementation of a similar scheme 
(or  any reform to road user charging), detailed analysis of the price 
elasticity of demand will be required. However, if structured correctly 
and priced efficiently, a rational road user charging model would see 
appropriate and intended shifts in the demand profile.
Table 7.6 Estimate of new road use charges in 2012 dollars
Source: Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2014) .
Conclusion
It is easy to be grim about the lack of breadth and ambition in Australia’s 
contemporary policy debate, when even relatively simple reforms with 
clear national benefits are unable to progress.
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But there are positive portents the road transport debate will end up 
heading in good directions, with the transport policy debate already 
fundamentally changing in the past few years. The motoring clubs are 
a key reason for this.
The typical role of user groups in a reform debate is to clamour for more 
investment, greater subsidies and other unreasonable ‘solutions’.
When we released our 2014 report, the CEO of the AAA said the 
association is in favour of road pricing.
The South Australian Labor Premier, Jay Weatherill (2015), said:
I propose that we establish a national heavy vehicle road-user charging 
system run by the Commonwealth … South Australia would be willing 
to trial different elements of heavy vehicle, road user charging.
The then federal assistant minister for infrastructure and regional 
development, Jamie Briggs (2015), said: ‘[U]ltimately, road pricing [is] 
a fairer way for people to … pay for … roads, to make sure that they 
continue to be maintained.’
Business has also begun to respond, with Transurban funding a world-
leading technology study, assessing how best to capture usage data and 
give users choice.
These developments show there is a gathering consensus around this issue, 
and our principal recommendation is that the federal government should 
direct the Productivity Commission to establish a detailed public inquiry 
into the funding, regulation and pricing of Australia’s road transport 
market. This inquiry is necessary to give people a say, but also to explain 
the trade-offs and the overall benefits of road user pricing.
This is not a niche area of government policy or an abstract application of 
economic theory; rather, it is a fundamental challenge that is entrenched 
in the price of the goods and services we consume and produce.
This is a goods and services tax (GST)–level change, affecting every 
household in the country, but the opportunity for these kinds of 
discussions to be subverted by cheap fear campaigns and other things has 
effectively been neutered by the involvement of the major logistics groups 
and the major motoring organisations. We are simply seeking to begin 
a genuine, honest and collaborative policy reform process for road user 
charging and funding.
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Road pricing and road market reform make an exciting discussion for 
those who work for government central agencies and the transport agencies 
within government, and they each have a role to play in promoting 
intelligent debate. It is a discussion that needs to begin and we need to 
find acceptable solutions.
We need to give governments the complete picture and also give opposition 
parties the sense that this is a non-partisan issue. This is a policy issue that 
needs to be ‘kicked off’ by calm discussion.
It is a very exciting period in road transport reform because we are fresh 
out of easy answers—and because of the active involvement and support 
of the motoring clubs.
But the next step is for the federal government to confirm that the issue of 
road user charging will advance to a full public inquiry.
A detailed public inquiry is needed to ‘pull the teeth’ on road pricing. 
It would let the community begin to have a look underneath the bonnet 
and see what is wrong; and would mean that, in five or 10 years’ time, 
when the road networks are congested and undermaintained to a point 
where the heat from the community is such that change can happen, 
we will have a well-debated, well-understood, well-articulated and 
well-designed system that is able to move forward to implementation.
If a federal inquiry on road pricing happens, I am bullish that road user 
charging reform will happen in my lifetime.
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Lessons from Auckland in road 
transport planning: Making 
trade‑offs transparent
Peter Winder
During the period 2011–15, Auckland City undertook a concerted effort 
to find acceptable solutions to the problem that existing funding sources 
fall well short of the levels of investment necessary to provide the transport 
outcomes demanded by Aucklanders. This chapter provides an overview 
of the combined policy and political strategy that was used and reflects 
on the related lessons it provides. A key focus is the necessity and value 
of making policy (and political) trade-offs explicit and transparent, and 
taking the time to ensure that all stakeholders clearly understand both the 
trade-offs and the associated constraints.
Context
Context is, arguably, everything. A transport planner I worked with once 
told me that the peak load passenger capacity for a bus in northern China 
during the winter is one-third less than during the summer, because 
everyone wears such bulky clothes to survive the cold. It is always important 
to know and understand the context within which you are working. 
In  this chapter, I will discuss the issue of hypothecation in the context 
of funding and reinvesting in New Zealand’s transport infrastructure. 
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Since 2008–09, all national transport funding in New Zealand has been 
hypothecated. For land transport, for example, all vehicle licensing, excise 
tax and distance-based road user charges for diesel-powered vehicles go 
straight into the National Land Transport Fund. This is administered by 
the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), a Crown entity at arm’s 
length from political interference (in theory) that allocates that funding 
to land transport across the country.
As well as controlling funding, the NZTA also owns the state highway 
network. This is a clear point of difference with Australia, where major 
roads are state-owned but often federally prioritised and funded. Local 
authorities own the remainder of the road network in New Zealand 
(streets and minor roads), and raise most of their revenue from property 
taxes, comprising levies on property based on either land value or capital 
value. In broad terms, local authorities receive matched funding from 
the NZTA for their approved road and public transport program. There 
are considerable constraints on and parameters around what projects can 
be funded and how they must be procured. So it is a slightly different 
funding framework, and that is part of the context.
The discussion here is focused on Auckland, and again context is important. 
As a geographer, I tend to think spatially in terms of topography and 
the physical layout of streets, businesses, homes and offices. Auckland 
is set on an isthmus between two harbours: Waitemata Harbour to the 
north-east and Manukau Harbour to the south-west (see Figure 8.1). 
Otahuhu, the narrowest point between what is in essence the west coast 
(and the Manukau Harbour) and the east coast of the city, is only 1,200 
metres wide—the narrowest point in the country. State Highway 1 forms 
the principal road corridor connecting the various parts of Auckland. 
As a matter of historical accident, the railway line also runs more or less 
along the same route.
Auckland is characterised by low-density settlement, with 1.5 million 
people spread around the two harbours. As New Zealand’s largest 
city, Auckland is growing quite rapidly, attracting 75 per cent of 
New Zealand’s  growth, with two-thirds of that coming from natural 
population increase. Demographically, Auckland is quite different from 
the rest of New Zealand, with a large, young and growing population. 
The  population level in most of the rest of the country is static or in 
decline. This presents particular challenges for the government of the day 
in terms of how to raise and allocate revenue.
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Figure 8.1 Map of Auckland showing major road networks
Source: Based on and including data from Land Information new Zealand, reused under 
the Creative Commons Attribution 4 .0 International licence .
While a system of national hypothecation for the funding of roads has 
obvious benefits in terms of transparency and equity, trying to raise the 
national fuel tax to fund expensive road projects in Auckland is a difficult 
and unpopular political proposition.
Since 2010, a single local authority has administered Auckland, and that 
has changed things quite dramatically. Having one powerful authority 
representing the city, rather than the previous eight local authorities, 
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has also changed the context nationally. The unending fighting between 
local authorities has been removed, as has the opportunity for the central 
government to play one authority off against another. Amalgamation 
dramatically changed the balance of power between the central government 
and the mega local authority, the Auckland Council.
Transport funding gap
Over the next 30 or so years, an important issue for Auckland’s growth is 
the marked gap between the level of future spending required to satisfy 
the city’s expected transport projects (the dotted line in Figure 8.2) and 
the anticipated actual funding Auckland is likely to receive (the blue 
line). The red lines shown in Figure 8.2, adapted from a 2014 study 
(Alternative Transport Funding Project Team 2014), reflect the NZTA’s 
expected program for the next 30 years for Auckland, including the 
Auckland Council’s own program. The blue line aggregates the expected 
amount to be raised from local property rates by the Auckland Council 
on current policy settings, plus the proportion of national funding that 
would arrive in Auckland over that period. The shortfall is significant. 
To amplify the issue, this funding gap exists in a context where almost 
every citizen of Auckland thinks not enough is being done to improve 
transport infrastructure and transport mobility.
Figure 8.2 Funding gap: $300 million per annum over 30 years
Source: Adapted from Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
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Finding an Auckland solution
With little progress made in previous efforts to address this funding 
gap,  something different was needed. Rather than approaching the 
question of what is the most appropriate way to raise funds from an 
academic or esoteric framework, the debate in Auckland has focused 
on finding politically feasible ways to raise enough money to build the 
network that is necessary. In the face of a city that is growing rapidly, 
all of the transport solutions—whether public transport or roads—are 
expensive. The integrated policy and political process was designed so 
that it built community support for, and understanding of, the solution 
as it was developed.
It was obvious the primary challenge was not technical or analytical, but 
political. Obviously, there are many ways to raise money, all of which 
are technically feasible. The challenge for jurisdictions is how to get the 
politics right to make them possible. In Auckland, some work had already 
been undertaken, with these issues addressed in 2003 by a joint officials 
group and the associated funding issues fed into the 2007 Auckland 
Transport Alignment Project. Most of that work, however, has focused 
on making the right transport investments; trying to get the national 
government of the day engaged in how to pay for it has been an altogether 
different challenge.
About three years ago, the Mayor of Auckland asked: How do we change 
the government’s thinking? How do we come up with options that are 
politically palatable and that will build enthusiasm for the necessary 
action? The approach adopted—through the combined thinking of the 
mayor’s political strategists, planners and consultants—was to follow 
a consensus collaborative decision-making model. My role in that process 
was as the project manager and facilitator.
From the outset it was clear that, if the key issue was to change the politics, 
what we needed to do was get all the ‘movers and shakers’ in one room 
and  sort out the politics. So we brought together representatives from 
all of the major stakeholders. Among the interest groups were some very 
important players, including unions, employers, infrastructure advocates, 
the Automobile Association, property investors and the international 
airport, not to mention local environmentalists, walking and cycling 
advocates, the tourism industry association and so on. We assembled 
a ‘who’s who’ of key players in this area and formed a really interesting, 
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challenging, but effective deliberative group. One of the more interesting 
dynamics to emerge was observing a representative of the child poverty 
action group advocating staunchly for the least well-off in the community 
and how that interplayed with both the union movement and local 
employers and manufacturers, all against a backdrop of working out how 
to pay more for roads and transport.
Framed in this way, decision-making really became quite simple, albeit 
not all that quick. We put a group of people in a room and provided 
a  facilitator and whatever resources were necessary to inform them in 
terms of expert advice and further investigative work, and then asked 
them to address the issue of road funding on which they would have to 
reach a consensus. The question they were asked was not how to optimally 
price the transport network, but how to best raise the extra $300 million 
a year to build the Auckland Plan’s transport network. They were never 
asked about what, in their opinion, was the best network—and that was 
really important, because, within the stakeholder group, there were some 
markedly different views on some of the particular projects that were 
included in the proposed investments. We would never have achieved 
consensus on prioritising the projects. What we were able to do instead 
was work through a platform for raising enough money to implement the 
whole program.
The first stage to build a consensus involved working through a large 
number of completely ‘blue-sky’ or ‘off-the-wall’ ways to raise money. 
Topics discussed included regional lotteries, a regional goods and services 
tax or regional payroll tax, and a raft of things that went in and very quickly 
went out the other side. A proposal to adopt a betterment tax on improved 
land values was another of the ideas that went in and disappeared in the 
first round. We relied on a number of technical reports as to whether these 
ideas had merit and to work out which of the different options could 
be dismissed as impractical. During this stage of the process, there was 
significant engagement with the public on a draft report that enumerated 
all of the options that had been considered and provided the reasons some 
had been discarded. At the same time, all of the key stakeholders who were 
part of the consensus-building group had an obligation to engage with 
their own member and/or community constituents. This consultation 
process was part of a very overt campaign to get people focused on the 
options and choices. The depth of that engagement, for instance, started 
a number of fascinating debates, such as one that occurred in the union 
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movement about how to charge for transport. It triggered an entrenched 
political-philosophical debate about the appropriateness or otherwise 
of user charging of transport, and that debate has continued.
We concluded the first stage of our deliberations with a narrowed field 
of options, all of which were, in essence, various forms of user charges 
and  conventional mechanisms of rates and fuel taxes (see Table 8.1). 
We then embarked on a second stage of work, which was designed to take 
those preferred options and turn them into two funding pathways that 
could be formally considered by the council and the people of Auckland. 
Why did we select two funding pathways? As part of the first stage of 
work, we looked in detail at what other countries had done when they 
were considering introducing charging schemes, and there were a number 
of things that stood out. The most blindingly obvious was that when 
governments go to their communities and ask them whether they would 
like to pay a new and additional tax, the answer is invariably a definitive 
‘no’. For obvious reasons, we avoided that trap.
Another thing that was readily apparent to us was that, in the realm 
of taxation reform, striving for total perfection could be the enemy of 
the good. Jurisdictions that opted to implement an idealised ‘big bang’ 
change or a complicated ‘bells and whistles’ scheme invariably failed. 
Hence, we came to the conclusion that it would be far easier to adopt 
a series of incremental steps in a preferred direction that might take some 
years to progress. If we were able to get to the first step of introducing 
a standardised user charge, we reasoned that we would then be able to 
progressively refine or expand that as a second or third step in the process. 
It was our view that, over time, we might be able to get closer to an 
optimum pricing model that charged travellers fairly for usage. If we went 
out with a complicated scheme straight up, however, set at prices that 
were optimal, it would almost certainly have failed. All the participants in 
the consensus-building process, from the very beginning, were conscious 
that any solution would be not simply a technical question, but rather 
a political question. How can we get the politics to line up?
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Table 8.1 Rates and fuel tax option
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
The two options that were settled on gave Aucklanders real choices 
(see Figure 8.3), the first of which was between two different levels of 
investment: a basic transport network, which was effectively what 
Auckland could afford based on existing funding sources, or the transport 
program contained in the Auckland Plan, which required sourcing an 
additional $300 million a year to implement. So, the first question was 
very simple: would people prefer the basic option, which would not work, 
or the expanded option, which would be much more effective? The answer 
to that question was equally straightforward. Everyone wanted the second 
option; they were prepared to pay more.
Having established this preference, we then introduced a series of 
payment options. We asked, if people wanted the more extensive transport 
plan, how were they prepared to pay for it? The choice we provided 
Aucklanders was between a flat $2 toll charge for using the motorway 
system or a combination of increases in property rates and fuel taxes. 
Reaching a consensus on this question was more of a challenge. The toll 
charge hit motorists who crossed the isthmus using the designated 
motorways. The option to increase rates and fuel tax added another 
1 per cent per annum (compounding) to people’s rates. Combined with 
the rate increases already contained in the council’s budgets, this would 
result in increases of about 4–4.5 per cent per annum. The proposed fuel 
tax increase was structured to permanently add about 1.2 cents per litre 
of petrol.
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Figure 8.3 Two transport options
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
By design, the resulting debate focused entirely on what needed to 
be raised in Auckland to pay for the city’s transport needs. We quite 
deliberately sidestepped the question of what ought to be done nationally 
to avoid a debilitating debate about the South Island not wanting to pay 
for Auckland’s infrastructure—an argument Auckland would have lost. 
We recognised that rates and fuel tax changes were easy to implement, 
spreading the funding more broadly and delivering critical revenue. 
Conversely, motorway user charging would be complex, costly to 
implement and required legislation, but had a range of other economic 
benefits in terms of aligning cost with benefit.
To impose a local motorway charge, there were two possible user charge 
options (see Table 8.2). Some of the group wanted to go for simplicity, 
while others were determined to look at a variable pricing regime. 
The  group eventually managed to agree on a flat rate fee structure. 
How did we end up there? The answer lies in the fact that the motorway 
network dominates the transport system in Auckland. A simple charge 
on the motorway would collect the revenue needed at a reasonably low 
per use charge. There are quite defined entry and exit points, so tolling is 
quite straightforward. It is, in essence, a closed system, and it dominates 
the performance of the network, so it is the easiest solution with the 
most direct demand consequences. The low level of the necessary charge 
also  helped alleviate the social impact concerns that a number of the 
group had.
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Table 8.2 Motorway user charge option: Two possible approaches 
to charging
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
In comparing the options, a number of issues were raised, such as transport 
impacts and the demand for public transport. Figure 8.4 compares the 
basic network with the impact of the three different charging regimes. 
Importantly, all of the charging schemes were designed to deliver the 
same amount of revenue and each delivered the Auckland Plan’s transport 
network. The biggest differences were the future outcomes from the 
Auckland Plan transport network (compared with the basic network), 
and obviously this required the additional investment. It is worth noting 
that, despite the level of investment in the Auckland Plan transport 
network, our modelling suggested average speeds would get worse over 
time (see Figure 8.5), so we certainly were not proposing an optimised 
level of investment. But performance was significantly improved under 
a motorway user charge compared with rates and fuel tax increases.
Figure 8.4 Annual passenger transport boardings
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
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Figure 8.5 Average AM peak speed on the strategic freight network
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 set out the expected level of congestion under each 
of the different payment options (with the basic program included as 
a comparator). Figure 8.6 shows projections of the time spent in morning 
peak hour congestion and performance under each of the charging 
options. The outcomes for commuters are significantly better by 2046 
with the Auckland Plan transport network, and better again once a variable 
motorway user charge is introduced to reduce peak demand. Figure 8.7 
indicates the similar effects in the inter-peak periods during the day.
Figure 8.6 Percentage of AM peak spent in severe congestion on the 
strategic freight network
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
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Figure 8.7 Percentage of inter-peak spent in severe congestion on the 
strategic freight network
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
Before making any final decisions, we undertook impact assessments, 
looking at who wins and who loses. We asked not only which charging 
option we should adopt, but also who was most likely to pay. We were 
able to determine that businesses would pay 34 per cent of the rates and 
fuel  tax increases and, if a motorway toll was introduced, they would 
pay 41–46 per cent of the charge (see Table 8.3). The analysis indicated, 
however, that the benefits to business exceeded the costs. It was an 
indication of the strength of the consensus-building process that all 
the business representatives in the consultative group were able to say: 
‘Yes, we can “swallow” that.’
The average impact on households is much the same between the two 
schemes, but the incidence of the charges is quite different. Drivers who 
are regular users pay a significantly greater proportion of the motorway 
user charge. Moreover, vulnerable households end up paying more under 
either pathway. In terms of economic impacts, we had interesting and 
ongoing debates about how these would be calculated, and determining 
the base case. But the bottom line was that a better return was delivered 
by implementing the motorway user charge than with rates and fuel 
tax increases.
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Table 8.3 Fairness/impact of charging options
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
The consensus-building group reported its findings to the Auckland 
Council, which then put the two choices to the people of Auckland as 
part of their three-yearly long-term planning process. In a month, through 
a large consultation process, the council received 15,000 submissions on 
this issue, and, of those, as shown in Figures 8.8 and 8.9, more than 
50 per cent supported the Auckland Plan transport network as opposed 
to the basic network. Unfortunately, during the consultation process, 
Generation Zero, a young people’s lobby group, started advocating for 
another network altogether, which had the effect of diluting somewhat 
the clarity of the message delivered by the consultation.
Figure 8.8 Submissions relating to the proposed networks
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
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Figure 8.9 Submissions relating to proposed funding options
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
Figure 8.8 shows there was more popular support for the motorway 
user  charge than for an increase in rates and fuel tax. Unfortunately, 
a material number of people bought into the ‘other’ network and therefore 
concluded that an increase in cost was not necessary. In parallel, the 
council conducted a random survey of 5,000 Aucklanders that showed 
similar results (Tables 8.4 and 8.5), but with a stronger preference for 
the Auckland Plan because in this survey the third alternative was not 
in the choice set for respondents. In terms of a preference for charging 
frameworks, there was evidence of significant support for the motorway 
user charge.
Table 8.4 Preferred transport network survey results
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
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Table 8.5 Preferred funding option survey results
Source: Alternative Transport Funding Project Team (2014).
So what did we learn from all of this? The surveys showed that by 
deliberately making this a public discussion about choices, and in turn 
making both the choices and their consequences explicit, we were able 
to get to a rather different point than critics of the process had expected. 
We  arrived at a point where we had the consensus-building group—
and all of the key stakeholders—more or less saying this is the right way to 
go. We had the public of Auckland saying yes, we are prepared to accept 
something different to improve transport outcomes.
At this point, it was the political reaction that was all important. 
The Auckland Council does not have the legislative ability to introduce 
road user charges or a motorway charging scheme for highways in its own 
jurisdiction and the central government indicated it was not yet convinced 
by Auckland’s arguments. As a result, the council resolved to continue its 
advocacy efforts and implement a targeted rate in the interim to bridge 
some of the gap. There remained majority support on the council to 
implement a motorway user charge and to continue to argue the funding 
issue with the national government.
The national government, however, remains unconvinced. Other 
participants who attended the ‘Shifting the Transport Infrastructure 
Debate in Australia’ workshop have mentioned a time frame of three hours 
between a policy being floated and the government saying ‘no’. However, 
through this deliberative process, there had been a succession of  ‘nos’. 
The  period of lapsed time between when Auckland Council releases 
something and when the national government says ‘no’ is getting longer, 
and the reasons for the ‘no’ are changing and diminishing. To maintain 
progress, the Auckland Council and the national government have agreed 
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on the need to set up another study, the Auckland Transport Alignment 
Project (ATAP). Importantly, the terms of reference for that work include 
both parties agreeing with the suite of projects as well as agreeing on 
funding. So the government is continuing to materially shift its position 
in response to what Auckland Council has done, to the point that now it 
is willing to formally consider funding, whereas previously it would not.
ATAP remains a work in progress. Following the local and general 
elections  in 2016 and 2017 (respectively), the original ATAP has been 
updated to take into account the latest population forecasts (Ministry of 
Transport 2018). Whether the government will be prepared to move on 
something as significant as this in the year-long window between the two 
elections remains a big question.
In conclusion, my principal message from the Auckland case study is 
that it is possible to discuss and scope many items of important public 
policy considered controversial, unpopular and even esoteric. If, however, 
those involved cannot take people with them and therefore change the 
politics associated with their proposals and win support, nothing much 
will happen. At the end of the day, it’s all about the politics.
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Winning public support 
for transport reforms
Gary Banks
It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in 
hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than 
to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. For  the 
innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old 
conditions, and only lukewarm defenders in those who may do well 
under the new. 
— Niccolo Machiavelli, 1513
The reformer’s dilemma has rarely been more eloquently or succinctly 
put than in Machiavelli’s much-cited observation in The Prince. Written 
half a millennium ago, it shows this problem is neither new nor confined 
to democracies. That said, more recent experience suggests a corollary to 
Machiavelli’s axiom, which could be expressed in similar terms: there is 
often nothing easier for a government than to make bad policies, for it 
can count on strong support from those who profit and little opposition 
from those who lose.
Many of the policies needing reform today were introduced in precisely 
such circumstances. Once in place, of course, such policies can become 
politically very hard to withdraw—and that is the nub of the problem we 
face today in securing key transport policy reforms.
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Expanding a little, the reality is that, almost by definition, structural 
reform generally entails losses for some groups. These are typically much 
more concentrated within the community and individually significant to 
its members than are the consequent gains from reform, notwithstanding 
their much larger overall magnitude. It follows that those with most 
at stake, and therefore having the loudest political voice, will normally 
be the losers, not the winners from reform. And to those not following 
things too closely, they have persuasive arguments, including the ability 
to identify actual workers in specific electorates at risk of losing their jobs 
and livelihood (the ‘phone book’ test).
The asymmetries confounding reform do not stop there. Significant ones 
exist within government itself—notably, the division along sectoral lines 
of  bureaucratic structures. While having departments ‘responsible’ for 
such sectors as manufacturing, agriculture and mining, or for certain 
groups in society or for the environment facilitates policy knowledge and 
program expertise in such areas, it can lead to fragmented information 
systems and an inability to see the ‘big picture’. Central agencies have 
a broader remit, but often lack the detailed knowledge to act as an effective 
policy counterweight.
The automobile industry has traditionally been one of the most successful 
beneficiaries of this asymmetric political economy favouring government 
preferment (second perhaps only to the Pharmacy Guild), with workers, 
bosses and sponsoring departments united in common cause.
If anything, the present political contours are making the conditions 
for successful reform even tougher than they were. Meaningful reform 
initiatives (ones that actually live up to the name) are getting harder 
to contemplate and, especially, consummate. There are a number 
of interacting forces at work.
A key one relates to what I have been calling ‘Washminster’. Changes 
within our political-bureaucratic structures have seen the balance of power 
in policy development shifting decidedly from the department (with its 
technical expertise) to the minister’s office. This drift has ironically 
coincided with a loss of policy capability in ministerial offices as careerist 
political staffers, often with political aspirations of their own, replace 
policy experts close to the minister. The consequent ascendancy of politics 
over policy has been exacerbated by the advent of ‘new media’, with its 
insatiable daily need for content that ‘sells’. Sensationalism, conflict and 
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faux controversy are its currency. This fans the ‘oppositionism’ that has 
emerged with a vengeance in our parliaments—for who could reasonably 
expect to get media attention for agreeing with the government?
There is currently a presumption that politicians should respond 
immediately to issues, making decisions in time for the daily news cycle. 
Ministers themselves feel they have to react quickly, if only to preempt 
a potential opposition attack that might get first run in the media.
The problems are compounded as the modern media machine interacts 
with increasingly fickle and volatile electorates. Old political loyalties 
and habit voting have largely broken down. It was once accepted that 
no more than 10–20 per cent of voters would be ‘swingers’, with most 
of the electorate having a fairly enduring sense of party identification 
(and a significant number being ‘rusted on’). Recent surveys and studies 
suggest that swinging or floating voters may now constitute up to 
40 per cent of the electorate. In other words, proportionately more votes 
are ‘up for grabs’ than ever before. At the same time, growing affluence 
and abundant information mean the electorate has more things of concern 
to them politically. And vested interests have ready access to electronic 
soapboxes that provide wide reach but little real scrutiny.
Lessons from past structural 
reform successes
While the environment just described is undoubtedly a tougher one 
for reformers than in the past, the obstacles to structural reform have 
never been trivial. Admittedly, some of the key reforms, such as reducing 
industry protection, were not technically difficult—and in that sense 
involved ‘low-hanging fruit’—but all faced considerable political hurdles. 
Indeed, opposition to tariff reform was fierce. The approaches used to 
secure structural reforms in the past therefore, in my view, remain relevant 
to our current challenges.
The standout structural reform was the National Competition Policy 
(NCP), which yielded important gains to the Australian community. 
In its policy coverage and cross-jurisdictional reach, its achievements 
were without precedent internationally and it continues to be lauded 
in forums such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The NCP was confronted by all the adverse 
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political and administrative asymmetries noted previously, as  well 
as the additional complexity of securing agreement among several 
governments. In enabling the market to occupy areas where competition 
had previously been excluded, the NCP was essentially seeking to 
withdraw longstanding ‘entitlements’. So how was this achieved?
A Productivity Commission review of the NCP in 2005 came up with 
three overarching success factors:
• Recognition by governments and oppositions across the country that 
there was a problem and that changes were needed if Australians were 
to sustain high standards of living.
• Broad acceptance of the solutions, some of which were quite 
innovative. The notion of reversing the onus of proof in relation to 
the competition test—requiring the recipient of a regulatory barrier 
to make a national interest case for retaining it—was revolutionary 
in its overturning of historical convention.
• Implementation arrangements gave careful consideration to 
the structuring of incentives and governance arrangements for 
implementation, with the National Competition Council central 
to this architecture.
Each of these could be seen simply as conditions that need to be satisfied 
for any successful reform. The more fundamental question is how they 
were satisfied. The commission’s report again found three key contributors.
First was the existence of credible evidence and analysis about both the 
extent of the policy problem and the likely benefits from mooted reforms. 
While the Hilmer review (1993) was instrumental in this, it had the 
benefit of  earlier inquiries and research by the Industry Commission, 
the Economic Planning Advisory Commission (EPAC), the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) and other well-
respected independent bodies. These often involved not only research, but 
also the testing of findings and policy ideas in public forums.
Second, there was strong technical and advisory support within key 
departments and political offices. I have stated previously that the calibre 
of senior public servants and ministerial advisors has never been higher 
than it was in those years. This meant that policy champions had the ear 
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of ministers, in advancing the ideas coming out of inquiries or reviews and 
refined through the bureaucracy. This was reinforced by new coordination 
processes across ministries and jurisdictions.
Third, and most important, was the quality of political leadership, at 
both federal and state levels, including the ability to explain and promote 
the idea of structural reform and the community-wide benefits that 
would flow from it, notwithstanding the adjustment problems for some. 
It enabled a compelling narrative to be consistently advocated over a long 
period. It is not enough to have the right answer (as the opposition Liberal 
Party’s ‘Fightback’ platform showed). Good policy has to be explained 
effectively to the public to make a difference. This is, above all, the task 
of the political leadership.
These elements were all mutually reinforcing. Good process, careful 
program design, effective leadership and a strong, consistent narrative 
were the hallmarks of the NCP’s success. Expressed in this way, the fact 
successful outcomes resulted is not surprising. Indeed, the OECD has 
identified similar factors in the reform successes of a range of countries.
Winston Churchill is said to have remarked that a government should 
never ‘waste a good crisis’ as an opportunity to advance hard policy 
decisions. Australia’s reforms had more to do with a well-engineered 
sense of crisis than the real thing. Former treasurer Paul Keating’s famous 
evocation of a ‘banana republic’ in a radio interview was one instance 
(echoing Lee Kwan Yew’s equally impactful ‘white trash’ warning of a few 
years earlier (Clare 2015)). Similarly, treasurer Peter Costello (2004) was 
able to convince the public that a looming crisis awaited if we failed to 
prepare for the ‘destiny’ of an ageing population. In neither case were 
existing economic settings in a desperate state, but the ability to project 
what lay ahead and to provoke public discussion about this and the actions 
required to avert the problems constituted a compelling reform narrative. 
(There are other examples I  could cite, including Costello’s ‘$8 billion 
black hole’ (Davidson 2005).)
Another feature of successful reform leadership was the ability to anticipate 
and genuinely address potential adjustment costs. If this factor is ignored, 
it has the potential to derail reform initiatives. Australians have a deeply 
ingrained sense of fairness, reflected in welfare entitlements that exceed 
those in most countries. Reforms bringing community-wide benefits 
still need to pay attention to the losers, especially redundant workers. 
The incentive payments to the states and territories were partly predicated 
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on providing the fiscal wherewithal for this. In addition—and apart from 
the general safety nets—programs for retraining or relocation were devised 
in conjunction with the reforms. (It has to be said though that the reality 
fell somewhat short of the rhetoric, which, in the end, arguably inhibited 
the full implementation of the NCP agenda.)
Is transport reform tougher?
These observations about the success factors in the NCP provide a long, 
but hopefully relevant, introduction to the question of ‘winning support 
for transport reform’. The transport policy reform agenda is very similar 
to that of the NCP itself. It involves questions of governance and asset 
management, the structures for funding and user charging and the extent 
to which governments retain equity and control. It is also about reducing 
regulation that is anticompetitive or otherwise raises costs or inhibits 
productivity. And, looking to the future, it is about securing a better basis 
for informing investment decisions, particularly in relation to allocation 
and timing.
If the transport reform agenda is indeed comparable to national 
competition  policy reform, one might ask why more headway has not 
been made? After all, there have been several public inquiries and reviews 
making a cogent case for reform, akin to the Hilmer review, including some 
by the Productivity Commission, as well as a number of special taskforces. 
We have also seen considerable high-level government attention being 
paid to the issues, particularly in relation to funding aspects. And we 
briefly even had a prime minister proclaiming himself ‘the infrastructure 
prime minister’ (Abbott 2013).
Yet, spending aside, we have seen less progress on the structural reform 
dimensions than in other areas of public infrastructure: less governance 
reform (with most entities still embedded in departmental structures), less 
contestability and less cost-reflective pricing. Understanding why that is 
so is obviously the key to moving forward. It seems unlikely it is because 
transport is an inherently more complex policy area than, say, energy, water 
or telecommunications, as anyone familiar with telecommunications 
would attest for a start. But if not technically more complex, could it be 
said that the politics are more challenging?
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In considering the political dimensions, it is useful to examine the 
potential ‘blockers’ to specific reforms. Unsurprisingly, the ‘usual suspects’ 
loom large.
For a start, when it comes to reforming governance arrangements 
(corporatisation, privatisation or even commercialisation), politicians, 
existing provider organisations, the unions and consumers each have their 
own concerns about loss of control or loss of income, or both.
In the regulatory space, as noted, incumbents can be expected to oppose 
regulatory changes that will increase competitive pressures. And labour 
unions often resist moves to enhance organisational ‘flexibility’ as code 
for loss of entitlements.
Vested interests typically pursue objectives other than efficiency for capital 
spending. And governments themselves tend to be attracted less to 
smaller bottleneck investments—even those with a high pay-off—than 
to higher-profile greenfield projects.
But the strongest opposition has arisen in relation to user charging for 
roads. Traditionally, the public has seen roads as a free good, funded 
through less transparent fuel excise and other taxation, rather than direct 
pricing. So proposals to introduce cost-reflective pricing are bound to face 
broad opposition, particularly from those paying more as a result.
The obstacles to these reforms, while challenging, are not so different 
to those for other areas of infrastructure that progress should not be 
possible.  Even in the most challenging area of road pricing, users are 
becoming accustomed to the principle of ‘user pays’ from moves in 
other service areas (such as water) and have clearly accepted the logic 
for toll roads. And, given roads are not really ‘free’ anyway, making 
a compelling case for moving to a more efficient way of paying for them, 
provided arrangements can be shown to be ‘fair’, should not be so hard. 
Indeed, considerable headway has already been made, with reports by 
the Productivity Commission and Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 
showing the way forward. At  least the technological hurdles are now 
surmountable, such that charging based on where and when a vehicle 
actually uses the road network can be accurately determined. Provided 
there can be some assurance that resulting revenue will flow into improved 
road services (admittedly no simple matter institutionally), support from 
business at least could be assured.
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Advancing the transport reform agenda
The biggest challenges currently have more to do with the general 
deterioration in the climate for structural reforms, described earlier. While 
these may call for new tactics and tools, the broad approach that worked 
so well for us in the past should remain central. The dual preconditions 
for success remain securing broad agreement on why reform is needed and 
on the reforms that will deliver the greatest public value.
Too often in recent times governments have sought to truncate this two-
step process, pursuing the ‘what’ before ensuring the ‘why’ is understood 
and accepted. Admittedly, building public understanding of the need 
for change can be difficult. It cannot be achieved overnight. It requires 
persistence and repetition. (Former prime minister John Howard recently 
remarked in an interview that ‘a treasurer must be in the media every 
day … Making the case for change, being one of the government’s most 
effective communicators’ (Bowen 2014).)
Arm’s-length policy reviews can provide crucial support. In particular, 
credible independent estimates of the costs of the status quo and of the 
gains from reform constitute handy rhetorical assets for a government. 
Compared with the earlier Hilmer review process, however, it is not 
clear that more recent reviews in the transport area have done enough 
to convince people there is a real problem. Or, perhaps more accurately, 
it is not clear that governments have taken sufficient advantage of the 
opportunity they presented to make a compelling case.
Only once the need for change is broadly accepted can specific reform 
proposals be effectively prosecuted. These need to lay out not only the 
gains from change, but also the likely incidence of both gains and losses, 
whether the latter would be mitigated in some way and, if not, why not. 
The public will focus on the losers (encouraged by the media and the losers 
themselves) and will ultimately make a judgement about whether the 
proposed reforms seem fair. This is more likely to the extent that reform 
processes have allowed people to voice their concerns and whether the 
government is judged to have listened. (Listening is often more important 
in the end than whether the government actually agrees.)
Because there is always an element of uncertainty as well as disruption in 
any significant reform proposal, the public will naturally be risk-averse. 
Pilot projects and the phasing in of initiatives can help allay concerns, 
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as well as pointing to potential design improvements ahead of a wider 
rollout. (We heard the instructive example of Sweden, where road pricing 
was widely opposed at the outset, but, following a carefully staged 
implementation process, eventually received a 70 per cent approval rating 
from the public.)
In Australia, there is of course the additional difficulty of securing 
acceptance and agreement across our federation. Previous examples of 
reforms that have stalled or failed have often arisen because there has not 
been agreement about the problem or the proffered solution (or both) in 
the first place. In some cases, a federal government has sought to proceed 
without properly consulting the states. The outcome in most such cases, 
unsurprisingly, has been failure. It should be obvious therefore that much 
transport reform, particularly road pricing, stands no chance without 
securing collaboration and cooperation across jurisdictions.
Summing up
To conclude, desirable transport reform is challenging—for reasons I have 
outlined—and it would be easy to become pessimistic about its prospects. 
But the specific challenges are not really more daunting than in some 
other areas of infrastructure reform. And much good work establishing 
the case for reform has already been done.
The real question is whether political leaders are up to the task, in an 
environment that has become ever more challenging for far-sighted reform. 
There is mounting evidence that they are not; however, there are also a few 
shards of light in the gloom. For example, the fact the most recent NSW 
election was essentially fought on an important infrastructural reform 
issue, and that the government managed to prevail notwithstanding 
orchestrated opposition from ‘the usual suspects’, provides some grounds 
for optimism. Then there is the impressive reformist record of the previous 
New Zealand Government, which, contrary to Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
aphorism, not only knew what to do, but also managed to get re-elected—
not once, but twice. The New Zealand experience reinforces the lessons 
from Australia’s own past, that the key to governments winning public 
support is a credible and well-argued case that reforms will actually make 
life better for a country’s citizens. That does not seem too much to ask.
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Assessing the likelihood of 
proposed reform pathways 
to road pricing in Australia: 
Do they necessarily involve 
‘diabolical politics’?
John Wanna
Over recent years, a number of detailed official reports have been publicly 
released advocating various options for a more sustainable, efficient and 
transparent road charging regime.1 These policy reports by highly reputable 
bodies in the public and private sectors, including input from specialist 
parliamentary committees, argue, principally, that the present road 
funding arrangements are inadequate and unsustainable, distortionary, 
not related to the efficient use of road networks and corridors and do not 
allow sensible investment decisions to be made over the longer term. They 
have not necessarily been adopted as definitive policy pronouncements by 
any jurisdictional level of government in Australia. Mostly, these reports 
are critical of the existing complexities and messiness in the provision and 
1  These public reports are in addition to considerable work within the levels of government by 
departments of infrastructure, transport and treasury. There has also been work directly focused 
on road user charging commissioned by the Transport and Infrastructure Council of federal, state 
and territory transport ministers. Some of this research-based material is made public, especially as 
information papers, discussion papers, reports and statistical updates. These public reports are listed 
in the reference list for this chapter.
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upkeep of roads, which currently involve all three levels of government, 
with no one taking responsibility for the system-wide aspects of the 
network, especially investment priorities and the design and management 
of the road asset base. The reformist reports take the form of ‘green paper’–
style discussion papers intended to inform the community and setting out 
selected options for public consultation. This chapter considers a selection 
of these more influential reports from the recent past and examines the 
prospects for and feasibility of their ideas and reform proposals.
Limitations of the present system of road 
pricing and funding
So what, fundamentally, is wrong with the present system of road funding?
• First, the existing array of pricing and cost-recovery mechanisms is 
indirect, unnecessarily complicated and politically messy, involving 
multiple but separate jurisdictions.
• Second, funds raised by state and territory governments do not closely 
relate to actual usage, and excise levies are only approximately related 
to usage.
• Third, there is no link between these various charges on vehicles and 
the costs of providing and maintaining our present road network.
• Fourth, road funding by governments is considered to be an essentially 
political arrangement, inherently arbitrary and inefficient for both 
road users and network asset management.
• Fifth, the projected funds generated by road and fuel charges are 
considered insufficient to fund the existing road network going 
forward and to meet future infrastructure needs.
Presently, road users pay various levies into the consolidated revenue 
accounts of different jurisdictions—namely, a series of fixed state-based 
access charges including licence fees and vehicle registration levies, plus 
a mixture of consumption-based levies on various fuels collected by the 
Commonwealth Government through its excise taxation powers (although 
fuel excise is not a fee-for-service charge). State governments also impose 
stamp duties on new vehicles and fees for new licence plates, while local 
governments collect parking levies. In addition, the Commonwealth 
imposes fringe benefits taxes on the private usage of company-provided 
vehicles, some luxury car taxes and customs duties. In total, Australian 
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governments raise approximately $30 billion in road-related revenues, 
but spend about $25 billion on road-related funding, much of which 
is in the form of recurrent funding by state and territory governments, 
although major road investment is a charge to the capital budget and is 
often borrowed. Over time, governments tend to increase charges on fuel 
and levies on vehicles when they want a revenue increase, not necessarily 
when they want to invest more in roads.
Significantly, these levies as proxies for road user charges are not necessarily 
tied to the provision of better roads or the more efficient use of road 
transport networks. Governments can spend more or less on roads than 
these various levies return to the Treasury. As such, there is no apparent 
relationship here and the level of funding committed to road investments 
in government budgets can vary enormously from year to year, especially 
at the Commonwealth level.
Other factors may also drive investment in roads—not necessarily the 
condition of the existing road network or demands for new roads. Hence, 
governments in the different jurisdictions can vary spending aggregates 
depending on their own pressing priorities and funding obtained from 
other sources. They can also spend more or less on infrastructure for 
reasons not related to actual usage patterns. One factor is countercyclical 
fiscal policy, where governments reduce spending when economic growth 
is high and increase spending when economic business cycles decline. 
Employment creation associated with road building or maintenance plays 
a significant role in this policy framework. Moreover, servicing the needs 
of population growth (and location) is an underlying but ongoing pressure 
on demand for new roads; and the impact of that population growth varies 
by region and between regions over time as they experience growth or 
decline. Improving economic access through road infrastructure can be an 
important component of regional development policies determining the 
specifics of road construction.
Another complicating factor driving road expenditure is that such spending 
across the public sector remains a highly politically driven process, with 
little transparency or rationale. Governments decide not only how much 
to allocate to roads from their resources, but also the location and types 
of roads to be built or extended. Systemic integration or interoperability 
may not be foremost in their thinking. Road building, road extensions 
and road maintenance programs (including road widening, increased 
lanes, tunnels, bridges, ‘blackspots’, country town bypasses and so on) 
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
152
are subject to the whims of governments of the day seeking re-election 
or placating local interests. Commonwealth transfers to the states and 
territories for roads and repairs (and to local governments for road repair) 
remain allocated under the tied grants provision in the Constitution 
(Section 96 on payments) and usually come with conditionality or 
earmarked priorities attached.
A consequence of this interplay of factors is that irregular patterns of 
investment in roads tend to prevail. For instance, the Commonwealth 
committed just $2 billion to road funding in 2001, increased funding 
in 2005–06 to more than $5 billion—up from $2.47 billion the year 
before—and dropped back to $2.96 billion in 2006–07. In 2011–12, 
federal road funding rose to almost $8 billion, before dropping back 
to less than $5 billion by 2015. Such variability shifts costs and makes 
planning uncertain.
Beside the disconnect between road user charging and investment in the 
asset network, many of the publicly available reports, referred to above, 
address the inadequacies of the revenue-raising instruments themselves. 
A common criticism is that fixed licence fees and vehicle registration fees 
are crude instruments for funding roads and make no allowance for the 
intensity of usage by road users. These fees simply entitle usage, but in no 
way relate to actual usage.
A second criticism is that the substantial reliance on fuel excise from 
fuels  such as petrol, diesel, ethanol, biodiesel and fuel blends is not 
a  feasible long-term tax and is incapable of generating sufficient funds 
for the road network. Projections suggest that total excise revenues since 
the 1990s have been declining as a proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and as a proportion of total receipts to the Commonwealth 
(Infrastructure Australia 2013).2 Indeed, one influential report noted that 
the overall amount of money raised from fuel excise has been decreasing 
since 2003 and is projected to decrease even further into the future (from 
$7.5 billion to approximately $5 billion) (Graham and Reedman 2015). 
Moreover, the shift to fuel-efficient vehicles and alternative fuel types 
(and even electric-powered vehicles) has further exacerbated this trend.
2  Infrastructure Australia found that fuel excise revenues as a percentage of GDP halved from 
2001–02 to 2013. Although note must be taken that the goods and services tax (GST) elicited from 
fuel sales (including the levy being applied to the excise amount—that is, ‘double taxation’) that 
otherwise would be an additional ‘fuel tax’ is not included in the fuel excise figures, nor is it allocated 
to states for road building/maintenance.
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In terms of the revenue sources keeping pace with expenditure 
requirements, fuel excise was not indexed from 2001 until 2014. Unless 
the Commonwealth elected to increase the fuel excise charge from 
38 cents per litre of fuel to closer to 60 cents (as estimated by Infrastructure 
Australia), this source of funds is likely to continue to decline and not 
keep pace with infrastructural spending needs. And such a large hike in 
the rate of excise would not only feed into inflation and production costs, 
but also raise significant equity issues for those who have to travel great 
distances or require transport in their line of work.
If these criticisms of the limitations of the existing arrangements are widely 
accepted, what are the proposed solutions or remedies to this sorry state?
Evaluating the main proposals from the 
reform advocates
In recent years, there have been at least six major reports into aspects 
of road pricing and interconnected issues of road funding and demand 
moderation. Their principal arguments, conclusions and recommendations 
are set out below.
The recent review of Australia’s future tax system (2008–09), led by 
then Treasury head Ken Henry, examined two main aspects of funding 
road usage or reducing demand on usage: 1) measures to reduce urban 
congestion  in major cities; and 2) the introduction of mass–distance–
location pricing for heavy vehicles to ensure they pay for their marginal 
road wear costs. The report predicted congestion costs to the economy 
would exceed $20 billion by 2020, falling mainly on Sydney, Melbourne 
and Brisbane road users, and would continue to grow unless ‘location 
specific congestion charges [that] vary according to the time of day’ 
were implemented (Henry et al. 2010: 53). It criticised the existing 
array of taxes attributable to road users for being too inexplicit and 
indiscriminate. It argued that Australia should move from ‘indiscriminate 
taxes to efficient prices … to leverage the value of its existing transport 
infrastructure’ (Henry et al. 2010: 53). It argued for a ‘single institution 
to lead road tax reform, and ensure implementation’, nominated by 
and presumably answerable to the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) (Henry et al. 2010: 93).
RoAD PRICInG AnD PRovISIon
154
Although the report mentioned demand-driven pricing, it did not 
endorse a system of direct road pricing; rather, it pushed for congestion 
charges while leaving open the question of whether fuel excise should be 
used as the principal basis for road funding. The logic of this report, in 
other words, was that fuel excise and vehicle registration charges should 
be phased out over time and replaced with ‘more efficient road user 
charges’, although the report chose not to spell out what these should 
be, other than mentioning congestion pricing (Henry et al. 2010: 93, 
398). Furthermore, one recommendation suggested that ‘revenue from 
fuel tax imposed for general government purposes should be replaced 
over time with revenue from more efficient broad-based taxes’, which 
could include consumption taxes or even the GST (Henry et al. 2010: 
Recommendation 65). Such a  move would provide road funding with 
a more robust community-based growth tax (making funding more 
sustainable into the future) but would not constitute a direct user charge, 
and would not in itself constitute a congestion charge.
A Victorian parliamentary committee inquiry (Road Safety Parliamentary 
Committee 2010) largely accepted the status quo in terms of the current 
revenue-raising regimes, but argued for more dedicated spending on roads. 
It did not argue for direct user charging, but instead opted to retain the 
federal fuel excise levy while arguing for greater hypothecation of road-
generated revenues (earmarking funds collected purely for investment in 
roads). It was reasonably satisfied with the Commonwealth collecting excise 
on fuel (or thought the prospects of any change away from excise charging 
were not great), but did not endorse direct user charging. It recommended 
that 50 per cent of federal fuel excise should be hypothecated and, of 
this, 60 per cent should be earmarked for local roads, with the other 
40 per cent going to state roads. Quixotically, the committee hoped the 
‘hypothecated portion of fuel excise revenue was both raised and spent 
by the states without the need for federal government involvement’ 
(Road Safety Parliamentary Committee 2010: 63). The committee, which 
was charged mainly with investigating road safety issues, urged that the 
hypothecated funding arrangements be reviewed after five years.
In November 2011, the NSW Parliament announced an inquiry into 
road access pricing, which commenced in December 2012 and conducted 
public hearings on one day in May 2013. There was a particular focus 
on heavy vehicle usage, with rail lobbyists urging the committee to 
endorse competitive neutrality between transport sectors. The committee 
produced a report but did not release it before the March 2015 election 
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because of the political sensitivities involved. The chair of the committee, 
Charles Casuscelli, said the committee had been impressed by a popularly 
supported pricing scheme introduced by the US state of Oregon, which 
charged motorists 1.5 cents per mile travelled on roads (Saulwick 2014). 
Parliamentary committees in most other states and territories have 
generally eschewed looking into road pricing per se, and instead have 
tended to focus on arguing for adequate levels of funding, better local 
road funding, highlighting the parlous state of rural roads and road 
safety issues. It seems that industry lobbyists and think tanks have been 
more courageous than parliamentary committees in being prepared to 
investigate various pricing options (see, for instance, Australasian Railways 
Association 2010; Terrill and and Emslie 2016; Terrill et al. 2016).
Perhaps the most comprehensive and influential set of reform proposals 
to have emerged in recent years was the Productivity Commission’s 
major report into Public Infrastructure (2014), which included a specific 
section on the ‘reform in the roads sector’ that argued Australia needed 
to ‘move  to  alternative institutional models in the roads sector’ and 
recommended the establishment of a ‘corporatized public road agency 
model’. According to the commission:
[T]he new model should provide the opportunity and incentives to 
consider future direct road user charges, which would facilitate more 
effective asset utilisation and more rigorous assessment of new investments. 
(Productivity Commission 2014: 303)
The commission urged governments across Australia to adopt a ‘clear price 
signal for road use’.
However, while it admitted that ‘ideally, there would be a unified system 
of user charging for all vehicles that was linked to road spending’, the 
Productivity Commission (2014: 150) believed the best initial step 
in the reform process would be for each of the states and territories 
(and aggregations of local governments) to establish their own hypothecated 
road funds earmarked for road investment. It also argued that ‘reform of 
direct road user charging is not a prerequisite for the adoption of the 
governance and institutional arrangements’ it proposed. Nevertheless, in 
the same report, the Productivity Commission (2014: 141) recommended 
that ‘governments should undertake pilot studies of (revenue neutral) 
direct road user pricing using vehicle telematics’. In short, the commission’s 
report identified an idealised, efficient model of road user pricing and 
investment, but argued that, in the immediate term, interim steps could 
be taken towards enhancing the sustainability of the current system.
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A more prescriptive advocacy discussion paper released by Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia (2013) and prepared by Deloitte contrasted the 
existing funding framework with five other pricing models to compare 
their effectiveness. In the report entitled Road Pricing and Transport 
Infrastructure Funding, the alternatives considered were:
1. a cordon zone option for congestion charging (partial pricing in 
high-use facilities)
2. corridor-specific charging (partial pricing affecting national highways 
but all vehicles)
3. pricing charges for selected classes of vehicles on parts of the network
4. pricing for selected vehicles for the whole of the network
5. a universal model applying across the whole of the road network and 
incorporating all vehicles.
The report makes a strong case for the last model, called the ‘universal 
road user charge model’, applied across the entire road network. It is the 
only pricing model that generates additional funds for roads and meets 
the five analytical parameter challenges (it provides additional funding, 
covers road maintenance needs, charges the full allocation of costs, 
provides funding security and improves network performance).
The Deloitte report suggested there are three important features of this 
universal road user charge model. First, it would generate additional 
revenues to fund the network sustainably. Charges would be applied to 
road users ‘based on time, distance, location and the mass of the vehicle 
using the road network’ (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2013: 
48). Second, it would entirely replace the existing charges applying to 
fuel and fixed access/registration charges, and possibly even compulsory 
insurance. These would all be abolished as unnecessary. Third, it proposed 
to hypothecate the funds raised from the road pricing model into a single 
fund earmarked for transport investments. Although this preferred model 
was credited with meeting the criteria of providing a secure and sustainable 
funding source into the future, elsewhere the report indicates that it 
costed the charges on a ‘revenue-neutral’ basis, ‘meaning that the revenue 
of the new scheme would be equal to the current road-related revenues 
collected by federal and state governments’ (Infrastructure Partnerships 
Australia 2013: 48). However, as noted above in the early parts of the 
report examining whether the current system is broken, the authors note 
that revenues from fuel excise are declining both in absolute terms and as 
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a proportion of GDP; hence, rather than being entirely revenue-neutral, 
road user pricing would increase costs to motorists into the future over 
what they otherwise would be paying if fuel excise remained the principal 
source of revenue. Hence, to the extent that government dependence on 
fuel excise is decreasing as a proportion of total taxation receipts, user 
charging would replace this quantum with a source of revenues that could 
maintain the real magnitude of funding at present levels (or increase 
in the future).
The report acknowledges that such a road user charging scheme 
based on  telematics was planned by The Netherlands Government for 
introduction between 2012 and 2016, but was scrapped in 2010 when 
the sponsoring coalition government (the fourth Christian Democratic 
Appeal government of Jan Peter Balkenende) broke down and subsequently 
lost office at the elections later that year. Legislation authorising the 
Dutch charging regime lapsed when the governing coalition collapsed 
in February 2010 and the eventual new minority government that 
emerged post election, led by the centre-right Prime Minister Mark Rutte 
(People’s  Party for Freedom and Democracy), indicated it would not 
proceed with a per kilometre road charge.
Whereas other reports tend to focus on the merits of adopting a user-
based charging scheme but say little about the specifics of various funding 
models or how they will be implemented, the Deloitte discussion paper 
goes on to outline staged ‘pathways to reform’ and an implementation 
schedule. Implementation is based on incremental steps, beginning 
with the national harmonisation of registration fees and the adoption 
of a  national registration regulator, reducing the fuel excise rate, 
hypothecating revenues from roads, the reform of road funding and 
governance arrangements, implementing user charges for major highways 
and mass distance, adjusting heavy vehicle charges to incorporate their 
impacts on the environment and other road users and introducing 
time-of-day differentiated charging regimes to manage acute congestion 
in peak periods.
A subsequent paper, produced by consultants Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
(PWC) for Infrastructure Australia, entitled Modelling of Potential Policy 
Reforms, has recently argued in relation to transport reform:
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Federal, state and territory governments should commit to the full 
implementation of a heavy vehicle road charging structure in the next five 
years. This reform should include the removal of all existing registration 
and usage charges under the PayGo model and the introduction 
of supporting regulatory and investment frameworks …
Federal, state and territory governments should also commit to the 
full implementation of a light vehicle road charging structure in 
the next ten years. This reform must include the removal of all existing 
inefficient taxes—including fuel excise and registration charges—and 
the development of supporting regulatory and investment frameworks. 
(Infrastructure Australia 2016: iii)
The PayGo system is a bureaucratic system run through the National 
Transport Commission that estimates an arbitrary percentage of costs 
(50 per cent) associated with heavy vehicle usage based on a three-year 
rolling set of estimates (involving some physical monitoring), with 
some urban and regional roads excluded from the calculations. This 
calculated figure is then applied through fixed vehicle registration fees to 
different classes of heavy vehicles. It forces heavy vehicle users to make 
some contribution for wear and tear, but is a very inexact levy, leading 
to calls from rail operators to introduce a more refined ‘mass–distance–
location’ charging scheme. Rail operators are concerned that there is still 
a substantial cross-subsidisation of road haulage at the expense of rail 
freight carriers.
Moving away from the bureaucratic PayGo system, the PWC report 
calculated that the positive impact of the proposed reforms was estimated 
to be a productivity gain of 10 per cent for heavy vehicles from 2021 
and a 15 per cent gain from the light vehicle reforms starting in 2028. 
Elsewhere  in the report, PWC calculated that the net increase in 
GDP would equal $23.8 billion by 2031 and $34.8 billion by 2040 
(Infrastructure Australia 2016: 47). Unlike earlier reform proposals 
that anticipated an ongoing mix of funding arrangements, the PWC 
proposal opted starkly for a direct user charging system to entirely 
replace the existing indiscriminate levies and charges, although it did not 
particularly stress the need for congestion charging in addition to user 
distance charging.
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Immediate problems with the 
reform proposals
The main reform proposals involve not only a major change in the ways 
Australians pay for road transport, but also considerable institutional 
recalibration to make any proposed scheme viable. They also require 
the various governments to work together and honour commitments 
made about the way the system should work, and for the community to 
suspend their collective disbelief and instead trust governments to stand 
by commitments to the sector. As of mid-2017, the Commonwealth 
Government had not made any firm decision on road funding reform, 
although the Minister for Urban Infrastructure, Paul Fletcher, indicated 
in a ministerial statement to Parliament (in December 2015) that the 
government would accelerate work with the states and territories to 
consider options to ‘introduce cost-reflective road pricing for all vehicles’. 
Nevertheless, the author understands that many policy departments of the 
federal government are yet to sign on to the proposed reform agenda—
not least Treasury, Finance, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Social Services 
and Human Services, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Regional 
Development and Northern Australia. Moreover, no state or territory 
government has committed to a user charging system despite most likely 
being the main beneficiaries of such a system, and indeed many have 
explicitly ruled out such a system. Some prominent commentators, such 
as Marion Terrill, have described the reform options as arousing ‘diabolical 
politics’ that will in all likelihood scuttle the prospects of any beneficial 
scheme producing optimal results.
I outline the main sticking points to overcome in any user charging 
reform proposal.
Too many contending schemes?
One of the challenges for government policymakers is that there are 
many different and potentially rival proposals—in scope, ambition 
and application—although most are heading in similar directions to 
increase user charging. This is not an unfamiliar story in other policy 
areas. The  best way to proceed for governments in such circumstances 
is for them to be as clear as possible in their (sometimes competing) 
objectives, identify which options best address those objectives or which 
are politically feasible and then prioritise the reforms (noting that some 
reforms can be complementary) and undertake validation checks before 
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embarking on implementation. Only by being so clear and focused will 
governments stand any chance of gaining interjurisdictional agreement 
and community acceptance of the proposed options.
Some proposed schemes currently on the table are very explicit about 
the link between charging regimes and investment funding arrangements, 
while others leave such topics to future exigencies—leaving administrative 
arrangements ambiguous even though they are concerned to advocate for 
more resources to the network. Some pooling of collected user charge 
funds would create an investment potential but could get mired in the 
Lasswellian politics of ‘who gets what, when and where’. However, those 
interested only in congestion charges to rationalise usage at peak times 
or charge for access to CBD areas tend to focus on preventive measures 
(penalty charges for travelling in peak times) and far less on hypothecated 
reinvestment in road infrastructure. Some reform proposals seek 
a  complete system overhaul over a relatively short period, while others 
recommend trials and pilot programs to test the efficacy of reform models.
The upshot of having these contending models is that governments 
need to commission their various agencies to develop a coherent reform 
agenda based on clearly articulated objectives relating to the efficient 
use of the road network and pricing that delivers the appropriate 
supportive incentives. An incremental approach may be wisest, perhaps 
coordinated through COAG or a multijurisdictional interdepartmental 
committee structure. In the absence of such a multiparty agreement over 
the adoption of a coherent reform agenda, it is unlikely any government 
alone will decide to go ahead, meaning valuable time will be wasted and 
implementation will be stalled.
Shifting to a user pricing regime?
A crucial issue for governments to resolve will be how to justifiably set 
pricing for the provision of a service that is largely a monopoly provision, 
whether provided directly by Australian governments or leased in various 
forms to private toll road operators. Any declared user charging ‘price’ is 
liable to attract the criticism that it is inherently arbitrary, administratively 
determined and compulsorily imposed. Given governments collectively 
run the road system and would be involved in setting the price signals 
(even if an independent economic regulator was established), there are 
twin dangers in overpricing and/or inflexible pricing. Bureaucrats are not 
always responsive to markets. If history is to be believed and bearing in 
mind previous traditions of managing public infrastructure, governments 
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are likely to lay down a specific charging regime and concentrate on 
imposing it, while only occasionally assessing whether it achieves the right 
balance between sociopolitical objectives and market realities.
One proposal put forward by some infrastructure planners is for 
governments to set indicative revenue targets equal not only to all existing 
road-related investment, but also to the strategic priorities ahead. If taken 
to its logical conclusion—and any proposed user charging funding model 
was based on assessed future need—it would imply that road pricing would 
be ‘supply driven’ (geared to the desired investment plans) rather than 
‘demand driven’ by consumers or focused on demand management. This 
would mean that today’s drivers would cross-subsidise future generations 
in their enjoyment of the road network. Given the road system is largely 
a monopolistic public utility, a very real question we need to ask is how 
much we hope or intend to raise looking into the future (see below). 
In  part, this problem could be overcome by the use of borrowings to 
finance the investment plans (as occurs presently with many major road 
and infrastructural projects), with the debt serviced and the principal 
repaid by the users of the day over the effective life of the investment.
In determining a pricing regime, governments also need to establish 
what charges will be included in the pricing model. For instance, are 
governments likely to impose only the direct charges, such as for the 
distance travelled, routes taken, the vehicle size or load carried, or are 
we going to include charges for other impacts (or ‘externalities’), such 
as carbon dioxide emissions, traffic accidents, policing and emergency 
services, traffic management or even noise and air pollution? The Henry 
review suggested such costs be controlled by regulation and linked into 
a system-wide carbon pollution reduction scheme, taken from general 
revenue or even met by better insurance premiums.
Advances in technology can provide some of the answers and deal with 
some of the difficulties. Technologies such as telematics now allow us 
to be sophisticated with vehicle monitoring (route and distance) and 
allow variations in charging regimes, so it is not difficult to envisage that 
different rates of charging can apply for regional Australians driving on 
rural roads where there is no congestion, or discounted rates for non-
metropolitan zones. However, even quiet rural roads cannot be provided 
free to farming or mining communities, despite these constituencies being 
politically well connected and their parliamentary representatives often 
not supporting user charging schemes. Rural roads are generally not built 
as well as urban freeways and need repeated repair work. And, if smaller 
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but significant ‘C class’ roads are exempt (to use the classification system 
used in some states), this may create perverse incentives for heavy vehicles 
carrying freight to use these sealed roads to evade charges. Complicated 
equity considerations will dominate these discussions—with as yet no real 
consensus nationwide as to what is fair, what is appropriate, how much 
concessionary groups should contribute, relative charges for different 
users or for different roads, and so on.
Historically, in imposing fixed vehicle registration fees and other charges, 
some state governments argued that a flat fee was equitable, in that if 
a motorist or consumer chose to drive a particular vehicle they would 
pay the same rate as another. However, states separately set these fixed 
but discretionary fees according to different criteria, creating a veritable 
mishmash of charging regimes and levied matrices. For instance, as of 
2015, according to the various state and territory government websites, 
there was considerable variation in registration prices for an average 
motor vehicle, ranging from $1,120 per annum in the Australian Capital 
Territory to only $608 in Tasmania. New South Wales charged owners 
$904, whereas Victoria charged $787. Furthermore, many states use these 
fixed-charge systems to deliver ‘community service obligations’ and allow 
discounts for pensioners or seniors, carers or the disabled or in some cases 
to fix charges at different rates between city and country drivers.
A single independent charging institution and 
investment planner: Wishing away federalism?
Despite the hopes of some state parliamentary committees, it would be 
very difficult to operate coherent multiple road pricing schemes at the 
subnational level. The main reasons weighing against this option are to 
avoid spillover effects, reduce transaction costs and contain administrative 
costs and leakages, especially between separate charging systems given 
the high degree of interstate mobility. For instance, if one state removed 
entirely its registration fees and adopted a user pricing mechanism, 
but another state did not and retained its registration fees, it would be 
possible to register for free in the first state and yet drive for free in the 
second state.3
3  Admittedly, there is a degree of leakage under the present vehicle registration system, with people 
and firms able to register in the jurisdiction with the cheapest level of fees (for example, hire car 
companies or people with multiple addresses). For instance, many people who live in Canberra seem 
to drive vehicles with cheaper NSW registration plates.
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In recognition of this circumstance, many reform advocates have 
suggested—sensibly perhaps—the establishment of a single national 
institution to lead road charging (often called the ‘single national economic 
regulator’). They recommend that (as a minimum) a national body 
would develop consistent principles (possibly approved by a ministerial 
council) that would apply nationwide, perhaps deliver competitive 
neutrality between different transport sectors (road, rail, shipping) and 
allow a single collection agency to administer the scheme. Such a body 
(were governments to empower it) could perform many other functions, 
such as establishing the rates of charging and set fees, collecting and 
distributing the revenues collected and making infrastructural decisions 
that were aligned with network needs and productivity considerations. 
However, as discussed later in this chapter, it is not necessary for a national 
body that administers the pricing regulation and/or revenue collection to 
be the same one that evaluates and recommends to ministers the priorities 
for road funding.
Two distinct models for a single national economic regulator suggest 
themselves, although neither is without its own political problems of 
implementation. First, the states collectively could agree to ‘go it alone’ 
and set up a coordinated interstate body (a bottom-up initiative) with 
the same set of charging and congestion rates. Their immediate problems 
would be how to implement consistent user charges across Australia and 
how to convince the Commonwealth Government to withdraw from 
excise taxation on fuels (or gain some agreement on a joint partial funding 
model, which would erode the integrity of the user charging scheme). 
A similar bottom-up model is being rolled out by many of the states in 
the area of e-health patient records compiled and accessible by doctors, 
pharmacists and eventually hospitals, and in direct opposition to the 
Commonwealth’s bungled attempted imposition of its flawed national 
MyHealth initiative, which was widely seen as too time-consuming, likely 
to be punitive and not useful for patient care.
Second, a single national economic regulator could be established 
involving the Commonwealth and the states and territories (and even local 
governments as well) to administer the user charging regime. Presumably, 
this mooted national body would be an independent one established 
under intergovernmental agreement. But would the Commonwealth, 
either by decree or by stealth, seek to ‘control’ this body, as some consider 
has happened with other intergovernmental entities, or would the states 
exert their own control of it and, if so, how would divergent state interests 
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be mediated? It would be a challenge to design a governance structure 
for a national economic regulator responsible for user charging, roads 
funding and infrastructure prioritising, or even for each of those functions 
separately. The danger of having a national planning body that was 
dominated by state interests would be that national visions and priorities 
would be surrendered to parochial concerns of the major states, especially 
given the non-standardised or differential election cycles.
Moreover, if a nationally consistent scheme was adopted, what would be 
expected of the Commonwealth? Would the Commonwealth want to 
become more involved in frontline/operational transport management 
in metropolitan or regional areas, and does it have the capabilities and 
local knowledge to do so? There are real question marks over the issue 
of respective capabilities, a history of institutional distrust and zero-sum 
politics, notwithstanding the promotion of the subsidiary principle 
in some quarters.
Who would decide priorities for strategic 
infrastructural investment and priority maintenance?
States might be coaxed to agree with the logic of having a single entity to 
administer the charging and receipt of revenues, but states are unlikely 
to want it to determine infrastructural priorities. They would in all 
likelihood insist on a formulaic share-of-revenue model (similar to many 
existing arrangements under Section 96 funding agreements, but unlike 
the regularly contested goods and services tax (GST), which has funded 
states on an assessment of expenditure need and revenue capacity relative 
to the national average). Such a formulaic sharing model (distributed on a 
per capita basis or some other criteria that could be agreed on) in essence 
would be non-strategic, unresponsive to market demands or behavioural 
changes and lock in funding where it may continue to be inefficient.
Would state and territory governments, in particular, be prepared seriously 
to give up the power to make politically sensitive (and politically driven) 
decisions to commission new roads, prioritise network improvements and 
determine the precedence of road maintenance plans? While there are 
concerns that insufficient funds are directed to road building, spending 
on roads remains an important form of pork-barrelling, especially 
between politicians and the citizenry when there are relatively limited 
opportunities for delivering local largesse. There is much electoral kudos 
at stake and enormous local lobbying about road improvements. It seems 
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unlikely that Australian jurisdictions will hand the power to determine 
road priorities over to an independent body or a national funding body 
or even allow a national body to ‘pick and choose’ from a prepared list of 
intended projects. However, as noted above, the functions of road pricing 
regulation and road investment analysis need not coexist.
Hypothecating the revenues raised, establishing 
locked boxes for infrastructure?
It is doubtful a national road user charging scheme could work optimally 
without some form of hypothecation, whether Australia went straight 
to a hypothecated model or moved towards it in stages. Hypothecated 
funding for the network would be the obverse of the pricing side of the 
equation. Logically, all funds raised from road transport (congestion 
charges or user charges) ought to be ploughed back into improvements to 
the road network and ought to be seen to be ploughed back by fee-paying 
road consumers. There is far better public acceptance of revenue-generating 
regimes that tie the revenues raised back to a definite worthwhile purpose. 
Arguably, roads are better suited to this kind of cost-recovery regime 
involving hypothecation than other areas of public policy—for instance, 
tying hospital expenditure (driven by the health needs of the community) 
to the revenue generated from a national lottery (driven by the propensity 
of some people to gamble).
To date, a number of state governments have used limited hypothecation 
instruments for traffic fine revenue to be tied to road safety programs 
(New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Western 
Australia). For instance, the NSW Government (at the Auditor-General’s 
recommendation) has put a toe into the water of hypothecation by 
establishing the Community Road Safety Fund in 2013, into which all 
traffic fines for speed camera and red-light camera offences are deposited 
(approximately $137 million per annum when the fund was established). 
These hypothecated funds are directed not particularly to investments in 
roads, but to road safety, including the enforcement of road rules by police 
and road safety engineers; and, at the time of its establishment, these fines 
were estimated to cover approximately half of the road safety costs of the 
state government (budgeted at $231 million in 2011–12, while the cost 
of speed-related crashes was more than $1.7 billion annually).
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It must be acknowledged that there is much opposition to hypothecation in 
Australia. Such schemes can be seen as an arbitrary compartmentalisation 
of budgets, which can then put artificial constraints on budgetary 
flexibility and allocative efficiency—and perhaps limit the potential of 
increasing funds to pressing priorities. Under hypothecated conditions, 
infrastructure planners would have, in effect, a locked box to spend on 
projects irrespective of competing priorities within transport funding or 
with societal issues such as health and aged care. Such an approach equally 
attempts to defy political logics, economic cycles and planning sequences. 
A survey of road funding since 1990 conducted by the Parliamentary 
Library (Webb 2000: i) argued against hypothecation by suggesting:
Arguments that more of the revenue raised from motor vehicle 
taxes should  be earmarked (hypothecated) for spending on roads are 
questionable. The level of Commonwealth road funding is determined 
in the overall budget context without reference to the revenue raised 
from particular taxes, and expenditure on roads competes with other 
expenditures. The House of Representatives Standing Committee has 
recommended that the hypothecation provisions in the Australian Land 
Transport Development Act 1988 be removed to end the notion of a link 
between fuel excise revenue and the level of road funding.
This classical attack on hypothecation is premised on the notion that all 
taxation collected from various sources should go to general consolidated 
revenue so that spending plans ‘compete with other expenditures’. This is 
separate from the aforementioned approach of user paying, whereby user 
charges are applied for certain forms of public provision to meet the costs 
of delivering those services to the community. Such user charging models 
are in fact an efficient way of harnessing market forces to ensure demand 
recognises the costs of supply, and that consumers are able to allocate their 
funding to areas of highest value to them.
Complex intergovernmental aspects?
Not surprisingly, road pricing initiatives globally have typically taken 
place in unitary systems (or city-states) where the national government 
has the constitutional power to impose the scheme. Federations are 
more problematic, although Germany has had a heavy vehicle toll on 
federal highways since 2005. Incentives/disincentives for states to join 
a national road pricing scheme have already been mentioned above, but 
other challenging intergovernmental dimensions are likely to affect any 
implementation of a pricing regime. At the local level, where there are 
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minimal opportunities for leakage, states with significant congestion 
problems would be able to vary congestion charges to suit local conditions 
(or, alternatively, to ‘sweat’ infrastructure outside peak-hour commuting 
times). To make a national system work, states may have to either introduce 
common template legislation empowering such a body or refer powers 
to the Commonwealth so that the constitutionality of any proposed 
reform would withstand legal challenge by a disgruntled jurisdiction or 
constituency. Were the states to choose to refer their powers there remains 
legal uncertainty about whether they can ever reclaim those powers.
Likely problems with undertaking tax trade‑offs 
and the abolition of existing charges and fees
To date, most of the modelling on road pricing has come from economic 
theory positing a perfect world of rational action. In practice, it is unlikely 
any level of government will behave altruistically or surrender powers or 
revenue instruments at its disposal. Assumptions that moving to a new 
system based on the introduction of a pricing mechanism dependent on 
actual usage (and one that is able to affect behavioural change) will lead 
to a complete transformation of road funding are not credible. Political 
economy will come to the fore. There is also the assumption that a pure 
pricing model does not need to rely on other existing levies and blunt 
charges to work effectively (and that any retention of fixed levies would 
distort consumer decisions; Henry et al. 2010: 398–9).
Hence, we see assertions bandied around that when the new charging 
regime is introduced the raft of existing levies will be abolished at the 
outset of the transition phase or phased out over a limited period. Many 
of the reformist reports naively make the assumption in their cost–benefit 
calculations that the existing state taxes and levies would be entirely repealed 
as the new system gets under way. In these modelling calculations, the 
fixed charges that states and territories impose on vehicle owners would be 
abolished, as could compulsory third-party insurance rates, which could 
be included in and priced into the direct charging regime. States would 
effectively be asked to give up certain instruments of taxation, leaving 
them with an even narrower tax base, exacerbating vertical fiscal imbalance 
issues and facing the prospect of never getting such taxation instruments 
back again. Surrendering such inefficient and irritant fixed-based taxes in 
exchange for a generic and largely non-discriminatory national system 
would require a huge leap of faith by subnational governments, and only 
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one or two of these jurisdictions need to object or refuse to participate for 
the system to be threatened. It is more likely that states and territories will 
agree to decrease these levied fixed charges but not abolish them entirely.
While it is true that many of the fixed levies imposed by states and territories 
are inefficient and irritating, they can nevertheless be manipulated for 
political gain/social engineering. States can use their own discretion to 
increase registration fees and give concessions to selected constituencies 
for electoral reasons. It is highly unlikely states and territories will entirely 
abolish vehicle registration charges, stamp duties, charges for number 
plates, drivers’ licences, compulsory third-party insurance or even vehicle 
safety checks and roadworthy certificates. This is despite the fact that these 
items could all be incorporated and covered through a national pricing 
mechanism that was geared more towards actual usage.
Similarly, the Commonwealth enjoys the undisputed constitutional power 
to levy and collect fuel excise. It is unlikely to surrender this power or 
abolish the excise duty entirely. Even if a road pricing scheme comes into 
play, technically replacing the need for excise entirely (in that distance 
usage is captured within the pricing), it would be in the Commonwealth’s 
interest to retain some excise charge. More than likely, the Commonwealth 
will redefine the nature of the excise charge so it is able to retain some 
component of the existing levy. For instance, currently, fuel excise is 
taxed to provide a funding source for roads (a partial earmarking or 
hypothecation), but if roads were to be funded directly through revenues 
raised entirely through user charges, the Commonwealth could still insist 
on collecting some fuel excise by redefining the excise tax as a means to 
capture the other negative externalities (such as pollution or depletion 
of a non-renewable resource).
The Henry review of taxation tackled this issue when it argued that 
‘fuel tax and other transport taxes are not an efficient or equitable means 
of financing general government expenditure’ (Henry et al. 2010: 375 
and E3-1). However, the Productivity Commission (2017: 1–2) has argued 
the fuel tax credit enjoyed by off-road mining and farming sectors is:
not considered assistance as the excise tax on fuel is purported to be 
a  mechanism to pay for roads, which are not used by those receiving 
the fuel rebate. Should roads be generally priced, as discussed in the 
Commission’s Public Infrastructure [Productivity Commission 2014], 
the taxation of fuel would change, perhaps towards a recognition of the 
negative externalities of fuel consumption. A diesel fuel rebate under 
those conditions would constitute assistance.
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Hence, by redefining fuel excise in economic terminology, the 
Commonwealth would claim ground to retain some portion of that 
tax even though it is not regarded as appropriate for general taxation 
purposes. Moreover, in addition to the complex interests around paying 
for road use, changes to the existing fuel excise may affect off-road vehicle 
users, bringing powerful mining and farming interests into conflict with 
the aims of the road pricing policy.
A parallel case on which to reflect involves the introduction of the GST 
in 2000. The Commonwealth managed to convince the subnational 
governments in 1999–2000 to abolish a list of inefficient taxes as part of 
the adoption of the broad-based GST, arguing that the replacement funds 
generated by the GST would then be transferred to these jurisdictions. 
Seventeen years later, however, many of these irritant state taxes are still 
in place. States dragged the chain or simply refused to repeal these duties 
and fixed taxes. This example suggests the states and territories would 
be reluctant to vacate the road vehicle/driver registration processes if 
a national universal charging regime were imposed. Most observers would 
conclude from history that they would be inclined to retain some or all 
of these charges, although perhaps levied at a reduced rate.
Sceptics could be forgiven for concluding that, aside from some potentially 
better management of our road transport network, one of the principal 
objectives of road pricing reform is to seek an increase in funding going 
to roads while pretending that motorists will not pay more. Retaining the 
existing array of state-based levies while introducing a full-cost user-based 
pricing mechanism would constitute a sleight of hand. The Productivity 
Commission (2014: 151) mentioned this when it talked of the ‘widespread 
fear among motorists that they would be worse off’.
Transitional arrangements?
Another problematic issue to consider is the transitional arrangements 
necessary to move from the existing overly complex and multi-actor 
system of road charging to one of universal road user charging. Ideally, 
any pricing scheme should be phased in over time, but this will weaken 
the impact of the price signals and expected behavioural responses. Would 
states and territories move as one and dismantle their various fixed fee 
structures according to an agreed uniform schedule? If not, various users 
in those jurisdictions that attempt to hold on to former levies will face 
a ‘double whammy’ until the rates eventually fall.
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There are other transitional complications such as what to do with the 
existing toll road and tunnel facilities, many of which are governed by 
long-term operational contracts as part of public–private partnerships 
(PPP) arrangements. Toll prices are likely to remain far higher than 
a  comparable systemic user charge for road usage mainly because toll 
charges are set to cover the investment costs amortised over a certain 
period, not principally to manage demand and cover usage. Moreover, 
toll prices tend to be standardised according to the class of vehicle, not 
variable subject to congestion levels (although in theory they could 
be made more volume sensitive). Can toll operations be included in 
a seamless pricing regime, while still identifying the necessary payments 
and forwarding these to the operators? Alternatively, can toll roads fall 
back into the system of public provision and be priced according to usage 
and congestion, and presumably with the operators given compensation 
for their loss of business?
Future issues?
A central question for pricing advocates to answer is whether pricing will 
replace the existing quantum of funds that currently flows through the 
system (conforming to principles of ‘budget neutrality’) or provide sufficient 
funds to cover the entire costs of running the road system (to eliminate 
any cross-subsidisation from general revenue)? Or,  alternatively, are we 
hoping to raise increased funds to invest in system upgrades and enhanced 
infrastructure into the future? These matters need to be addressed in the 
process of setting clear objectives and preferred options.
An interesting conundrum to contemplate is that Australia, like many 
other  parts of the world, may not remain wedded to individual car 
transportation into the future. Car usage may decline, especially if 
investments in rapid public transport accelerate and cities consolidate 
their population density rather than continue the previous pattern 
of urban sprawl. Working from home or from centres closer to one’s 
residence may reduce the necessity for employees and others to commute. 
The increasing availability of online services and information accessibility 
will lessen the need to travel to one specific place to receive such benefits. 
Road network planners will have to consider what to do if usage begins 
to drop dramatically (and already we have evidence that today’s motorists 
are driving less than before, making fewer trips and consuming less 
petrol than previously). Even a small user charge in monetary terms may 
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encourage motorists to combine trips (opting for fewer, multipurpose 
trips) and discourage them from making optional or non-imperative trips. 
Under such circumstances, how would a national economic regulator of 
roads respond? Would an efficient road charging regime see prices increase 
if usage declined, to make up for the shortfall in required estimated 
revenues, or would prices decrease, reflecting less wear and tear and less 
demand for road transport? And, if prices were to rise to cover revenue 
shortfalls, would this further discourage motorists, thus exacerbating the 
problems? Moreover, if higher volumes of heavy freight were transferred 
from roads to rail under a policy of competitive neutrality, how would the 
prices charged for heavy vehicle usage respond?
While moving to a cost-recovery system responding to market signals and 
demand may make much sense in public policy terms, there remain many 
areas of unpredictability and future unknowables. Adopting such market 
mechanisms may enable more flexible management of the transport 
network into the future, but markets are themselves imperfect and can 
also have perverse logics and consequences. These issues will have to be 
sensitively managed with much analytical foresight and astute judgement. 
There is already some recognition of this dilemma in the published 
reports reviewed in this chapter, with many calling for root and branch 
reviews and systemic evaluations to be conducted on a regular basis. Road 
transport reform remains a pressing imperative for governments at all levels 
of Australian politics and of all political persuasions. Currently, there are 
many options for market reform already on the table, but not all have met 
with rapturous applause or been embraced by the various jurisdictions 
around Australia. In all likelihood, the magnitude of change in road 
transport that will occur in the future will be truly transformational and 
will revolutionise the present broken system for all time; the challenges 
ahead are formidable and the politics may well be ‘diabolical’, but we 
cannot afford to not ‘get it right’ as we go forward.
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